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OPINION OF  THE  COURT 
________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, announced the judgments of the 
Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with 
respect to Parts I and II, an opinion with respect to Parts III.A, 
III.B, III.C.1, III.C.2, and III.C.3.a, in which FUENTES, 
SMITH, GREENAWAY, Jr., VANASKIE, KRAUSE, and 
ROTH, Circuit Judges, joined, and an opinion with respect to 
Parts III.C.3.b, III.D, and IV, in which SMITH and 
GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges, joined. FUENTES, 
Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting 
in part, and dissenting from the judgments, in which McKEE, 
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Chief Judge, VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, 
RESTREPO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges, joined. 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgments, in which FISHER, 
CHAGARES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, 
joined.  
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 Federal law generally prohibits the possession of 
firearms by any person convicted in any court of a “crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Excluded from the prohibition is “any 
State offense classified by the laws of the State as a 
misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of 
two years or less.” Id. § 921(a)(20)(B). And there is also an 
exemption for “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or 
set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had 
civil rights restored,” where the grant of relief does not 
expressly preserve the firearms bar. Id. § 921(a)(20).  
 In United States v. Marzzarella we adopted a 
framework for deciding facial and as-applied Second 
Amendment challenges. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). Then in 
United States v. Barton we held that the prohibition of 
§ 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on its 
face, but we stated that it remains subject to as-applied 
constitutional challenges. 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).  
 Before us are two such challenges. In deciding them, 
we determine how a criminal law offender may rebut the 
presumption that he lacks Second Amendment rights. In 
particular, a majority of the Court concludes that Marzzarella, 
whose two-step test we reaffirm today, drives the analysis.1 
                                              
 1 Parts III.A–C.3.a preserve the Marzzarella 
framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges and 
overrule aspects of Barton that are inconsistent with it. Seven 
Judges join those Parts expressly. Chief Judge McKee and 
Judges Shwartz and Restrepo, who join Judge Fuentes’s 
opinion, agree that Marzzarella controls the Second 
Amendment analysis, but do not join any of Part III because 
they reject the notion that the Marzzarella framework can be 
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Meanwhile, a separate majority holds that the two as-applied 
challenges before us succeed. Part IV of this opinion sets out 
how, for purposes of future cases, to make sense of our 
fractured vote.  
I.  Background 
 In 1996 Daniel Binderup began a consensual sexual 
relationship with a 17-year-old female employee at his 
bakery. Binderup was 41 years old at the time and was aware 
that his employee was a minor, though she was over the legal 
age of consent in Pennsylvania (16). Two years later, 
Binderup pled guilty in a Pennsylvania state court to 
corrupting a minor, a misdemeanor subject to possible 
imprisonment for up to five years. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 6301(a)(1)(i), 1104. Despite this, Binderup’s sentence was 
the colloquial slap on the wrist: probation (three years) and a 
$300 fine plus court costs and restitution. His criminal record 
shows no subsequent offenses.  
 In 1990 police stopped Julio Suarez on suspicion of 
driving while intoxicated. During the stop, police noticed that 
Suarez was carrying a .357 Magnum handgun, as well as two 
“speed loaders” (devices that allow one to load all chambers 
of a revolver mechanically rather than inserting bullets one-
by-one). He had no permit for the gun. He later pled guilty in 
a Maryland state court to unlawfully carrying a handgun 
without a license, a misdemeanor subject to possible 
imprisonment for “not less than 30 days and not [more than] 
three years or a fine of not less than $250 and not [more than] 
$2,500 or both.” Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 36B(b) (1990) 
(now codified at Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 4-203). Suarez 
                                                                                                     
reconciled with any aspect of Barton’s as-applied Second 
Amendment analysis, which they would overrule entirely.  
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nonetheless received a suspended sentence of 180 days’ 
imprisonment and a $500 fine, followed by a year of 
probation that he completed successfully. Eight years later, he 
was convicted again in a Maryland state court, this time for 
the state-law misdemeanor of driving under the influence of 
alcohol. Only the first of the convictions was subject to 
§ 922(g)(1). Suarez now lives in Pennsylvania and since 1998 
has led a life free of run-ins with the law. He holds a “Secret” 
federal government security clearance in connection with his 
job as a consultant for a government contractor.   
 Pennsylvania law disqualified Binderup and Suarez 
(collectively, the “Challengers”) from possessing firearms 
due to their convictions, but in 2009 they successfully 
petitioned the Pennsylvania courts to remove that prohibition. 
Federal law, however, continues to bar them from possessing 
firearms because their convictions have not been expunged or 
set aside, they have not been pardoned, and their civil rights 
have not been restored. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); Logan v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 23, 37 (2007). Nor has the Attorney 
General granted them relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which 
allows her to remove the prohibition on a case-by-case basis 
“if it is established to [her] satisfaction” that a barred 
individual “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to 
public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be 
contrary to the public interest.”  
 Binderup and Suarez want to obtain guns to defend 
themselves and their families within their homes, but they 
have not attempted to do so for fear of violating § 922(g)(1). 
As a result, each filed a complaint in federal District Court 
(Binderup in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Suarez in 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania) seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief. They claim as a matter of statutory 
construction that § 922(g)(1) does not apply to their 
convictions and, if it does, the statute is unconstitutional as 
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applied. The Government opposed the lawsuits, and the 
parties in both cases filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment.  
 The District Courts rejected the Challengers’ statutory 
argument but held that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as 
applied. The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania ruled that § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional as applied to Binderup because he 
“distinguishe[d] himself from those individuals traditionally 
disarmed as the result of prior criminal conduct and 
demonstrate[d] that he poses no greater threat of future 
violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding 
citizen.” Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-cv-6750, 2014 WL 
4764424, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014). The Court did not 
analyze the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under any form of 
means-ends scrutiny, meaning it did not evaluate the law to 
assess whether its purpose—the end sought—matches 
appropriately the means chosen to achieve it. Id. at *20–21. 
Depending on the importance of the rights involved and the 
nature of the burden on them, a law’s purpose may need to be 
only legitimate and the means to achieve it rational (called 
rational basis scrutiny); the purpose may need to be important 
and the means to achieve it substantially related (called 
intermediate scrutiny); or the purpose may need to be 
compelling and the means to achieve it narrowly tailored, that 
is, the least restrictive (called strict scrutiny). The latter two 
tests we refer to collectively as heightened scrutiny to 
distinguish them from the easily met rational basis test. 
 The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania applied “a two[-]prong test for 
Second Amendment challenges” derived from our case law. 
Suarez v. Holder, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 1:14-CV-968, 2015 
WL 685889, at *6–7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2015). It found first 
that Suarez has Second Amendment rights notwithstanding 
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his 1990 conviction because he demonstrated that “he is no 
more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.” Id. at 
*10. Then the Court applied means-ends scrutiny (in that 
case, strict scrutiny) and determined that § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional as applied to him due to the severity of the 
burden it imposes. Id. at *7 & n.9.  
 The Government appealed the summary judgments, 
and the Challengers’ cross-appealed the District Courts’ 
interpretations of the dispossession statute. The District 
Courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1346, 
2201, and 2202. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
 Separate panels heard the appeals, and the Court sua 
sponte consolidated them for rehearing en banc. Our review 
is plenary. InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P., 340 F.3d 144, 
158 (3d Cir. 2003). 
II.  The Challengers’ Statutory Argument 
Section 922(g)(1), as noted, does not cover state 
misdemeanors “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two 
years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). The Challengers 
argue that the exception includes any state misdemeanor that, 
like theirs, could have been punished by less than two years’ 
imprisonment.  
We disagree. The exception in § 921(a)(20)(B) covers 
any crime that cannot be punished by more than two years’ 
imprisonment. It does not cover any crime that can be 
punished by more than two years in prison. In other words, 
§ 921(a)(20)(B)’s use of “punishable by” means “subject to a 
maximum penalty of.” Although we have never explicitly 
defined it this way, we have at least twice relied on that 
understanding in interpreting the relationship between 
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§ 921(a)(20)(B) and § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Essig, 
10 F.3d 968, 969–71 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on an 
understanding of “punishable” that refers to whether the 
maximum potential sentence for a state misdemeanor exceeds 
two years, not whether a lesser sentence might be imposed); 
United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 69–70 (3d Cir. 
1989) (explaining that a “misdemeanor punishable [by] up to 
seven years in prison” was “not a misdemeanor subject to a 
sentence of two years or less”). The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in 
Schrader v. Holder supports our decision, as it distinguishes 
crimes carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of more 
than two years from those “punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or less” under § 921(a)(20)(B). 
704 F.3d 980, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And the Supreme Court 
drew a similar distinction in Logan. See 552 U.S. at 34 
(“[Section] 921(a)(20)(B) . . . places within [§ 922(g)(1)’s] 
reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than 
two years’ imprisonment.” (emphasis added)). Although this 
language is a dictum, “we should not idly ignore” its inclusion 
in the Supreme Court’s thorough discussion of 
§ 921(a)(20)(B). In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
 Even if we were writing on a blank slate, we would 
reject the Challengers’ interpretation. When considering a 
crime’s potential punishment, we ordinarily refer only to the 
maximum punishment a court may impose. As the District 
Court in Suarez perceptively observed, when a crime has 
maximum and minimum possible punishments, we describe it 
as being “punishable” by that specific range; and when a 
crime references only a maximum punishment, “we ordinarily 
identify only the upper boundary” of that range, as “[a]ll 
lower possible terms of imprisonment are included by 
implication.” 2015 WL 685889, at *3. That is why we would 
not describe a crime carrying a specified term of 
imprisonment of up to three years as one “punishable by a 
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term of imprisonment of two years or less.” By contrast, a 
misdemeanor carrying a ceiling of 18 months’ imprisonment 
would properly be described in the criminal law context as a 
crime “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or 
less” and on its face would not trigger the bar on gun 
possession. Accordingly, “subject to a maximum possible 
penalty of” is the best reading of the phrase “punishable by” 
as used in § 921(a)(20)(B).  
 Our interpretation also makes sense in light of similar 
language in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. They 
provide three distinct grades of probation and supervised 
release violations—Grades A, B, and C—with Grade A 
violations treated most severely and Grade C least severely. 
See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a). The Challengers’ 
interpretation of the phrase “punishable by” would erode 
those distinctions. Since Grade C applies only to offenses 
“punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less,” 
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3), the Challengers’ interpretation would 
render offenses punishable by more than a year (Grade B), as 
well as even more serious offenses described as Grade A, 
eligible for Grade C treatment. This would be an absurd 
result. 
 In a last-ditch effort, the Challengers argue that 
§ 921(a)(20)(B)’s use of “punishable” merits application of 
the rule of lenity (that ambiguous criminal laws be construed 
in favor of defendants) or the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine (that ambiguous statutory language be construed to 
avoid serious constitutional doubts). Both of these principles 
require ambiguity in the statute. See Voisine v. United States, 
579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2282 n.6 (2016). As there isn’t 
any here, they give no plausible defense.  
 In sum, the Challengers’ argument that their 
convictions fall within § 921(a)(20)(B)’s exception to 
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§ 922(g)(1) has no traction. Their misdemeanor convictions 
were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. 
Hence they cannot seek refuge in § 921(a)(20)(B) and are 
subject to the bar of § 922(g)(1). 
III.  The Challengers’ Constitutional Argument 
 A.  The Second Amendment 
The Challengers contend that, notwithstanding how we 
rule on their statutory argument, § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional as applied to them. The Second Amendment 
states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the 
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In 
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court invalidated 
a law that “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home” 
and “require[d] that any lawful firearm in the home be 
disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, 
rendering it inoperable.” 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). In so 
doing, the Court held the Second Amendment protects an 
individual’s right to possess a firearm “unconnected with 
militia service.” Id. at 582. At the “core” of the Second 
Amendment is the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens 
to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 634–35; 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 170–71; Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
Two years after Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the 
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates the 
Second Amendment right recognized in Heller” because the 
right is “fundamental” to “our system of ordered liberty.” 561 
U.S. 742, 778, 791 (2010).  
 Although the Second Amendment guarantees an 
individual right, it is “not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; 
see United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 
(10th Cir. 2012); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to 
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Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 
1443 (2009).2 Heller catalogued a non-exhaustive list of 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that have 
historically constrained the scope of the right. 554 U.S. at 
626–27 & n.26; see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 (treating the 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures” listed in Heller 
as “exceptions to the right to bear arms”). They include, but 
are not limited to, “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, [] laws 
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as 
schools and government buildings, [and] laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of 
arms.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; see McDonald, 561 U.S. 
at 786. These measures comport with the Second Amendment 
                                              
 2 Professor Volokh’s taxonomy of possible gun 
regulations divides them into  
 
[(1)]“what” restrictions (such as bans on machine 
guns, so-called “assault weapons,” or unpersonalized 
handguns), [(2)] “who” restrictions (such as bans on 
possession by felons, misdemeanants, noncitizens, or 
[juveniles]), [(3)] “where” restrictions (such as bans on 
carrying in public, in places that serve alcohol, or in 
parks, or bans on possessing [guns] in public housing 
projects), [(4)] “how” restrictions (such as storage 
regulations), [(5)] “when” restrictions (such as waiting 
periods), [(6)] “who knows” regulations (such as 
licensing or registration requirements), and [(7)] taxes 
and other expenses. 
 
Volokh, 56 UCLA L. Rev. at 1443.  
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because they affect individuals or conduct unprotected by the 
right to keep and bear arms. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 631, 635 
(suggesting that one is “disqualified from the exercise of 
Second Amendment rights” if he is “a felon” or “insane”). 
For example, bans on “weapons not typically possessed by 
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-
barreled shotguns,” are permissible because those weapons 
fall outside the historical “scope of the right.” Id. at 625; see 
United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 
Machinegun Receiver/Frame, Unknown Caliber Serial No. 
LW001804, 822 F.3d 136, 141–44 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91–93.  
As to cases involving burdens on Second Amendment 
rights, Heller did not announce which level of scrutiny 
applies but cautioned that challenges based on those rights are 
not beaten back by the Government supplying a rational basis 
for limiting them. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was 
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a 
rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant 
with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational 
laws, and would have no effect.”). 
 Some judges—including Judge Hardiman and those 
colleagues who join his opinion concurring in the 
judgments—and commentators have interpreted Heller to 
mean that any law barring persons with Second Amendment 
rights from possessing lawful firearms in the home even for 
self-defense is per se unconstitutional; that is, no scrutiny is 
needed. See Hardiman Op. Typescript at 13–19; Heller v. 
District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272–73 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Volokh, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 
at 1462; Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in 
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
375, 377, 380 (2009); see also United States v. McCane, 573 
F.3d 1037, 1047–50 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
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concurring). But neither the Supreme Court nor any court of 
appeals has held that laws burdening Second Amendment 
rights evade constitutional scrutiny. Rather, when faced with 
an as-applied Second Amendment challenge, they agree that 
some form of heightened scrutiny is appropriate after it has 
been determined that the law in question burdens protected 
conduct. See, e.g., Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97–101 (applying 
intermediate scrutiny and, in the alternative, strict scrutiny to 
§ 922(k)’s prohibition on possession of any firearm with a 
destroyed serial number); United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 
685, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny 
to § 922(g)(1)); United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 
1141–42 (9th Cir. 2013) (same with respect to § 922(g)(9)’s 
disarmament of a domestic-violence misdemeanant); United 
States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(same); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 802–05 (10th 
Cir. 2010) (same with respect to § 922(g)(8)’s dispossession 
of certain persons subject to a domestic restraining order); 
Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308, 326–29 
(6th Cir. 2014) (applying strict scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)’s 
dispossession of any person “who has been committed to a 
mental institution”), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
(Apr. 21, 2015). 
 That individuals with Second Amendment rights may 
nonetheless be denied possession of a firearm is hardly 
illogical. It is no different than saying that the Government 
may prevent an individual with First Amendment rights from 
engaging in First Amendment conduct—even conduct at the 
core of the First Amendment—if it makes the showing 
necessary to surmount heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 464–65 (2007) (applying 
strict scrutiny to a statute prohibiting political speech at the 
core of the First Amendment); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 102–03 (1947) (upholding the 
constitutionality of prohibitions on certain political activities 
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by federal employees notwithstanding the First Amendment). 
Thus burdens on Second Amendment rights are subject to 
scrutiny in much the way that burdens on First Amendment 
rights are. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434–36 (3d Cir. 
2013); see NRA Amicus Br. at 13–15 (asserting that burdens 
on core Second Amendment rights should be subject to strict 
scrutiny). Far from subjecting the Second Amendment to an 
“entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights 
guarantees,” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion), 
this view uses “the structure of First Amendment doctrine [to] 
inform our analysis of the Second Amendment,” Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 89 n.4; see id. (“Heller itself repeatedly invokes 
the First Amendment in establishing principles governing the 
Second Amendment.”).  
 Even if a law that “completely eviscerates the Second 
Amendment right” would be per se unconstitutional under 
Heller, Hardiman Op. Typescript at 18, § 922(g)(1) is no such 
law. Notwithstanding that provision (and as already noted), 
persons convicted of disqualifying offenses may under some 
circumstances possess handguns if (1) their convictions are 
expunged or set aside, (2) they receive pardons, or (3) they 
have their civil rights restored. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). And 
were Congress to fund 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), they could ask the 
Attorney General to lift the ban in their particular cases. 
Though some of these statutory avenues for relief are closed 
to Binderup and Suarez, see infra Part III.D, the remaining 
opportunities for them to overcome the ban contrast starkly 
with the District of Columbia law in Heller that made it a 
crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited entirely 
the registration of handguns by individuals; there was nothing 
Mr. Heller could do to possess a handgun lawfully while 
outside his job as a District of Columbia special police officer 
guarding the Federal Judicial Center (in other words, he 
guarded judges). See 554 U.S. at 574 (citing D.C. Code §§ 7-
2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)); Parker 
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v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 
2007); cf. United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (noting that disarmament under § 922(g)(9) is 
ordinarily not “perpetual” because of exceptions similar to 
those under § 922(g)(1)); Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138 (same). 
 To say that § 922(g)(1) is per se unconstitutional as 
applied to anyone with Second Amendment rights 
notwithstanding the statute’s escape hatches is a bridge too 
far. For starters, that would condemn without exception all 
laws and regulations containing preconditions for the 
possession of firearms by individuals with Second 
Amendment rights. By that reasoning, any law prohibiting an 
individual from possessing a handgun unless he passes a 
physical examination (to show he is capable of handling a 
firearm safely) or completes firearm training (to show he 
knows how to handle a firearm safely) would similarly be per 
se unconstitutional, even if it is the least restrictive means of 
achieving a compelling government interest. There is no 
precedent for crippling the Government’s ability to regulate 
gun ownership in this manner. And to guarantee absolutely 
the ability to keep and bear arms even in cases where 
disarmament would survive heightened scrutiny would be a 
radical departure from our post-Heller jurisprudence and risk 
undermining many commonplace constitutional gun 
regulations.  
B.  The Framework for As-Applied Second 
Amendment Challenges 
Unlike a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge 
“does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but 
that its application to a particular person under particular 
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.” 
United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(quoting United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d 
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Cir. 2010)); see Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“It is axiomatic that a 
statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet 
valid as applied to another.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). Accordingly, our review of Binderup’s and 
Suarez’s as-applied challenges requires us to consider 
whether their particular circumstances remove them from the 
constitutional sweep of § 922(g)(1). 
Two of our precedents—Marzzarella and Barton—
have guided how we approach as-applied Second Amendment 
challenges. The former involved an as-applied challenge to 18 
U.S.C. § 922(k), which bars the possession of any firearm 
with an obliterated serial number. It derived from Heller a 
“two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges” to 
firearm restrictions. 614 F.3d at 89. We first consider 
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct 
falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee.” Id. If not, the challenged law must stand. But if 
the law burdens protected conduct, the proper course is to 
“evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny,” 
id., that form in Marzzarella being intermediate scrutiny, id. 
at 97. “If the law passes muster under [the] standard 
[applied], it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.” Id. at 89. 
As to § 922(k), we held that the law withstood intermediate 
scrutiny “even if it burden[ed] protected conduct” by fitting 
reasonably with the important “law enforcement interest in 
enabling the tracing of weapons via their serial numbers.” Id. 
at 95, 98. (We also noted in a dictum that the law would 
survive strict scrutiny, were that the test, because the 
provision serves a compelling interest through the least-
restrictive means. Id. at 99–101.)  
Nearly every court of appeals has cited Marzzarella 
favorably. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 n.49 (2d Cir. 2015); Chovan, 735 
20 
 
F.3d at 1136–37; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 
194–96 (5th Cir. 2012); GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia, 
687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller, 670 F.3d 
at 1252–53; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 
(7th Cir. 2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680–83; Reese, 627 F.3d 
at 800–05. Indeed, it has escaped disparagement by any 
circuit court. 
 A year after Marzzarella we decided Barton, which 
involved a felon convicted under the provision now before 
us—§ 922(g)(1). Barton raised facial and as-applied Second 
Amendment challenges to the firearm ban. After dispensing 
with his facial challenge and confirming the availability of as-
applied challenges under the Second Amendment, we ruled 
that “the common law right to keep and bear arms did not 
extend to those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” 
633 F.3d at 173. Because Barton’s prior convictions for 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and for receipt 
of a stolen firearm (as well as his illegal post-conviction sale 
of a firearm with an obliterated serial number) were “closely 
related to violent crime,” we concluded that he lacked Second 
Amendment rights. Id. at 174. Put another way, Barton did 
not present “facts about himself and his background that 
distinguish[ed] his circumstances from those of persons 
historically barred from Second Amendment protections,” id., 
so he was “disqualified from the exercise of Second 
Amendment rights,” id. at 174 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 
635), and his as-applied challenge could not succeed.  
 Read together, Marzzarella and Barton lay out a 
framework for deciding as-applied challenges to gun 
regulations. At step one of the Marzzarella decision tree, a 
challenger must prove, per Barton, that a presumptively 
lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment rights. This 
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requires a challenger to clear two hurdles: he must (1) 
identify the traditional justifications for excluding from 
Second Amendment protections the class of which he appears 
to be a member, id. at 173, and then (2) present facts about 
himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances 
from those of persons in the historically barred class, id. at 
174.  
 No doubt a challenger cannot prevail merely on his 
say-so. Courts must find the facts to determine whether he has 
adequately distinguished his circumstances from those of 
persons historically excluded from Second Amendment 
protections. Not only is the burden on the challenger to rebut 
the presumptive lawfulness of the exclusion at Marzzarella’s 
step one, but the challenger’s showing must also be strong. 
That’s no small task. And in cases where a statute by its terms 
only burdens matters (e.g., individuals, conduct, or weapons) 
outside the scope of the right to arms, it is an impossible one. 
But if the challenger succeeds at step one, the burden shifts to 
the Government to demonstrate that the regulation satisfies 
some form of heightened scrutiny, discussed further below, at 
step two of the Marzzarella analysis.  
 The Challengers, the District Court in Binderup, and 
some of our colleagues claim that Marzzarella and Barton set 
standards for different types of as-applied Second 
Amendment challenges and that only Barton controls 
challenges to § 922(g)(1); Marzzarella has no role in the 
analysis. Our view is that, at least in pertinent part, each 
complements the other for an as-applied Second Amendment 
challenge to a presumptively lawful regulatory measure like 
§ 922(g)(1). Barton identifies the two hurdles that an 
individual presumed to lack Second Amendment rights must 
overcome to rebut the presumption at step one of the 
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Marzzarella framework.3 Rebutting it permits testing the law 
or regulation under heightened scrutiny at step two. With this 
understanding, Marzzarella and Barton are neither wholly 
distinct nor incompatible.  
 C.  Step One of the Marzzarella Framework 
1.  The Challengers Presumptively Lack Second 
Amendment Rights 
 Heller teaches that “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.” 
554 U.S. at 626 & 627 n.26. Traditionally, “felons” are 
people who have been convicted of any crime “that is 
punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one 
year.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.6 
(2d ed. 2015); cf. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 
563, 567 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)).  
Section 922(g)(1) bars the possession of firearms by 
anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
a term exceeding one year.” This means that its prohibition 
extends to anyone convicted of a crime meeting the 
                                              
 3 Though Barton clarifies the types of showings that a 
challenger must make at step one of the Marzzarella 
framework, it defines too narrowly the traditional justification 
for why a criminal conviction may destroy the right to arms 
(i.e., it limits felon disarmament to only those criminals likely 
to commit a violent crime in the future) and, by extension, 
defines too broadly the class of offenders who may bring 
successful as-applied Second Amendment challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1) (i.e., it allows people convicted of serious crimes 
to regain their right to arms). See infra Parts III.C.1–3.a. 
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traditional definition of a felony, though Congress excluded 
anyone convicted of a “State offense classified by the laws of 
the State as a misdemeanor” unless it is punishable by more 
than two years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).  
 Binderup and Suarez were each convicted of a 
misdemeanor subject to § 922(g)(1): Binderup’s was 
punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment; Suarez’s by up 
to three years in prison. The Pennsylvania and Maryland 
legislatures classify their respective offenses as 
misdemeanors. However, based on their maximum possible 
punishments, they meet the traditional definition of a felony, 
and Congress treats them as felonies for purposes of 
§ 922(g)(1). As a result, Binderup and Suarez are subject to a 
firearm ban that is, per Heller, “presumptively lawful.”  
2.  The Traditional Justification for Denying 
Felons the Right to Arms 
 Turning to the first hurdle of step one, we look to the 
historical justification for stripping felons, including those 
convicted of offenses meeting the traditional definition of a 
felony, of their Second Amendment rights. “[M]ost scholars 
of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms 
was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, 
accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous 
citizens.’” United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 684–85 
(7th Cir. 2010); see, e.g., Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A 
Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun 
Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491–92 (2004); Saul 
Cornell, “Don’t Know Much about History”: The Current 
Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L Rev. 
657, 679 (2002); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: 
Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 Mich. L. 
Rev. 588, 626–27 (2000); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical 
Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 
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(1995); Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A 
Dialogue, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1986, at 143, 146; 
Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 
266 (1983). Several of our sister circuits endorse the 
“virtuous citizen” justification for excluding felons and felon-
equivalents from the Second Amendment’s ambit. See, e.g., 
United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979–80 (4th Cir. 
2012) (“[F]elons were excluded from the right to arms 
because they were deemed unvirtuous.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); Yancey, 621 F.3d at 684–85; United States 
v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right 
to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming . . . unvirtuous 
citizens (i.e., criminals).” (quoting Kates, Jr., 49 Law & 
Contemp Probs. at 146)); United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 
8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In the parlance of the republican 
politics of the time, these limitations were sometimes 
expressed as efforts to disarm the ‘unvirtuous.’”).  
 People who have committed or are likely to commit 
“violent offenses”—crimes “in which violence (actual or 
attempted) is an element of the offense,” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 
642; see Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280—undoubtedly qualify as 
“unvirtuous citizens” who lack Second Amendment rights. 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 173–74; see United States v. Bena, 664 
F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “a common-law 
tradition that the right to bear arms is limited to peaceable or 
virtuous citizens”); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha 
Stewart Have A Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 727–
28 (2009). But Heller recognized “longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons,” not just violent 
felons. 554 U.S. at 626. The category of “unvirtuous citizens” 
is thus broader than violent criminals; it covers any person 
who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent or non-
violent. See Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640–41; United States v. 
Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004); Don B. Kates & 
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Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations & 
Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1363–
64 (2009); see also Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1115 (“[F]elons are 
categorically different from the individuals who have a 
fundamental right to bear arms.”). To the extent Barton 
suggests that people who commit serious crimes retain or 
regain their Second Amendment rights if they are not likely to 
commit a violent crime, 633 F.3d at 174, it is overruled. See 
infra Part III.C.3.a. 
 The view that anyone who commits a serious crime 
loses the right to keep and bear arms dates back to our 
founding era. “Heller identified . . . as a ‘highly influential’ 
‘precursor’ to the Second Amendment the Address and 
Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the 
State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents.” Skoien, 614 
F.3d at 640 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 604). That report 
“asserted that citizens have a personal right to bear arms 
‘unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public 
injury.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, 
The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History 662, 665 (1971)). 
“[C]rimes committed”—violent or not—were thus an 
independent ground for exclusion from the right to keep and 
bear arms. And there is reason to believe that felon 
disarmament has roots that are even more ancient. See Kates, 
Jr., 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 266 (“Felons simply did not fall 
within the benefits of the common law right to possess 
arms.”). 
 The takeaway: persons who have committed serious 
crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms much the way they 
“forfeit other civil liberties, including fundamental 
constitutional rights.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 175.  
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  3.  The Challengers’ Circumstances  
a.  Distinguishing the Historically Barred 
Class 
Having identified the traditional justification for 
denying some criminal offenders the right to arms—that they 
are “unvirtuous” because they committed serious crimes—we 
turn to how other criminal offenders may distinguish their 
circumstances from those of people who historically lacked 
the right to keep and bear arms. Barton suggests two ways to 
satisfy this second hurdle of step one: the first is that a 
challenger may show that he never lost his Second 
Amendment rights because he was not convicted of a serious 
crime; the second is that a challenger who once lost his 
Second Amendment rights by committing a serious crime 
may regain them if his “crime of conviction is decades-old” 
and a court finds that he “poses no continuing threat to 
society.” 633 F.3d at 174.  
We agree with Barton only insofar as it stands for the 
unremarkable proposition that a person who did not commit a 
serious crime retains his Second Amendment rights. Setting 
aside what makes a crime “serious” in the Second 
Amendment context and whether § 922(g)(1) covers any non-
serious crimes—issues we address in Part III.C.3.b and on 
which there is disagreement, see Fuentes Op. Typescript at 
19–20—being convicted of a non-serious crime does not 
demonstrate a lack of “virtue” that disqualifies an offender 
from exercising those rights.  
But our agreement with Barton ends there. We reject 
its claim that the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation 
will restore the Second Amendment rights of people who 
committed serious crimes. That view stems from Barton’s 
misplaced focus at Marzzarella’s step one on the probability 
27 
 
of violent recidivism and is inconsistent with the true 
justification for the disarmament of people who commit 
serious crimes: they are “unvirtuous.” See supra Part III.C.2. 
A challenger’s risk of violent recidivism tells us nothing 
about whether he was convicted of a serious crime, and the 
seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying offense is our 
sole focus throughout Marzzarella’s first step. 
There is no historical support for the view that the 
passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation can restore 
Second Amendment rights that were forfeited. To the extent 
Congress affords such a remedy in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) or 
18 U.S.C. § 925(c), that is a matter of legislative grace; the 
Second Amendment does not require that those who commit 
serious crimes be given an opportunity to regain their right to 
keep and bear arms in that fashion. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court and our Court have recognized in the Second 
Amendment context that the Judicial Branch is not 
“institutionally equipped” to conduct “a neutral, wide-ranging 
investigation” into post-conviction assertions of rehabilitation 
or to predict whether particular offenders are likely to commit 
violent crimes in the future. United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 
71, 77 (2002); see Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 
285 F.3d 216, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc); cf. S. Rep. 
102-353, at 19 (1992) (doubting that even the Executive 
Branch could feasibly grant individualized exceptions to 
§ 922(g)(1) based on an offender’s supposed rehabilitation 
because doing so is “a very difficult and subjective task” that 
“could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if 
the wrong decision is made”).  
In short, only the seriousness of the purportedly 
disqualifying offense determines the constitutional sweep of 
statutes like § 922(g)(1) at step one. To the extent Barton 
holds that people convicted of serious crimes may regain their 
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lost Second Amendment rights after not posing a threat to 
society for a period of time, it is overruled. 
   b.  Application to the Challengers  
We now consider whether the Challengers have shown 
that their crimes are not serious. As a preliminary matter, we 
note that Judge Fuentes, those colleagues joining his opinion 
dissenting from the judgment, and the Government deny the 
possibility of successful as-applied Second Amendment 
challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., Gov’t Binderup Br. at 14; 
Gov’t Suarez Br. at 15; Fuentes Op. Typescript at 18–40. In 
their view, § 922(g)(1), at least in its current form, is 
constitutional in all its applications because it does not burden 
the Second Amendment rights of felons or felon-equivalents 
who, because of their convictions, lack Second Amendment 
rights. Put another way, they believe that all crimes subject to 
§ 922(g)(1) are disqualifying because their maximum possible 
punishments are conclusive proof they are serious. 
But that view puts the rabbit in the hat by concluding 
that all felons and misdemeanants with potential punishments 
past a certain threshold lack the right to keep and bear arms 
when, despite their maximum possible punishment, some 
offenses may be “so tame and technical as to be insufficient 
to justify the ban.” United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 
110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). Heller confirms such a showing is 
possible, as it describes prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons as only “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. 
at 626–27 & n.26. Unless flagged as irrebutable, 
presumptions are rebuttable. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 173; 
Williams, 616 F.3d at 692. Indeed, under the approach of 
Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his opinion 
dissenting from the judgments, the Government could make 
an end-run around the Second Amendment and undermine the 
right to keep and bear arms in contravention of Heller. A 
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crime’s maximum possible punishment is “purely a matter of 
legislative prerogative,” Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 
(1980), subject only to “constitutional prohibitions on 
irrational laws,” Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see United 
States v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 2007). Yet Heller 
teaches that the Government needs more than a rational basis 
“to overcome the right to keep and bear arms.” 554 U.S. at 
628 n.27; see Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95–96. Therefore, to 
determine whether the Challengers are shorn of their Second 
Amendment rights, Heller requires us to consider the 
maximum possible punishment but not to defer blindly to it.  
At the same time, there are no fixed criteria for 
determining whether crimes are serious enough to destroy 
Second Amendment rights. Unlike the “historically 
unprotected categories of speech” that are First Amendment 
exceptions “long familiar to the bar,” United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 470 (2010), the category of 
serious crimes changes over time as legislative judgments 
regarding virtue evolve. For example, though only a few 
exceedingly serious crimes were “felonies” at early common 
law, by the time of our country’s founding “many new 
felonies were added by English statute.” 1 Wharton’s 
Criminal Law § 17 (15th ed. 2015); see, e.g., 4 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *18 (“[N]o less than a[ ] hundred 
and sixty [actions] have been declared by act of parliament to 
be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be 
worthy of instant death.”); Francis Bacon, Preparation for the 
Union of Laws of England and Scotland, in 2 The Works of 
Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England 163–64 (1841) 
(listing dozens of felonies, including “[w]here a man stealeth 
certain kinds of hawks” or “invocates wicked spirits”). The 
upshot is that “exclusions need not mirror limits that were on 
the books in 1791” to comport with the Second Amendment. 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 641. Rather, we will presume the 
judgment of the legislature is correct and treat any crime 
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subject to § 922(g)(1) as disqualifying unless there is a strong 
reason to do otherwise.  
 Here, upon close examination of the Challengers’ 
apparently disqualifying convictions, we conclude that their 
offenses were not serious enough to strip them of their 
Second Amendment rights. For starters, though the 
Challengers’ crimes meet the generic definition of a felony 
and Congress’s definition of a felony for purposes of 
§ 922(g)(1), the Pennsylvania and Maryland legislatures 
enacted them as misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are, and 
traditionally have been, considered less serious than felonies. 
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); 
misdemeanor, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); 1 
LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.6. Congress tried to 
ensure that only serious crimes would trigger disarmament 
under § 922(g)(1) by exempting from the ban any state-law 
misdemeanant whose crime was punishable by less than two 
years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). But we 
believe that accommodation still paints with too broad a 
brush, for a state legislature’s classification of an offense as a 
misdemeanor is a powerful expression of its belief that the 
offense is not serious enough to be disqualifying. 
 This is not to say that state misdemeanors cannot be 
serious. No doubt “some misdemeanors are . . . ‘serious’ 
offenses,” Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 70, and “numerous 
misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many 
felonies,” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). See 
Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 149–50 (2010) 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (“At common law . . . many very 
serious crimes, such as kidnapping and assault with the intent 
to murder or rape, were categorized as misdemeanors.”). And 
the maximum possible punishment is certainly probative of a 
misdemeanor’s seriousness. But Congress may not overlook 
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so generally the misdemeanor label, which, in the Second 
Amendment context, is also important.  
 Other considerations, however, confirm our belief that 
the Challengers’ crimes were not serious. As explained 
above, violent criminal conduct—meaning a crime “in which 
violence (actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,” 
Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642; see Voisine, 136 S. Ct. at 2280—is 
disqualifying. See Part III.C.2. But neither Challenger’s 
offense had the use or attempted use of force as an element.4 
Though, as explained, it is possible for non-violent crimes to 
be serious, the lack of a violence element is a relevant 
consideration.   
Also important is that each Challenger received a 
minor sentence by any measure: Binderup was sentenced to 
three years’ probation (a condition of which was to avoid 
contact with his employee) and a $300 fine plus court costs 
and restitution, while Suarez received a suspended sentence 
of 180 days’ imprisonment and a $500 fine. That is because 
severe punishments are typically reserved for serious crimes. 
                                              
 4 Though we look only to a crime’s elements rather 
than to the way it actually was committed, we note as an aside 
that the District Court in Binderup explained that “[t]here is 
simply nothing in the record here which would support a 
reasonable inference that [Binderup] used any violence, force, 
or threat of force to initiate or maintain the sexual relationship 
with his seventeen-year-old employee” or “that he even 
engaged in any violent or threatening conduct.” 2014 WL 
4764424, at *22. Similarly, the District Court in Suarez 
described Suarez’s misdemeanor as “minor and non-violent.” 
2015 WL 685889, at *9. 
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Additionally, punishments are selected by judges who have 
firsthand knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the 
cases and who likely have the benefit of pre-sentence reports 
prepared by trained professionals. With not a single day of 
jail time, the punishments here reflect the sentencing judges’ 
assessment of how minor the violations were.  
Finally, there is no cross-jurisdictional consensus 
regarding the seriousness of the Challengers’ crimes. Some 
states treat consensual sexual relationships between 41 and 17 
year olds as serious crimes, see Gov’t Binderup Br. at 17–19 
& n.4, but the vast majority of states do not, see Asaph 
Glosser et al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and 
Reporting Requirements 6–7 (Dec. 15, 2004), available at 
https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75531/report.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Binderup’s conduct arguably 
would have been criminal in a few other states because his 
17-year-old sexual partner was his employee, yet it still 
would have been legal in many states. Similarly, though some 
states punish the unlicensed carrying of a concealed weapon 
as a serious crime, see Gov’t Suarez Br. at 16-17 n.5, more 
than half prescribe a maximum sentence that does not meet 
the threshold of a traditional felony (more than one year in 
prison) and others do not even require a specific credential to 
carry a concealed weapon, see Thomson Reuters, 50 State 
Survey: Right to Carry a Concealed Weapon (Statutes) 
(October 2015); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., States’ Laws 
and Requirements for Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across 
Nation 73–74 (2012), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592552.pdf (last visited Aug. 
25, 2016); Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Concealed 
Weapons Permitting, http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-
laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-places/concealed-
weapons-permitting/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Were the 
Challengers unable to show that so many states consider their 
crimes to be non-serious, it would be difficult for them to 
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carry their burden at step one. But because they have shown 
that there is no consensus regarding the seriousness of their 
crimes, their showing at step one is that much more 
compelling.5 
 In sum, the Challengers have carried their burden of 
showing that their misdemeanors were not serious offenses 
despite their maximum possible punishment.6 This leads us to 
                                              
 5 Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his 
opinion dissenting from the judgments caution that this 
approach is not “workable” and “places an extraordinary 
administrative burden on district courts,” Fuentes Op. 
Typescript at 2, 71, but the criteria we use to assess the 
seriousness of a misdemeanor subject to § 922(g)(1)—the 
elements of the offense, the actual sentence, and the state of 
the law—are easily administrable. These objective indications 
of seriousness are well within the ambit of judgment 
exercised daily by judges. Courts are also well suited to the 
task of identifying serious crimes in the Second Amendment 
context, as in other constitutional contexts the Judicial Branch 
is charged with discerning “objective criteria reflecting the 
seriousness with which society regards [an] offense.” 
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 68; see, e.g., Blanton v. City of North 
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543–44 (1989) (Sixth Amendment); 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1985) (Fourth 
Amendment); Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) 
(Fifth Amendment).  
 
 6 Our decision is limited to the cases before us, which 
involve state-law misdemeanants bringing as-applied Second 
Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). This is important 
because when a legislature chooses to call a crime a 
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conclude that Binderup and Suarez have distinguished their 
circumstances from those of persons historically excluded 
from the right to arms. That, in turn, requires the Government 
to meet some form of heightened scrutiny at the second step 
of the Marzzarella framework.  
 D.  Step Two of the Marzzarella Framework 
 Next, we consider whether § 922(g)(1) survives 
heightened scrutiny as applied. On this record, it does not. No 
doubt § 922(g)(1) is intended to further the government 
interest of promoting public safety by “preventing armed 
mayhem,” Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, an interest that is both 
important and compelling. But whether we apply intermediate 
scrutiny or strict scrutiny—and we continue to follow the lead 
of Marzzarella in choosing intermediate scrutiny, 614 F.3d at 
97—the Government bears the burden of proof on the 
appropriateness of the means it employs to further its interest. 
See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 
                                                                                                     
misdemeanor, we have an indication of non-seriousness that 
is lacking when it opts instead to use the felony label. We are 
not confronted with whether an as-applied Second 
Amendment challenge can succeed where the purportedly 
disqualifying offense is considered a felony by the authority 
that created the crime. On the one hand, it is possible to read 
Heller to leave open the possibility, however remote, of a 
successful as-applied challenge by someone convicted of such 
an offense. At the same time, even if that were so, the 
individual’s burden would be extraordinarily high—and 
perhaps even insurmountable. In any event, given that neither 
Challenger fits that description, we need not decide the 
question. 
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469, 480 (1989); Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 
506 n.1 (2005).  
 Here the Government falls well short of satisfying its 
burden—even under intermediate scrutiny. The record before 
us consists of evidence about the Challengers’ backgrounds, 
including the time that has passed since they last broke the 
law. It contains no evidence explaining why banning people 
like them (i.e., people who decades ago committed similar 
misdemeanors) from possessing firearms promotes public 
safety. The Government claims that someone like Suarez is 
“particularly likely to misuse firearms” because he belongs to 
a category of “potentially irresponsible persons,” Gov’t 
Suarez Br. at 27–28, and that someone like Binderup is 
“particularly likely to commit additional crimes in the future,” 
Gov’t Binderup Br. at 35. But it must “present some 
meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its 
predictive [and here conclusory] judgments.” Heller, 670 
F.3d at 1259. In these cases neither the evidence in the record 
nor common sense supports those assertions. 
 The Government relies on a number of off-point 
statistical studies to argue that it is reasonable to disarm the 
Challengers because of their convictions. It notes that felons 
generally commit violent crimes more frequently than non-
felons, see Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 6 (2002), and 
that the “denial of handgun purchases [to convicted felons] is 
associated with a reduction in risk for later criminal activity 
of approximately 20–30%,” Mona A. Wright et al., 
Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons 
Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence, 89 Am. J. 
of Pub. Health 88, 89 (1999). But these studies estimate the 
likelihood that incarcerated felons will reoffend after their 
release from prison. The Challengers were not incarcerated 
and are not felons under state law; they are state-law 
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misdemeanants who spent no time in jail. The Government 
cannot draw any reasonable conclusions about the risk posed 
by their possession of firearms from such obviously 
distinguishable studies. It claims that even criminals placed 
on probation rather than sent to prison have a heightened risk 
of recidivism, but the study it cites found that, “[g]enerally, 
the risk of recidivism was highest during the first year after 
admission to probation,” and that “[a]s released prisoners and 
probationers age, they tend to exhibit lower rates of 
recidivism.” Iowa Div. of Crim. & Juvenile Justice Planning, 
Recidivism Among Iowa Probationers 2 (July 2005), 
available at http://publications.iowa.gov/15032/ (last visited 
Aug. 25, 2016). Binderup’s and Suarez’s offenses are 20 and 
26 years old, respectively, so that study tells us little, if 
anything, about the risk of recidivism in these cases.7  
                                              
 7 As discussed, evidence of how individuals have lived 
their lives since committing crimes is irrelevant under 
Marrzarella’s first step, as there is no historical support for 
rehabilitation being a consideration in determining whether 
someone has Second Amendment rights. However, at step 
two of the analysis the question is no longer whether the 
Challengers fall within the Second Amendment’s protections. 
They do. Our task now is to decide whether the Government 
can disarm them despite these protections. Whereas our 
obligation at step one is to draw constitutional lines—
separating those who have Second Amendment rights from 
those who do not—at step two we must ask whether the 
Government has made a strong enough case for disarming a 
person found after step one to be eligible to assert an as-
applied challenge. This turns in part on the likelihood that the 
Challengers will commit crimes in the future. Thus, under the 
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 The Government also claims to have studies of 
particular relevance to each Challenger’s situation, but this 
argument too misses the mark. As to Binderup, the 
Government cites studies from several states that it contends 
would classify him as a sex offender on account of his 
criminal conduct. See Gov’t Binderup Br. at 33–34; see also 
id. at 28 n.8 (citing a Pennsylvania study showing that 
individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses have a 50–
60% chance of rearrest within three years of release from 
prison). Binderup unsurprisingly disputes that label. We need 
not delve into the weeds here, as, much like the more general 
studies discussed above, the sex-offender specific studies 
focus on people who were incarcerated. It is not helpful to 
draw inferences about the usefulness of disarming Binderup 
from those off-point studies.  
 As to Suarez, the Government emphasizes that persons 
arrested for “weapons offenses” are rearrested at high rates, 
Gov’t Suarez Br. at 30 & nn.10–11 (citing studies), and relies 
on a study indicating that California handgun purchasers in 
1977 “who had prior convictions for nonviolent firearm-
related offenses such as carrying concealed firearms in public, 
but none for violent offenses,” were more likely than people 
with no criminal histories to be charged later with a violent 
crime, see Garen J. Wintemute et al., Prior Misdemeanor 
Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-
Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of 
Handguns, 280 Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2086 (1998). Yet that 
study only addresses the risk of recidivism within 15 years of 
a conviction for an unspecified “nonviolent firearm-related 
offense[].” Id. at 2086. Common sense tells us that recidivism 
                                                                                                     
right circumstances the passage of time since a conviction can 
be a relevant consideration in assessing recidivism risks.  
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rates would change with the passage of an additional 11 years 
(Suarez was convicted 26 years ago) and vary based on the 
circumstances of the prior conviction.  
 This is not to say that empirical studies are irrelevant 
to as-applied Second Amendment challenges. Parties may use 
statistics to show that people who commit certain crimes have 
a high (or low) likelihood of recidivism that warrants (or does 
not warrant) disarmament, even decades after a conviction. In 
these cases, empirical studies could have demonstrated an 
appropriate fit between the Challengers’ total disarmament 
and the promotion of public safety if they contained reliable 
statistical evidence that people with the Challengers’ 
backgrounds were more likely to misuse firearms or were 
otherwise irresponsible or dangerous. The Government 
simply presented no such evidence.8  
 Additionally, that federal law gives Binderup and 
Suarez opportunities to escape the effect of § 922(g)(1) does 
not save the statute from unconstitutionality under the 
                                              
 8 Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his 
opinion dissenting from the judgments suggest that our 
heightened scrutiny analysis boils down to the Challengers 
asking us to trust that they will not misuse firearms because 
we cannot make predictive judgments about the need to 
disarm the Challengers “with any degree of confidence.” 
Fuentes Op. Typescript at 55. We disagree. Under either form 
of heightened scrutiny it is the Government’s burden to prove 
that the restriction is appropriately tailored. The problem in 
our cases is that because the Government’s evidence sweeps 
so broadly, it does not establish that the restriction serves an 
important interest even as applied to people like the 
Challengers, let alone to the Challengers themselves.  
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circumstances. For starters, several avenues are closed to 
them altogether: they may not apply for relief under § 925(c) 
because that provision has been unfunded for years, see 
Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1; and Suarez is ineligible for 
expungement or the restoration of his civil rights, see Md. 
Code, Crim. P., § 10-105; Logan, 552 U.S. at 31–32. Those 
avenues that remain open to them do not satisfy even 
intermediate scrutiny. Binderup’s record may be expunged 
only after he reaches age 70 (or is dead for three years), 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9122(b), but as there is no evidence showing 
it is reasonable to ban Binderup from possessing a firearm 
today, there is certainly no evidence to show that it is 
reasonable to keep that ban in place until his 70th birthday. 
The only remaining option is for Binderup and Suarez to 
receive pardons from the Governors of Pennsylvania and 
Maryland, respectively. (Pardons are, as already noted, an 
independent ground for relief from the firearm disability in 
§ 922(g)(1), and Binderup must receive a pardon to restore 
his civil rights. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502(a)(3).) But the 
Government has presented no evidence or explanation as to 
why a Governor’s decisions about pardons—“a classic 
example of unreviewable executive discretion,” Bowens v. 
Quinn, 561 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2009)—are reasonably 
related to the risk posed by the Challengers’ possession of 
firearms. Though a pardon would reflect well on Binderup 
and Suarez, it is hardly reasonable to treat the absence of a 
pardon—rare by any measure—as adequate proof of a 
continuing need to disarm them indefinitely. 
The Challengers’ isolated, decades-old, non-violent 
misdemeanors do not permit the inference that disarming 
people like them will promote the responsible use of firearms. 
Nor is there any evidence in the record to show why people 
like them remain potentially irresponsible after many years of 
apparently responsible behavior. Without more, there is not a 
substantial fit between the continuing disarmament of the 
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Challengers and an important government interest. Thus, 
§ 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 When sorting out a fractured decision of the Court, the 
goal is “to find a single legal standard” that “produce[s] 
results with which a majority of the [Court] in the case 
articulating the standard would agree.” United States v. 
Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 693 
(3d Cir. 1991), modified on other grounds, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992)). We have at times “looked to the votes of dissenting 
[judges] if they, combined with votes from plurality or 
concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant 
issue.” Id. And when no single rationale explaining the result 
enjoys the support of a majority of the Court, its holding 
“may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Marks 
v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 69 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)). 
 Applying those interpretive tools here, the following is 
the law of our Circuit: (1) the two-step Marzzarella 
framework controls all Second Amendment challenges, 
including as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1); (2) a 
challenger will satisfy the first step of that framework only if 
he proves that the law or regulation at issue burdens conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment; (3) to satisfy step one 
in the context of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), a 
challenger must prove that he was not previously convicted of 
a serious crime; (4) evidence of a challenger’s rehabilitation 
or his likelihood of recidivism is not relevant to the step-one 
analysis; (5) as the narrowest ground supporting the Court’s 
judgments for Binderup and Suarez, the considerations 
discussed above will determine whether crimes are serious 
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(i.e., disqualifying) at step one; and (6) if a challenger makes 
the necessary step-one showing, the burden shifts to the 
Government at step two to prove that the regulation at issue 
survives intermediate scrutiny.  
 In the cases before us, though Binderup and Suarez fail 
to show that their misdemeanor offenses are not subject to 
§ 922(g)(1), they have rebutted the presumption that they lack 
Second Amendment rights by distinguishing their crimes of 
conviction from those that historically led to exclusion from 
Second Amendment protections. This meets the first-step test 
of Marzzarella. At step two, the Government has failed to 
present sufficient evidence to demonstrate under even 
intermediate scrutiny that it may, consistent with the Second 
Amendment, apply § 922(g)(1) to bar Binderup and Suarez 
from possessing a firearm in their homes. Accordingly, we 
affirm the judgments of the District Courts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel Binderup v. Attorney General of the United States; 
Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives 
Nos. 14-4550, 14-4549 
 
Julio Suarez v. Attorney General of the United States; 
Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives 
Nos. 15-1975, 15-1976 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgments, joined by FISHER, 
CHAGARES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges.  
 The Second Amendment secures an individual “right 
of the people” to keep and bear arms unconnected to service 
in the militia. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 
595 (2008). This “pre-existing” right was included in the Bill 
of Rights in light of the troubles the colonists experienced 
under British rule and the Founders’ appreciation of the 
considerable power that was transferred to the new federal 
government. Without a specific guarantee in our fundamental 
charter, it was feared that “the people” might one day be 
disarmed. See id. at 598–99. At the same time, the Founders 
understood that not everyone possessed Second Amendment 
rights. These appeals require us to decide who count among 
“the people” entitled to keep and bear arms.  
 The laws of the United States prohibit felons and 
certain misdemeanants from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1). Guided by the Supreme Court’s characterization 
of felon dispossession as “presumptively lawful” in Heller, 
we held in United States v. Barton that this prohibition does 
not on its face violate the Second Amendment. 633 F.3d 168 
(3d Cir. 2011). In doing so we stated that § 922(g)(1) remains 
subject to as-applied constitutional challenges. Id. at 172–75. 
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These consolidated appeals present two such challenges. 
Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez—each permanently barred 
from possessing firearms because of prior misdemeanor 
convictions—contend that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as 
applied to them.  
 It is. The most cogent principle that can be drawn from 
traditional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms is 
that dangerous persons likely to use firearms for illicit 
purposes were not understood to be protected by the Second 
Amendment. And because Binderup and Suarez have 
demonstrated that their crimes of conviction were nonviolent 
and that their personal circumstances are distinguishable from 
those of persons who do not enjoy Second Amendment rights 
because of their demonstrated proclivity for violence, the 
judgments of the District Courts must be affirmed.     
I 
We agree with all our colleagues that Binderup and 
Suarez are subject to disarmament under the plain terms of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1 We also agree with Judges Ambro, 
Smith, and Greenaway that the District Court correctly held 
                                              
1 Given the Court’s universal agreement that 
§ 922(g)(1) is unambiguous as to whom it covers and what it 
criminalizes, we have trouble comprehending the Dissent’s 
fears that our approach for assessing the statute’s as-applied 
constitutionality under the Second Amendment (set forth 
infra) puts it at risk of being declared unconstitutionally 
vague under the Due Process Clause. See Dissent at 71–74. 
Our view is simply that certain applications of this pellucid 
statute might be unconstitutional. 
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that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and 
Suarez. But we perceive flaws in Judge Ambro’s opinion.2  
To begin with, our colleagues misapprehend the 
traditional justifications underlying felon dispossession, 
substituting a vague “virtue” requirement that is belied by the 
historical record. Then, under the guise of “reaffirm[ing]” the 
two-step test of United States v. Marzzarella, Ambro Op. 6, 
they actually expand that test—and along with it, the judicial 
power. For our colleagues hold that even with respect to 
persons entitled to Second Amendment rights, judges may 
pick and choose whom the government may permanently 
disarm if the judges approve of the legislature’s interest 
balancing. Despite Binderup’s and Suarez’s success today, 
our colleagues have retained “the power to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether the [Second Amendment] right is 
really worth insisting upon.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that all but three of our dissenting 
colleagues—who have concluded that all as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) must fail—join the bulk of Judge 
Ambro’s constitutional analysis. By contrast, we would 
hold—consistent with Heller—that non-dangerous persons 
convicted of offenses unassociated with violence may rebut 
the presumed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on an as-applied 
basis, and that when a law eviscerates the core of the Second 
                                              
2 Although a majority of the Court joins two portions 
of Judge Ambro’s opinion and a plurality joins others, the 
outcome-determinative sections are supported by only three 
judges. To minimize confusion, we will refer to the opinion 
as “Judge Ambro’s opinion” and will indicate whether the 
relevant portion thereof was backed by a majority or not 
where necessary.  
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Amendment right to keep and bear arms (as § 922(g)(1) does 
by criminalizing exercise of the right entirely), it is 
categorically unconstitutional.  
A 
The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In Heller, the Supreme 
Court held the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to possess a firearm unconnected to service in a militia, 
and to use that weapon for traditionally lawful purposes, such 
as self-defense within the home.  554 U.S. at 595. The Second 
Amendment “elevates above all other interests the right of 
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
hearth and home”—a right that is at the “core” of the Second 
Amendment. Id. at 635 (emphasis added). Two years after 
Heller, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court held the 
Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller,” explaining that the 
right is “fundamental” to “our system of ordered liberty.” 561 
U.S. 742, 778 (2010). 
Although the Second Amendment is an enumerated 
fundamental right, it is “not unlimited.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
626. “No fundamental right—not even the First 
Amendment—is absolute.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 802 
(Scalia, J., concurring). A range of “who,” “what,” “where,” 
“when,” and “how” restrictions relating to firearms are 
permitted—many based on the scope of the Second 
Amendment and others based on their satisfaction of some 
level of heightened scrutiny. See Eugene Volokh, 
Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
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Defense: An Analytical Framework and A Research Agenda, 
56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1443 (2009) (distinguishing between 
 “‘what’ restrictions (such as bans on machine guns, so-called 
‘assault weapons,’ or unpersonalized handguns), ‘who’ 
restrictions (such as bans on possession by felons, 
misdemeanants, noncitizens, or 18-to-20-year-olds), ‘where’ 
restrictions (such as bans on carrying in public, in places that 
serve alcohol, or in parks, or bans on possessing [guns] in 
public housing projects), ‘how’ restrictions (such as storage 
regulations), [and] ‘when’ restrictions (such as waiting 
periods)”); United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164, 
1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying the same heuristic).  
For instance, the right is “not a right to keep and carry 
any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for 
whatever purpose.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. Likewise, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged the “historical tradition of 
prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, Heller 
catalogued a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures” that have historically constrained the 
parameters of the right. Id. at 627 n.26. These include 
“longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons and the mentally ill, . . . laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications 
on the commercial sale of arms.”3 Id. at 626–27. Critically, 
                                              
3 At least one of our sister courts has characterized 
Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations as dicta. 
See United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 
2010). But “[c]ourts often limit the scope of their holdings, 
and such limitations are integral to those holdings.” United 
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such “traditional restrictions go to show the scope of the right, 
not its lack of fundamental character.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 
802 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The reason, for 
example, that the Second Amendment “does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” is that they 
fall outside the historical “scope of the right”—not that the 
right yields to some important or compelling government 
interest. Heller, 554 U.S. at 625; see also United States v. 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). 
The Supreme Court has not yet heard an as-applied 
Second Amendment challenge to a presumptively lawful ban 
on firearms possession. But that fact makes Heller and 
McDonald no less binding on our inquiry here.  
B 
1 
 Two of our decisions pertain to Binderup’s and 
Suarez’s as-applied challenges in these appeals. United States 
                                                                                                     
States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(treating Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language as 
binding); see also United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768, 771 
(11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that this portion of Heller 
limits the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by law-
abiding and qualified individuals, it is not dicta.”). Moreover, 
the Court doubled down on this language in McDonald. See 
561 U.S. at 786. Hence, we have concluded that Heller’s list 
constitutes a limitation on the scope of its holding and does 
not qualify as dicta. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 171; United 
States v. Huet, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012). 
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v. Marzzarella involved an as-applied challenge to a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits the 
possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number—a 
“what” restriction limiting possession of a certain category of 
firearms. 614 F.3d at 87. Because this statute was not 
included in Heller’s list of presumptively lawful firearm 
regulations, we gleaned from Heller a “two-pronged approach 
to Second Amendment challenges.” Id. at 89. We first 
consider “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on 
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee.” Id. If the conduct lies outside the Second 
Amendment’s scope, the right does not apply and the 
challenged law must stand. But if the law burdens protected 
conduct, we determined that the proper course is to “evaluate 
the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.” Id. “If the 
law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it 
fails, it is invalid.” Id.  
 Applying that test to § 922(k)’s ban on the possession 
of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, we held that the 
law “would pass constitutional muster even if it burdens 
protected conduct.” Id. at 95. In other words, we skipped the 
first step and proceeded to apply means-ends scrutiny. We 
chose intermediate scrutiny4 because “[t]he burden imposed 
by the law does not severely limit the possession of firearms” 
and does not bar possession of an entire class of firearms. Id. 
                                              
4 Intermediate scrutiny “require[s] the asserted 
governmental end to be more than just legitimate, either 
‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important,’” and requires “the 
fit between the regulation and the asserted objective be 
reasonable, not perfect.”  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98 
(citations omitted). 
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at 97. Under that standard, we concluded that the law is 
constitutional because it fits reasonably with the substantial or 
important “law enforcement interest in enabling the tracing of 
weapons via their serial numbers.” Id. at 98. We also opined 
that the law would pass strict scrutiny5 because it serves a 
compelling government interest through the “least-restrictive” 
means. Id. at 100. 
 A year after Marzzarella we decided Barton, which 
involved facial and as-applied challenges to the very law in 
question here: § 922(g)(1). Unlike the law at issue in 
Marzzarella—the “what” restriction codified in § 922(k)—
the statute at issue in Barton (and in these appeals) was a 
presumptively lawful “who” restriction that prohibits certain 
people from possessing guns because of their membership in 
a criminal class. Barton was a felon who had been convicted 
of possessing firearms and ammunition in violation of 
§ 922(g)(1). Barton, 633 F.3d at 169. We readily concluded 
that his facial challenge “must fail” in light of Heller’s list of 
presumptively lawful firearm regulations. Id. at 172. We 
reasoned that since a facial challenge requires a showing that 
the challenged law “is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications,” Heller foreclosed a facial challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) because it is “presumptively lawful,” meaning 
that, “under most circumstances, [it] regulate[s] conduct 
which is unprotected by the Second Amendment.” Id.  
 Most relevant to these appeals is our analysis of 
Barton’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). In that regard, 
                                              
5 “Strict scrutiny asks whether the law is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.”  
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96 n.14 
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we first determined that “Heller’s statement regarding the 
presumptive validity of felon gun dispossession statutes does 
not foreclose” an as-applied challenge. Id. at 173. We 
reasoned that “[b]y describing the felon disarmament ban as 
presumptively lawful, the Supreme Court implied that the 
presumption may be rebutted.”6 Id. at 173 (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted).   
                                              
6 At times, the Government seems to reject even the 
possibility of an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 
a presumptively lawful regulation. See, e.g., Gov’t Suarez Br. 
15 (“In recognizing section 922(g)(1) as a ‘presumptively 
lawful regulatory measure[],’ the Supreme Court did not 
suggest that the statute nonetheless could be subject to a 
successful as-applied constitutional challenge.” (internal 
citation omitted)); Gov’t Binderup Br. 14 (same, verbatim). 
The Government retreated from that proposition somewhat at 
oral argument, reframing its position as an objection merely 
to as-applied challenges that rely on individualized review of 
whether a law is unconstitutional in light of the challenger’s 
particular circumstances. But some degree of individualized 
assessment is part and parcel of all as-applied challenges. See, 
e.g., United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 
2010) (explaining that an as-applied challenge “does not 
contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its 
application to a particular person under particular 
circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right” 
(emphases added)). 
And our determination in Barton that § 922(g)(1) is 
subject to as-applied challenges is by no means an outlier. 
Several of our sister courts have either accepted or allowed 
the possibility of as-applied Second Amendment challenges 
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to presumptively lawful regulations. See, e.g., United States v. 
Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Heller referred 
to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ 
which, by implication, means that there must exist the 
possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face 
of an as-applied challenge.”); United States v. Carpio-Leon, 
701 F.3d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Heller Court’s 
holding that defines the core right to bear arms by law-
abiding, responsible citizens does not preclude some future 
determination that persons who commit some offenses might 
nonetheless remain in the protected class of ‘law-abiding, 
responsible’ persons.”); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 
991 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (indicating willingness to consider an 
as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) but 
concluding it had not been raised properly). 
Although the Dissent rests its conclusion on its 
determination that all persons covered by § 922(g)(1) fall 
outside the scope of the Second Amendment, it too expresses 
doubt as to the availability of as-applied constitutional 
challenges to this “presumptively lawful” statute. See Dissent 
at 21 (stating that Marzzarella “concluded that the ‘better 
reading’ of Heller was that [the list of presumptively lawful] 
measures were complete ‘exceptions to the right to bear 
arms’”) (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91 and adding 
emphasis). Marzzarella held no such thing (indeed, it did not 
even involve a challenge to one of the presumptively lawful 
longstanding regulations identified by Heller). Rather, its 
examination of Heller’s list was geared toward determining 
whether such regulations were “presumptively lawful” based 
on the step-one question (the scope of the Second 
Amendment) or the step-two question (means-end scrutiny). 
Its conclusion that the former is the correct understanding of 
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Next, we explained what was required to mount a 
successful as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 
                                                                                                     
Heller meant that “these longstanding limitations are 
exceptions to the right to bear arms.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 
at 91. Barton’s characterization mirrored Marzzarella’s: it 
stated that a “lawful” longstanding regulation “regulates 
conduct ‘fall[ing outside] the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s guarantee.’” Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (quoting 
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91). But neither Marzzarella nor any 
other of our precedents has ever implied that Heller’s 
incomplete list of “presumptively lawful” firearm regulations 
“‘under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second 
Amendment.’” Dissent at 10 (quoting United States v. Rozier, 
598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) and adding emphasis). To 
so hold would ignore the meaning of the word “presumption.” 
A presumption of constitutionality “is a presumption . . . 
[about] the existence of factual conditions supporting the 
legislation. As such it is a rebuttable presumption.” Borden’s 
Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) 
(emphasis added). We do not disagree that the Heller Court 
included this “presumptively lawful” language to provide 
some “assurance[]” that its decision “did not provide a basis 
for future litigants to upend any and all restrictions on the 
right to bear arms.” Dissent at 36. Indeed, we have concluded 
that § 922(g)(1) is facially valid for this very reason. See 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 172. But we doubt the Supreme Court 
couched its first definitive characterization of the nature of 
the Second Amendment right so as to completely immunize 
this statute from any constitutional challenge whatsoever. Put 
simply, we take the Supreme Court at its word that felon 
dispossession is “presumptively lawful.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
627 n.26 (emphasis added). 
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§ 922(g)(1). We looked to the “historical pedigree” of the 
statute to ascertain “whether the traditional justifications 
underlying the statute support a finding of permanent 
disability in this case.” Id; see also id. at 175 (noting that the 
constitutionality of the felon dispossession statute under the 
Second Amendment right depends “upon whom the right was 
intended to protect”) (emphasis in original). Our analysis 
revealed that although persons convicted of violent crimes 
have been barred from firearm possession since 1931, it 
wasn’t until thirty years later that Congress dispossessed 
nonviolent felons. Id. at 173. The historical record 
demonstrated that “the common law right to keep and bear 
arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit 
violent offenses.” Id. Accordingly, we determined that the 
exclusion of felons and other criminals from the scope of the 
Second Amendment’s protections was tethered to the time-
honored practice of keeping firearms out of the hands of those 
likely to commit violent crimes. Id.  
 For the reasons discussed, we concluded that “[t]o 
raise a successful as-applied challenge, [one] must present 
facts about himself and his background that distinguish his 
circumstances from those of persons historically barred from 
Second Amendment protections.” Id. at 174. We explained 
further:  
For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-
violent crime might show that he is no more 
dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. 
Similarly, a court might find that a felon whose 
crime of conviction is decades-old poses no 
continuing threat to society.  
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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 We had no trouble concluding that Barton failed to 
make this showing because he could not demonstrate that he 
was “no more likely than the typical citizen to commit a 
crime of violence.” Id. To begin with, his prior disqualifying 
convictions were for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute and for receipt of a stolen firearm. Id. As we 
explained, “[c]ourts have held in a number of contexts that 
offenses relating to drug trafficking and receiving stolen 
weapons are closely related to violent crime”—again, the 
relevant historical justification for excluding the class of 
which Barton was a member from the Second Amendment’s 
protections. Id. The record also indicated that Barton had not 
been rehabilitated such that he was “no more dangerous than 
a typical law-abiding citizen.” Id. Indeed, he had recently 
admitted to selling a firearm with an obliterated serial number 
to a police informant. Id. For those reasons, we rejected 
Barton’s as-applied challenge because he had failed “to 
demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside the 
intended scope of § 922(g)(1).” Id.  
2 
 Our decisions in Marzzarella and Barton show that the 
threshold question in a Second Amendment challenge is one 
of scope: whether the Second Amendment protects the 
person, the weapon, or the activity in the first place. This 
requires an inquiry into “text and history.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 
595. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they 
were understood to have when the people adopted them, 
whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges 
think that scope too broad.” Id. at 634–35. The “critical tool 
of constitutional interpretation” in this area is “examination of 
a variety of legal and other sources to determine the public 
understanding of a legal text in the period after its enactment 
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or ratification.” Id. at 605 (emphasis in original); see also 
Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“Heller suggests that some federal gun laws will survive 
Second Amendment challenge because they regulate activity 
falling outside the scope of the right as publicly understood 
when the Bill of Rights was ratified; McDonald confirms that 
if the claim concerns a state or local law, the ‘scope’ question 
asks how the right was publicly understood when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified.”). Hence, 
the scope of the right is discerned with reference to the 
“historical justifications” underlying traditional limits on the 
right’s coverage. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. The test we 
enunciated in Barton was directed at this very question. See 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (“[T]o evaluate [an] as-applied 
challenge [to § 922(g)(1)], we look to [its] historical pedigree 
. . . to determine whether the traditional justifications 
underlying the statute support a finding of permanent 
disability in this case.”).  
 The fact that Barton speaks to scope does not mean, as 
our colleagues and the Government insist, that it requires 
application of means-end scrutiny once it is determined that a 
presumptively lawful regulation has dispossessed someone 
who falls within the protection of the Second Amendment. It 
is true that courts typically apply some form of means-end 
scrutiny to as-applied challenges once it has been determined 
that the law in question burdens protected conduct. But when, 
as in these appeals, it comes to an as-applied challenge to a 
presumptively lawful regulation that entirely bars the 
challenger from exercising the core Second Amendment 
right, any resort to means-end scrutiny is inappropriate once it 
has been determined that the challenger’s circumstances 
distinguish him from the historical justifications supporting 
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the regulation. This is because such laws are categorically 
invalid as applied to persons entitled to Second Amendment 
protection—a matter of scope.  
This principle is based on Heller itself. That decision 
invalidated a municipal law that banned handgun possession 
in the home and required any lawful firearm to be kept 
disassembled and bound by a trigger lock at all times, 
rendering it inoperable.7 Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. Especially 
significant for these appeals, the Court eschewed means-end 
scrutiny in assessing the constitutionality of the ban. Because 
the law precluded individuals from possessing an important 
class of firearms in the home even for self-defense (the right 
at the “core” of the Second Amendment) and required that all 
firearms within the home be rendered inoperable, it was 
unconstitutional without regard to governmental interests 
supporting the law or their overall “fit” with the regulation.  
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 629–30. 
Heller’s reasoning bears this out. Specifically, with 
respect to the District of Columbia’s requirement that all 
firearms in the home be “kept inoperable at all times,” the 
Court said: “[t]his makes it impossible for citizens to use 
them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 630 (emphasis added). 
Conspicuously absent from the Court’s analysis is any 
mention of means-end scrutiny. Instead, the Court reasoned 
                                              
7 McDonald involved a similar handgun ban, but the 
Court limited its analysis to the incorporation question and 
remanded the case. 561 U.S. at 791. The City of Chicago 
subsequently lifted the ban and replaced it with a less 
restrictive ordinance. See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 689. 
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categorically: (1) the regulation entirely deprives protected 
persons from exercising the core of the Second Amendment 
right; (2) it’s therefore unconstitutional. The same went for 
the District of Columbia’s handgun ban. After concluding that 
the Second Amendment includes handguns, the Court didn’t 
mince words: “[w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most 
popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the 
home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.” Id. 
at 629 (emphasis added). A nineteenth century authority 
quoted by the Supreme Court in the paragraph preceding this 
conclusion should eliminate any doubt regarding the Court’s 
categorical approach: “A statute which, under the pretence of 
regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which 
requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless 
for the purpose of defence, would be clearly 
unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–
617 (1840)) (emphases added); see also Bliss v. Com., 12 Ky. 
90, 91 (1822) (suggesting that a regulation that “import[s] an 
entire destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in 
defense of themselves and the state” would be plainly 
unconstitutional). Hence, a law that burdens persons, arms, or 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment and that does so 
with the effect that the core of the right is eviscerated is 
unconstitutional.8 
                                              
8 The Heller Court declined to detail which form of 
scrutiny might apply in cases involving less severe burdens 
on Second Amendment rights but cautioned that rational basis 
scrutiny would never apply. Id. at 629 n.27. “If all that was 
required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a 
rational basis,” the Court explained, “the Second Amendment 
 17 
 
 We are not the first to recognize this categorical rule. 
As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “[b]oth Heller and 
McDonald suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting 
the core Second Amendment right—like the handgun bans at 
issue in those cases, which prohibited handgun possession 
even in the home—are categorically unconstitutional.” Ezell, 
651 F.3d at 703; see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 380 (2009) (“Rather than adopting one 
of the First Amendment’s many Frankfurter-inspired 
balancing approaches, the majority endorsed a categorical test 
under which some types of ‘Arms’ and arms-usage are 
protected absolutely from bans and some types of ‘Arms’ and 
people are excluded entirely from constitutional coverage.”); 
Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1272–73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“As to the ban on handguns[,] 
. . . the Supreme Court in Heller never asked whether the law 
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government 
interest (strict scrutiny) or substantially related to an 
important government interest (intermediate scrutiny). If the 
Supreme Court had meant to adopt one of those tests, it could 
have said so in Heller and measured D.C.’s handgun ban 
against the relevant standard. But the Court did not do so; it 
instead determined that handguns had not traditionally been 
banned and were in common use—and thus that D.C.’s 
handgun ban was unconstitutional.”); Peruta v. Cnty. of San 
Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he rare law 
that ‘destroys’ the [core Second Amendment] right” requires 
“Heller-style per se invalidation.”) (O’Scannlain, J.), rev’d on 
reh’g en banc, 2016 WL 3194315 (9th Cir. June 9, 2016). 
                                                                                                     
would be redundant with the separate constitutional 
prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id.  
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Although we suspect that most firearm regulations 
probably will not trigger this categorical rule, § 922(g)(1) 
certainly does. As applied to someone who falls within the 
protective scope of the Second Amendment, § 922(g)(1) goes 
even further than the “severe restriction” struck down in 
Heller: it completely eviscerates the Second Amendment 
right.9 Cf. United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 
(10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (recognizing 
that “the broad scope of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—which 
permanently disqualifies all felons from possessing 
firearms—would conflict with the ‘core’ self-defense right 
embodied in the Second Amendment” to the extent that its 
presumptive validity does not attach) (emphasis in original). 
Indeed, the Government’s contention that one can fall within 
the protective scope of the Second Amendment yet 
nevertheless be permanently deprived of the right transforms 
what it means to possess a “right.” Boiled down to its 
essence, the Government’s position goes something like this: 
“You have the right to keep and bear arms, but you may never 
exercise that right because we have supplied good reasons.” 
This understanding of the Second Amendment is too 
                                              
9 The Government wrongly asserts that we have 
recognized that “even laws that actually burden Second 
Amendment rights must only have a ‘reasonable, not perfect,’ 
fit with an important government interest.” Gov’t Br. 26 
(quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98). The Dissent agrees 
that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard here. See 
Dissent at 41–45. But Marzzarella applied intermediate 
scrutiny (before going on to apply strict scrutiny, just in case) 
because the law under attack did not even “come close” to a 
ban on the possession of firearms in the home. Marzzarella, 
614 F.3d at 97.  
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parsimonious a view of a constitutional right because a 
“right” that entitles its holder to nothing whatsoever “is no 
constitutional guarantee at all.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
When the Second Amendment applies, its core guarantee 
cannot be withdrawn by the legislature or balanced away by 
the courts.10 Rather, “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes 
out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of 
Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis 
whether the right is really worth insisting upon.” Id. at 634.11  
                                              
10 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 
(2004) (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees 
with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their 
design. Vague standards are manipulable . . . .”). 
11 Judges Ambro and Fuentes deny that § 922(g)(1) 
eviscerates the right to keep and bear arms. In Judge Ambro’s 
view, because “persons convicted of disqualifying offenses 
may possess handguns if (1) their convictions are expunged 
or set aside, (2) they receive pardons, or (3) they have their 
civil rights restored,” the statute is akin to run-of-the-mill 
regulations imposing “preconditions” to firearm possession 
by individuals with Second Amendment rights, such as safety 
training requirements. Ambro Op. 17–18. Far from it. To 
begin with, the “only . . . option” available to Binderup and 
Suarez to satisfy the so-called “precondition” imposed by 
§ 922(g)(1) is to receive pardons. Id. at 39. To frame this 
moonshot as a mere condition precedent to arms possession 
not unlike a training-course requirement strains credulity. 
Section 922(g)(1) is a ban on firearms possession subject to a 
few statutory exceptions, not a mere regulatory proviso that 
simply conditions exercise of the right on the completion of a 
background check or safety class.  
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3 
For the reasons stated, Barton alone provides the 
standard for an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a 
presumptively lawful regulatory measure (like § 922(g)(1)) 
                                                                                                     
Indeed, Heller itself shows the “precondition” 
characterization of § 922(g)(1) to be unavailing. The handgun 
ban and disassembly ordinance struck down in that case 
likewise had exceptions that could be abstractly framed as 
“conditions precedent” to exercise of the Second Amendment 
right: the handgun ban was subject to an exception that the 
Chief of Police could issue one-year handgun licenses at his 
discretion and the disassembly ordinance allowed residents to 
keep lawful firearms in the home so long as they were 
rendered inoperable. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75. But the 
Supreme Court did not understand the licensing exception as 
a condition precedent to handgun possession or the 
disassembly rule as a mere precondition on keeping firearms 
in the home; it viewed these carve-outs as “minor exceptions” 
and struck down both ordinances as unconstitutional 
destructions of the Second Amendment right. Id. at 575 n.1, 
629–30. The Dissent’s retort that Heller is distinguishable 
because there the “core ‘right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home’” was 
implicated and here it is not because Binderup and Suarez’s 
misdemeanors place them outside of that class puts the rabbit 
in the hat. Dissent at 45 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). If 
Binderup’s and Suarez’s offenses are not of the type that 
were historically understood to remove them from the class of 
persons entitled to Second Amendment rights, § 922(g)(1) 
effects the same type of untenable “conditions” that were 
deemed unconstitutional in Heller.  
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that denies a core Second Amendment right to a certain class 
of persons. And our opinion in that case explains the two 
things an individual must do to mount a successful as-applied 
challenge. First, he must identify the traditional justifications 
for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class 
of which he is a member. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 172. Only 
justifications with “historical pedigree” are relevant for 
regulations imposing a permanent disability. Id. Second, he 
must present facts about himself and his background that 
distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the 
historically barred class. Id. at 174. These facts must speak to 
the traditional justifications that legitimize the class’s 
disability. In Barton we noted at least two ways of doing this: 
(1) “a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might 
show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding 
citizen,” or (2) “a court might find that a felon whose crime of 
conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to 
society.”12 Id. 
 This does not mean, of course, that a dispossessed 
individual can win an as-applied challenge by promising to 
                                              
12 Our colleagues reject Barton’s mention of the 
possibility that “the passage of time or evidence of 
rehabilitation [might] restore the Second Amendment rights 
of people who committed serious crimes.” Ambro Op. 26. We 
have not been presented with historical evidence one way or 
another whether this might be a route to restoration of the 
right to keep and bear arms in at least some cases, so we 
would leave for another day the determination whether that 
turns out to be the case.   
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behave well in the future.13 Courts must diligently inquire 
into the facts to determine whether a challenger has 
                                              
13 The Government’s and the Dissent’s repeated 
citations on this point to Pontarelli v. U.S. Department of 
Treasury are inapposite. That case involved an appropriations 
ban that suspended the ability of the Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) to consider petitions from 
convicted felons for restoration of their firearms privileges 
under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), a statute that also gives federal 
district courts jurisdiction to review applications denied by 
ATF. 285 F.3d 216, 217 (3d Cir. 2002). We concluded that 
“because the appropriations ban suspends ATF’s ability to 
issue the ‘denial’ that § 925(c) makes a prerequisite, it 
effectively suspends that statute’s jurisdictional grant.” Id. 
Given that “[e]valuating a § 925(c) application requires a 
detailed investigation of the felon’s background and recent 
conduct,” which includes “interviewing a wide array of 
people, including the felon, his family, his friends, the 
persons whom he lists as character references, members of 
the community where he lives, his current and former 
employers, his coworkers, and his former parole officers,” we 
noted as a “[p]olicy [c]onsideration[]” that without prior ATF 
involvement and an adversarial process, “courts are without 
the tools necessary to conduct a systematic inquiry into an 
applicant’s background.” Id. If courts “reviewed applications 
de novo,” we reasoned, “they would be forced to rely 
primarily—if not exclusively—on information provided by 
the felon,” which “would be dangerously one-sided.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Contrary to 
the Government’s and the Dissent’s characterizations, a 
constitutional inquiry into a presumptively lawful statute is 
distinct from the one-sided, fact-intensive inquiry that would 
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adequately distinguished his own circumstances from those of 
persons historically barred from Second Amendment 
protections. Heller and Barton place the burden on the 
challenger to rebut the presumptive lawfulness of § 922(g)(1). 
See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174. That’s no easy task. Government 
evidence regarding one’s criminal history will require the 
challenger to make a strong showing to distinguish himself 
from others with criminal records. But to deny one even the 
opportunity to “develop [a] factual basis” in support of his 
constitutional claim would run afoul of both Supreme Court 
guidance regarding the scope of the Second Amendment and 
the concept of an as-applied challenge. Id. at 174. 
II 
A 
We agree with the District Courts that § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez. As far as 
the historical justification for felon dispossession goes, we 
explained it in Barton: the time-honored principle that the 
right to keep and bear arms does not extend to those likely to 
commit violent offenses. Because the Supreme Court 
declined to “expound upon the historical justifications” for 
                                                                                                     
have been called for were courts required to assess § 925(c) 
petitions in the first instance. Reviewing an as-applied 
constitutional challenge based on facts alleged by a 
challenger and weighing those facts against competing 
evidence proffered by the Government is not only something 
courts are equipped to do, it is our constitutional duty. See 
U.S. Const. arts. III and VI, cl. 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).  
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the list of presumptively lawful firearm exclusions in Heller, 
554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 635—leaving that task to us—Barton’s 
rationale warrants further explication. As stated, Heller 
instructs that the public understanding of the scope of the 
right to keep and bear arms at the time of the Second 
Amendment’s enactment dictates the scope of the right today. 
Id. at 605. In undertaking this inquiry, we are reminded that 
“[h]istorical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires 
resolving threshold questions, and making nuanced judgments 
about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it.” 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 803–04 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
The most germane evidence available directly supports 
the conclusion that the founding generation did not 
understand the right to keep and bear arms to extend to 
certain categories of people deemed too dangerous to possess 
firearms. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, 
Constitutionalists and other opponents of the Federalists 
proposed language stating that “no law shall be passed for 
disarming the people or any of them unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.” 
The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the 
Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, reprinted 
in Bernard Schwartz, 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary 
History 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis added). Likewise, at the 
Massachusetts ratifying convention just months later, Samuel 
Adams offered a proposal that the “Constitution be never 
construed to authorize Congress . . . to prevent the people of 
the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping 
their own arms.” Journal of Convention: Wednesday 
February 6, 1788, reprinted in Debates and Proceedings in 
the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Held 
in the Year 1788, at 86 (Boston, William White 1856) 
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(emphasis added). And the New Hampshire convention 
proposed that “Congress shall never disarm any Citizen 
unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.” 
Schwartz, 2 The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History at 
761.  
These proposals show that there was broad consensus 
between Federalists and their opponents on the existence and 
nature of the “natural right” to keep and bear arms for 
defensive purposes; what was controversial was whether the 
Constitution required a Bill of Rights to ensure the right to 
keep and bear arms (as so-called Anti-Federalists contended) 
or whether such an explicit guarantee was unnecessary in 
light of Congress’s limited delegated powers and might in 
fact backfire by minimizing other, unenumerated liberties (as 
Federalists argued). See Stephen P. Halbrook, The Founders’ 
Second Amendment 190–215 (surveying the debates at the 
ratifying conventions and highlighting the commonplace 
understanding that “dangerous persons could be disarmed”). 
Indeed, it is telling that in the crucibles of the ratifying 
conventions, such public declarations of the scope of the right 
to keep and bear arms did not provoke any apparent 
disagreement. See id. As we summarized in Barton, the 
“[d]ebates from the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire ratifying conventions, which were considered 
‘highly influential’ by the Supreme Court in Heller . . . 
confirm that the common law right to keep and bear arms did 
not extend to those who were likely to commit violent 
offenses.” 633 F.3d at 174. Hence, the best evidence we have 
indicates that the right to keep and bear arms was understood 
to exclude those who presented a danger to the public. 
A number of firearms restrictions from the founding 
and pre-founding era support this conclusion. Aside from 
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“complete bans on gun ownership by free blacks, slaves, 
Native Americans, and those of mixed race” (each of which 
today would be plainly unconstitutional), the founding 
generation also disarmed those who refused to pledge their 
loyalty to the Revolution, state, or nation. Adam Winkler, 
Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1562 (2009). As 
the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[a]lthough these Loyalists 
were neither criminals nor traitors, American legislators had 
determined that permitting these persons to keep and bear 
arms posed a potential danger.” Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. 
v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 
F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United States v. 
Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that 
Massachusetts required participants in Shays’ Rebellion to 
obtain a pardon for taking up arms against the state, to swear 
allegiance to the state, and to give up their firearms for three 
years). This principle had some roots in the English arms 
tradition, wherein the Crown had the authority “to disarm not 
only papists, but dangerous and disaffected persons as well.” 
Patrick J. Charles, “Arms for Their Defence”?: An Historical, 
Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have 
Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be 
Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 57 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 351, 382 (2009); cf. Robert H. Churchill, Gun 
Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in 
Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment, 
25 L. & Hist. Rev. 139, 164 (2007) (noting that although 
“English law supplied ample precedent” to disarm 
“‘dangerous’ citizens,” the power was rarely practiced by 
early American governments). In short, “from time 
immemorial, various jurisdictions recognizing a right to arms 
have . . . taken the step of forbidding suspect groups from 
having arms,” and “American legislators at the time of the 
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Bill of Rights seem to have been aware of this tradition.” Don 
B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment 
Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings 
L.J. 1339, 1360 (2009); see also Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Pol’y at 711–12 (examining later laws (upheld in courts) 
barring possession of firearms while intoxicated and 
possession of firearms by “tramps” (roaming beggars) and 
construing them in terms of the “present danger” of 
misconduct presented by such persons were they to carry 
firearms).  
Although the debates from the ratifying conventions 
point strongly toward a limit on Second Amendment rights 
centered on dangerousness, dispossessory regulations enacted 
to that end were few and far between in the first century of 
our Republic. Consequently, some have reckoned that “[t]he 
historical evidence” regarding the scope of the Second 
Amendment “is inconclusive at best.” United States v. Skoien, 
614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., 
dissenting). We disagree. Even though “[t]he Founding 
generation had no laws . . . denying the right [to keep and 
bear arms] to people convicted of crimes,” Winkler, 56 
UCLA L. Rev. at 1563, novelty does not mean 
unconstitutionality. After all, “[t]he paucity of eighteenth 
century gun control laws might have reflected a lack of 
political demand rather than constitutional limitations.” 
Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and 
Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1343, 1354 
(2009). 
Thus, a common thread running through the words and 
actions of the Founders gives us a distinct principle to inform 
our understanding of the original public meaning of the text 
of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. 
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& Pub. Pol’y at 698 (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in 
America and pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms 
disability can be consistent with the Second Amendment to 
the extent that . . . its basis credibly indicates a present danger 
that one will misuse arms against others and the disability 
redresses that danger.”); id. at 727–28 (“[T]o the extent that 
one can distill any guidance from the English disability and 
the Revolutionary disarmament, it would seem at most to be 
that persons who by their actions—not just their thoughts—
betray a likelihood of violence against the state may be 
disarmed.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, What the Framers 
Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to ‘Bear Arms’, 
49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 151, 161 (1986) (concluding that 
“violent criminals, children, and those of unsound mind may 
be deprived of firearms” (emphasis added)). In sum, the 
historical record leads us to conclude that the public 
understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment was 
tethered to the principle that the Constitution permitted the 
dispossession of persons who demonstrated that they would 
present a danger to the public if armed.14  
                                              
14 In arguing generally that all persons with criminal 
records are not entitled to Second Amendment rights, the 
Government and the Dissent emphasize the fact that “[w]e as 
a society require persons convicted of crimes to forfeit any 
number of rights and privileges, including the right to sit on a 
jury, the right to hold elective office, and the right to vote.” 
Dissent at 2. But these forfeitable rights have different 
histories and different constitutional dimensions. Consider the 
right to vote, which like the right to keep and bear arms has 
been declared fundamental by the Supreme Court. See 
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). Although the 
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Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause does not require states 
to advance a compelling interest before denying citizens who 
have been convicted of crimes the right to vote, Richardson v. 
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974), that result was demanded by 
the Constitution’s text. Specifically, the Court relied on the 
“understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as reflected in [ ] express language” of Section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment that affirmatively contemplates 
criminal disenfranchisement, despite Section 1’s guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws. Id. Accordingly, felons fall 
outside the scope of the fundamental right to vote. See Wesley 
v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he right 
of felons to vote is not fundamental.”). Probably due to the 
breadth of this exclusion from the right to vote, the Supreme 
Court has not indicated that a disenfranchised criminal might 
succeed in demonstrating that such disenfranchisement is 
unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the historical 
understanding of the right. Rather, a challenger’s only option 
is to show that a particular disenfranchisement provision is 
either irrational or discriminatory. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 
56; Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). Thus, 
the scope of the right to vote is historically and textually 
distinct from the Second Amendment right. 
 Nor do limits on jury service or eligibility for public 
office offer any insight into the scope of the Second 
Amendment, not least because they are not fundamental 
rights. See Carter v. Jury Comm’n of Greene Cnty., 396 U.S. 
320, 332 (1970) (“The States remain free to confine the 
selection to citizens, to persons meeting specified 
qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those 
possessing good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair 
 30 
 
Section 922(g)(1) sweeps much more broadly than this 
traditional ground for disarmament. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 
173 (“Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was meant to keep 
firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people, 
Congress did not bar non-violent felons from possessing guns 
until 1961.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 24 & n.14 (1st Cir. 
2011) (“[I]n covering only those with a record of violent 
crime, § 922(g)(9) [(dispossession of domestic violence 
misdemeanants)] is arguably more consistent with the 
historical regulation of firearms than § 922(g)(1),” which 
“applies to all individuals convicted of a federal felony, thus 
encompassing individuals convicted of crimes as disparate as 
tax evasion and bank robbery. This breadth, and particularly 
the inclusion of nonviolent offenses, constitutes a significant 
departure from earlier understandings of a ‘felony.’ At 
common law, for example, ‘[o]nly the most serious crimes’ 
were considered to be felonies.” (internal citations omitted)); 
supra n.14. The upshot of all this is that the as-applied 
                                                                                                     
character.”); James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: 
Reviving A Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality 
of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & 
L. 1, 3 (2009) (“The Supreme Court does not recognize the 
right to sit on a jury as fundamental.”); Lindsay v. Bowen, 750 
F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that there is no 
“fundamental right to run for public office”); U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. amend. X.  
These defeasible civil rights cannot be invoked to 
justify disarming Binderup and Suarez. They are different 
rights, with different histories and scopes, subject to different 
constitutional analyses.  
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constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is tied to its historical 
justification: people who have demonstrated that they are 
likely to commit violent crimes have no constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms.15 
B 
The Government’s divergent reading of the historical 
scope of the Second Amendment—also adopted in different 
ways by Judges Ambro and Fuentes—is unconvincing. 
Relying on the republican notion of “civic virtue,” the 
Government maintains that Binderup’s and Suarez’s 
misdemeanor convictions place them outside the class of 
“those members of the polity who were deemed capable of 
exercising [the right to keep and bear arms] in a virtuous 
manner.” Gov’t Suarez Br. 14 (quoting Saul Cornell, “Don’t 
Know Much about History”: The Current Crisis in Second 
Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. Ky. L Rev. 657, 679 (2002)). 
To be sure, “[s]ome scholarship suggests that at the time of 
the nation’s founding, the right to bear arms was not 
understood to extend to those convicted of a felony, either 
because they were not believed to be among ‘the people’ 
whose right to bear arms was protected, or because they 
                                              
15 This rationale is consonant with the governmental 
interest usually offered today as justification for 
dispossession: public safety. But the traditional principle that 
constrained the class of persons not entitled to keep and bear 
arms still governs. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35 
(“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were 
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or 
not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that 
scope too broad.”). 
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lacked the requisite ‘virtue’ necessary for firearm 
possession.” Alexander C. Barrett, Note, Taking Aim at 
Felony Possession, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 163, 194–95 & n.197 
(2013) (citing Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A 
Dialogue, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986) (offering 
that the right to keep and bear arms was tied to the idea of the 
“virtuous citizen,” such that “the right to arms does not 
preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e., criminals) or 
those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are 
deemed incapable of virtue”)); see also Don B. Kates, Jr. & 
Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1360 
(2009) (“[T]here is every reason to believe that the Founding 
Fathers would have deemed persons convicted of any of the 
common law felonies not to be among ‘the [virtuous] people’ 
to whom they were guaranteeing the right to arms.”) 
(alteration in original).  
 This “virtue” standard—especially in the pliable 
version articulated by the Government—is implausible 
because the “civic republican” view of the scope of the 
Second Amendment is wrong. Although courts, scholars, and 
litigants have cited this supposed limitation,16 this virtuous-
                                              
16 See, e.g., United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 
684–85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Whatever the pedigree 
of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing weapons 
. . . most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the 
right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous 
citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm 
‘unvirtuous citizens.’”) (cited in Govt. Binderup Br. 13 and 
Govt. Suarez Br. 13–14); United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 
1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e observe that most scholars 
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citizens-only conception of the right to keep and bear arms is 
closely associated with pre-Heller interpretations of the 
                                                                                                     
of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms 
was ‘inextricably . . . tied to’ the concept of a ‘virtuous 
citizen[ry]’ that would protect society through ‘defensive use 
of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign 
enemies alike,’ and that ‘the right to bear arms does not 
preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e. 
criminals).’ We recognize, however, that the historical 
question has not been definitively resolved.” (internal 
citations omitted)) (cited in Govt. Binderup Br. 12–13 and 
Govt. Suarez Br. 13–14).   
Yancey relies on a 19th century treatise by Thomas M. 
Cooley for the proposition that the Constitution “protect[s] 
rights for “the People” excluding, among others, “the idiot, 
the lunatic, and the felon.” 621 F.3d at 685 (citing Cooley, A 
Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 29 (Boston, Little 
Brown & Co. 1868)). But this interpretation of Cooley’s 
Treatise has been thoroughly debunked (and, indeed, already 
had been prior to Yancey’s publication). See Marshall, 32 
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 709–10 (“The . . . discussion in 
Cooley [cited for felon dispossession] . . . concerns classes 
excluded from voting. These included women and the 
property-less—both being citizens and protected by arms 
rights. When Cooley does address the right to keep and bear 
arms, one finds this: ‘[H]ow far it may be in the power of the 
legislature to regulate the right we shall not undertake to say. 
Happily there neither has been, nor, we may hope, is likely to 
be, much occasion for the examination of that question by the 
courts.’”) (quoting Cooley, Treatise at 499 (Victor H. Lane 
ed., 7th ed. 1903)). 
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Second Amendment by proponents of the “sophisticated 
collective rights model” who rejected the view that the 
Amendment confers an individual right and instead 
characterized the right as a “civic right . . . . exercised by 
citizens, not individuals . . . who act together in a collective 
manner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a well 
regulated militia.” Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, A Well 
Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun 
Control, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491–92 (2004).17  
 Moreover, this supposed limitation on the Second 
Amendment stems from a misreading of an academic debate 
about “ideological interpretation,” Cornell & DeDino, 73 
Fordham L. Rev. at 528 n.29, the gist of which concerns the 
extent to which the Founders were civic republicans or 
libertarians as well as what bearing these ideologies might 
have had on how they understood the right to keep and bear 
arms. See Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the 
Second Amendment, 69 J. Am. Hist. 599, 599–601 (1982) (the 
article that served as contemporary scholars’ principal source 
                                              
17 Cf. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 
378 (D.C. Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(rejecting the view that “the Second Amendment protects 
private possession of weapons only in connection with 
performance of civic duties as part of a well-regulated citizens 
militia organized for the security of a free state” (second 
emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted)); David T. 
Hardy, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1237, 1241–84 (2007) 
(reviewing Saul Cornell, A Well-Regulated Militia: The 
Founding Fathers and the Origin of Gun Control in America 
(2006)) (marshaling considerable historical evidence against 
Cornell’s “civic right only” approach). 
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for the “virtuousness” limitation). Unfortunately, this 
literature sheds no light on “who” was thought to enjoy the 
right to keep and bear arms (at least, none beyond the now-
settled individual-versus-collective right interpretation). 
Rather, it relates to the rationale for having a right to keep 
and bear arms in the first place. See id. at 606–07 
(characterizing the right to keep and bear arms as one with 
both individual- and collective-right elements and claiming 
that the Founders’ unique blend of republicanism and 
libertarianism led them to “perceive[] a vital relationship 
between vigorous republican husbandmen and the possession 
of arms” and believe that a “man capable of defending 
himself with arms if necessary was prerequisite for 
maintaining the moral character to be a good republican”); 
Robert E. Shalhope, The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic, 
49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 125, 132 (1986) (explaining that 
strains of civic republicanism in early-American culture 
viewed arms possession as critical to the virtue of the 
citizenry and the spirit of the state, but never characterizing 
the possession of virtue as a prerequisite to arms rights).  
This literature does not help us identify the types of 
people who were not entitled to exercise Second Amendment 
rights.18 Contemporary advocates of a “virtuousness” 
                                              
18 Not least because it rests largely on a theoretical 
foundation that the Supreme Court has twice now rejected. 
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767–68. 
And as at least one scholar has surmised: “[i]f the Second 
Amendment does provide a right to own guns for self-
defense, republicanism cannot supply the intellectual 
foundation for it.” Williams, 101 Yale L.J. at 559 (emphasis 
added).  
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limitation have projected that constraint onto the right to keep 
and bear arms based on the fact that the very existence of the 
right was informed by republican philosophical principles.19 
That is not enough. We have found no historical evidence on 
the public meaning of the right to keep and bear arms 
indicating that “virtuousness” was a limitation on one’s 
qualification for the right—contemporary insistence to the 
contrary falls somewhere between guesswork and ipse dixit.  
Furthermore, it is hard to understand what the 
Government’s proposed “virtuousness” limitation would even 
require. The Government has offered no guidance in this 
regard, except to urge that we defer to legislative judgments 
about what sorts of offenses or characteristics render one 
insufficiently “virtuous” to enjoy a fundamental right. The 
Dissent and to a lesser extent Judge Ambro have accepted this 
approach. The legislative judgments set forth in the margin 
are but a few illustrations of its deep flaws.20 We doubt the 
                                              
19 One of the primary proponents of this school of 
thought has conceded that “[h]istorical scholarship has 
abandoned the notion that American political culture can be 
understood in terms of any single ideological tradition, and 
has embraced a more pluralistic conception of the intellectual 
world of the founders,” though he remains a devotee of the 
civic-virtue limitation. Cornell & DeDino, 73 Fordham L. 
Rev. at 492. 
20 Were we to adopt the Government’s proposed 
standard, consider a few examples of offenses that would 
(and currently do) render one permanently disqualified from 
possessing firearms. In Arizona, simple possession of any 
amount of marijuana is a felony punishable by enough jail 
time that any conviction triggers § 922(g)(1). See Ariz. Rev. 
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Stat. Ann. § 13-3405. As the Government would have it, the 
last three Presidents of the United States would have been 
forever barred from possessing firearms had their youthful 
indiscretions been prosecuted in the Copper State. Or 
consider Michigan, which has a generous (10-cents-per-
container) repayment policy for recyclable cans and bottles 
returned to the state—so long as the beverage containers were 
purchased in state. But one who returns out-of-state 
containers is subject to a felony count of beverage return of 
nonrefundable bottles punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment (thus disabling the conniving interstate recycler 
under § 922(g)(1)). See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§ 445.574a(1)(d). This spells disqualification for Kramer, 
Newman, and at least one recent real-life offender. See 
Seinfeld: The Bottle Deposit (NBC television broadcast May 
2, 1996); Seinfeld-inspired ‘Michigan bottle deposit scam’ 
lands Kramer wannabe in hot water (RT America Jun. 15, 
2016), available at https://www.rt.com/viral/346835-seinfeld-
michigan-bottle-deposit/. Finally, library theft in 
Pennsylvania constitutes a (federally disabling) misdemeanor 
of the first degree—punishable by up to five years’ 
imprisonment—if the value of the material is $150 or more. 
18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3929.1. These examples 
illustrate the saliency of Heller’s admonition that 
“[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were 
understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or 
not future legislatures . . . think that scope too broad.” 554 
U.S. 634–35. We would contravene this instruction and set 
dangerous precedent for other constitutional rights were we to 
blithely accept that “[i]f the citizens of a particular state 
believe that a criminal offense is too minor to trigger 
disarmament, their remedy is to petition the state legislature 
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to amend the law—not to seek redress in the federal courts.” 
Dissent at 61.  
The Government’s theory is all the more questionable 
when analogized to other constitutional rights, such as the 
First Amendment’s free-speech guarantee. Like limitations on 
the scope of the Second Amendment, the unprotected status 
of obscenity, fighting words, and the like is rooted in our 
history. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 
383 (1992). These free-speech exceptions mean that while 
Congress can sharply restrict speech that amounts to 
obscenity or fighting words as traditionally understood, it 
may not substantially redefine what counts as obscenity or 
fighting words in order to reach otherwise protected 
expression. See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 
(1958) (“[T]he line between speech unconditionally 
guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, 
suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.”); Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“[T]he power to 
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a 
permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”); 
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521–25 (1972) (statute that 
state claimed would only reach “fighting words” was 
unconstitutionally overbroad where its terms criminalized 
expression that a listener would find merely offensive or 
insulting). For instance, it would be plainly unconstitutional 
for a legislature to redefine “obscenity” in order to capture 
expression that would otherwise escape the traditional scope 
of obscenity as defined by the Supreme Court. See Janicki v. 
Pizza, 722 F.2d 1274, 1276 (6th Cir. 1983); Ashcroft v. Free 
Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). In other words, the 
historical scope of the First Amendment—not Congress—
determines the parameters of the right. 
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Founders designed a fundamental constitutional right to turn 
on such vagaries. Although it “befits a diverse nation of fifty 
sovereign States and countless municipalities . . . [that] gun 
regulation in the United States resembles a patchwork quilt 
that largely reflects local custom,” Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), to make 
an individual’s entitlement to the Second Amendment right 
itself turn on the predilections of the legislature governing his 
or her patch is deference the Constitution won’t bear. See 
McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750 (holding that “the Second 
Amendment right is fully applicable to the States” (emphasis 
added)). 
                                                                                                     
The import of this analogy for the Second Amendment 
is straightforward: although certain types of criminals are 
excluded from the right to keep and bear arms, this traditional 
limitation on the scope of the right may not be expanded by 
legislative fiat. To hold otherwise would treat the Second 
Amendment “as a second-class right, subject to an entirely 
different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights 
guarantees.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion). 
The historical record indicates that the right to keep and bear 
arms was publicly understood at the time of the Constitution’s 
enactment to secure a broadly held natural right that did not 
extend to violent criminals. To redefine the type of “criminal” 
that would qualify for dispossession via a malleable 
“virtuousness” standard in order to capture former nonviolent 
misdemeanants who are in all other respects indistinguishable 
from normal, law-abiding citizens would be akin to redefining 
“fighting words” to encompass run-of-the-mill “trash talk.” 
The Constitution takes each of these temptations “off the 
table.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
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 Even if we were to attempt to apply the notion of civic 
virtue to felon dispossession, it is doubtful the Government 
would prevail. Although felons at common law “were 
essentially stripped of property and other rights,” the term 
“felony” “applied only to a few very serious, very dangerous 
offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and robbery”—in other 
words, crimes closely associated with violence. Kates & 
Cramer, 60 Hastings L.J. at 1362. But see Marshall, 32 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 715–16 (casting doubt on the claim that a 
felony conviction necessarily entailed permanent 
dispossession). Indeed, one of the scholars cited by the 
Government concludes that insofar as a statute “would seek to 
bar arms possession by” persons who have been convicted of 
a nonviolent “felony” in the modern sense, “those laws would 
seem to be invalid.” Kates & Cramer, 60 Hastings L.J. at 
1363. See Barrett, 93 B.U. L. Rev. at 196 (“[E]ven if some 
felons were historically understood to be barred from 
possessing firearms, the common law term ‘felony’ applied to 
only a few select categories of serious crimes at the time the 
Second Amendment was ratified, while in modern times, vast 
categories of ‘non-dangerous’ activities qualify as 
felonious.”); Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 729–30 
(explaining that the first federal felony dispossession laws 
applied only to a core group of crimes including “murder, 
manslaughter, rape, mayhem, aggravated assault . . . robbery, 
burglary, housebreaking, and attempt to commit any of these 
crimes”). And at least one of our sister courts faced with the 
virtuousness argument treated “virtue” as basically 
synonymous with “non-dangerous.” See United States v. Rene 
E., 583 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (“To be sure, there is an 
ongoing debate among historians about the extent to which 
the right to bear arms in the founding period turned on 
concerns about the possessor’s ‘virtue,’ i.e., on a legislative 
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judgment that possession of firearms by a certain class of 
individuals would pose a serious danger to the public.” 
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, we reject the Government’s 
suggestion that Second Amendment protections are limited 
“to those members of the polity who were deemed capable of 
exercising [the right to keep and bear arms] in a virtuous 
manner.” Gov’t Suarez Br. 14.  
C 
 All this means that Binderup and Suarez must 
distinguish themselves and their circumstances from those of 
persons not entitled to keep and bear arms because of their 
propensity for violence. And as the District Courts found, 
both men did so. Specifically, each is a misdemeanant 
convicted of a non-violent crime who has shown “that he is 
no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.” See 
Barton, 633 F.3d at 174. While we agree with the 
Government that the felony-misdemeanor distinction is 
“minor and often arbitrary,” especially since “numerous 
misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many 
felonies,” Gov’t Binderup Br. 19 and Gov’t Suarez Br. 18 
(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985)), that is 
beside the point here. Our focus must remain on the 
legitimate (i.e., traditional) concern that justifies the 
dispossession of certain offenders: we cannot trust them not 
to commit violent crimes with firearms. The Government 
concedes that “the Supreme Court might find some felonies 
so tame and technical as to be insufficient to justify the 
ban,”21 Gov’t Binderup Br. 15 and Gov’t Suarez Br. 15 
                                              
21 The Dissent acknowledges this view, but expresses 
confidence that “institutional considerations” will prevent 
particularly absurd disarmaments. Dissent at 61. In our view, 
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(quoting United States v. Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d 110, 113 
(1st Cir. 2011)), but it insists that Binderup’s and Suarez’s 
misdemeanors do not qualify. We disagree.  
For purposes of the traditional justifications animating 
§ 922(g)(1), both Binderup’s corruption of minors offense 
and Suarez’s licensing violation were nonviolent 
misdemeanors. In Barton, we described the violent crimes of 
the sort that motivated felon dispossession since 1938 in the 
following way: “For nearly a quarter century, § 922(g)(1) had 
a narrower basis for a disability, limited to those convicted of 
a ‘crime of violence.’ ‘Crimes of violence’ were commonly 
understood to include only those offenses ‘ordinarily 
committed with the aid of firearms.’” Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 
(quoting Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 698, 702 
(2009)) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the “Federal Firearms Act of 1938 only restricted 
firearm possession for those individuals convicted of a ‘crime 
of violence,’ defined as ‘murder, manslaughter, rape, 
mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking, and certain 
forms of aggravated assault—assault with intent to kill, 
commit rape, or rob; assault with a dangerous weapon, or 
assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by 
imprisonment for more than one year’”). Dispossession on the 
basis of a conviction for these sorts of crimes comports with 
the original public understanding of the scope of the right to 
keep and bear arms.  
                                                                                                     
questionable disarmaments raise questions of constitutional 
law.  
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Neither Binderup’s improper relationship with an 
employee capable of consent nor Suarez’s possession of a 
handgun that he could have possessed lawfully had he 
acquired a license meets this description. Nor did their 
offenses involve any actual violent behavior. It is true that a 
small handful of States would classify Binderup’s offense as 
statutory rape22 or sexual abuse. And there are certainly 
circumstances in which an inappropriate and illegal 
relationship like Binderup’s might involve implicit or genuine 
violence. Such facts would make his a much different case. 
But as the District Court explained: 
There is simply nothing in the record here 
which would support a reasonable inference that 
[Binderup] used any violence, force, or threat of 
force to initiate or maintain the sexual 
relationship with his seventeen-year-old 
employee. Moreover, there is no record 
evidence present here which would support a 
reasonable inference that [he] was convicted of 
any crime of violence (or that he even engaged 
in any violent or threatening conduct) before or 
after his November 1997 conviction for 
[c]orruption of minors. 
                                              
22 As the District Court pointed out, however, Black’s 
Law Dictionary “defines ‘statutory rape’ as ‘[u]nlawful 
sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent (as 
defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that 
person’s will.’”  Binderup v. Holder, 2014 WL 4764424, at 
*24 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1374 (9th ed. 2009)) (emphasis added). 
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Binderup, 2014 WL 4764424, at *22. Nor is there any “record 
evidence [that] supports a reasonable inference that he has a 
propensity to commit violent acts, sexual or otherwise.” Id. at 
*23. In a real stretch, the Government likens Binderup’s 
conduct to that which was felonized by a 1576 English statute 
that forbade “carnal[] knowl[edge]” of “any woman child 
under the age of ten years.” Gov’t Binderup Br. 15–16 
(quoting Mortimer Levine, A More Than Ordinary Case of 
“Rape,” 13 and 14 Elizabeth I, 7 Am. J. Legal Hist. 159, 163 
(1963)). Deplorable as it was, however, Binderup’s conduct 
involved a seventeen-year-old capable of consent,23 was not 
subject to criminal sanction at the time of the founding, and—
most importantly—did not involve violence, force, or threat 
of force.  
The nonviolent nature of Suarez’s offense is evident as 
well. The Government’s unremarkable observation that 
Maryland’s licensing requirement relates to public safety does 
not make Suarez’s offense a violent crime. It neither involved 
the actual use or threatened use of force, nor was it “closely 
related to violent crime” in the way that drug trafficking and 
receiving stolen weapons are. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174. 
Heller characterized the Second Amendment as guaranteeing 
“the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis 
added). The Government relies on the Fourth Circuit’s 
                                              
23 Cf. Commonwealth v. Hughlett, 378 A.2d 326, 329 
(Pa. Super. 1977) (noting that “[i]t is axiomatic that females 
under the age of 16 may not legally assent to sexual acts of 
. . . any kind”). 
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decision in United States v. Pruess to argue that Suarez’s 
violation of a lawful, well-established firearm regulation 
demonstrates that he is not a responsible, law-abiding citizen. 
That reliance is misplaced.  
 In Pruess, the Fourth Circuit rejected an as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) by a felon whose disqualifying 
convictions related to his prior sales of illegal arms, 
concluding that Pruess could not “rebut the presumption of 
lawfulness of the felon-in-possession prohibition as applied to 
him.”  703 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2012). Although Pruess, 
like Suarez, had committed regulatory violations, his 
circumstances were dissimilar from Suarez’s in every other 
way. For example, Pruess had committed “repeated violations 
of the firearms laws, leading to at least twenty prior 
convictions,” and admitted that although he “did not intend to 
use them for violence himself . . . he believed that [certain] 
weapons and ammunition underlying his convictions were 
stolen.” Id. His repeated dealings in stolen, illegal weapons—
such as fully automatic AK-47’s and grenades—appropriately 
led the court to conclude that Pruess had committed acts 
“closely related to violent crime” and “flunk[ed] the ‘law-
abiding responsible citizen’ requirement.” Id. at 244, 246. 
Suarez, by comparison, committed a nonviolent firearms 
licensing offense with respect to an otherwise lawful weapon 
decades ago, the circumstances of which were unassociated 
with violence.24   
                                              
24 A number of other cases have applied Barton in 
rejecting as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Like Pruess, 
the challengers in those cases have little in common with 
Suarez. See United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 319–20 
(4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]hree prior felony convictions for 
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 In addition to showing that neither their offenses nor 
the circumstances surrounding them involved any violence or 
threat of violence, Binderup and Suarez have also 
demonstrated that their subsequent behavior confirms their 
membership among the class of responsible, law-abiding 
citizens to whom Second Amendment protection extends. As 
the District Courts found, both men presented compelling 
evidence that they are responsible citizens, each with a job, a 
family, and a clean record since 1997 and 1998. Their home 
State has seen fit to reinstate their right to keep and bear arms. 
And though it’s by no means dispositive in Suarez’s case, the 
fact that the United States deems him upright enough to 
entrust him with the Nation’s secrets is further evidence that 
he is a “typical law-abiding citizen.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 174. 
 The Government has presented no evidence that either 
Binderup or Suarez has been, or would be, dangerous, violent, 
or irresponsible with firearms.25 For all these reasons, the 
                                                                                                     
common law robbery and two prior convictions for assault 
with a deadly weapon on a government official clearly 
demonstrate that [Moore] is far from a law-abiding, 
responsible citizen.”); United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215, 
221–22, 221 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2012) (32 arrests and 16 
convictions for offenses such as assault of a police officer, 
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and destruction 
of property); United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905, 909 
(8th Cir. 2014) (three prior felony convictions for aggravated 
assault and resisting arrest). 
25 To be sure, Suarez’s 1998 DUI conviction was a 
dangerous act—but not in the sense of the traditional 
concerns motivating felon dispossession. See, e.g., Begay v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (holding that drunk 
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District Courts did not err when they found § 922(g)(1) 
unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez. 
D 
The Government cites a number of recidivism studies 
as a final justification for permanently disarming Binderup 
and Suarez. It notes that felons commit violent crimes more 
frequently than nonfelons. See Bureau of Justice Statistics, 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 
1994 at 6 (2002) (finding that, within a population of 234,358 
federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrest for 
homicides were 53 times the national average). Relatedly, it 
highlights a 1994 study finding that approximately one in five 
offenders imprisoned for nonviolent crimes were rearrested 
for violent offenses within three years of their release. See 
Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet, Profile of Nonviolent 
Offenders Exiting State Prisons, tbl.11 (Oct. 2004), available 
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf. The 
Government’s second piece of evidence is a study comparing 
denials of handgun purchases to convicted felons with 
successful purchases by persons arrested but not convicted of 
a felony. The study found that the “denial of handgun 
purchases is associated with a reduction in risk for later 
criminal activity of approximately 20% to 30%.” Mona A. 
Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to 
Persons Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence, 89 
Am. J. of Pub. Health 88, 89 (1999).  
                                                                                                     
driving is not a “violent felony” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act because it does not involve “purposeful, violent, 
and aggressive conduct”).  
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Finally, with respect to Binderup, it notes that “[s]ex 
offenders” (which Binderup is not) “present a high risk of 
recidivism.” Gov’t Binderup Br. 28 (citing Pennsylvania 
Dep’t of Corrections, Recidivism Report, 21 tbl. 12 (Feb. 8, 
2013), available at http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013-PA-DOC-Recidivism-Report.pdf) 
(finding that 50 percent of persons convicted of statutory rape 
and 60.2 percent of those convicted of  “[o]ther [s]exual 
[o]ffenses” were rearrested or reincarcerated within three 
years of release from Pennsylvania prison) and U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Special Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 
1994, 8 tbls.9, 15, available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf (finding a 41.4 
percent rearrest rate among persons convicted for “other 
sexual assault”). And with respect to Suarez, the Government 
emphasizes that persons arrested for “weapons offenses” are 
rearrested at high rates within a few years. Gov’t Br. 30 & nn. 
10–11 (citing studies). In addition, it relies upon a study 
indicating that California handgun purchasers in 1977 “who 
had prior convictions for nonviolent firearm-related offenses 
such as carrying concealed firearms in public, but none for 
violent offenses,” were over four times more likely to be 
charged with a later violent offense than a person with no 
criminal history. See Garen J. Wintemute et al., Prior 
Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent 
and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized 
Purchasers of Handguns, 280 Am. Med. Ass’n 2083, 2086 
(1998).   
The Government presents this evidence in its argument 
that § 922(g)(1) satisfies intermediate scrutiny as applied to 
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Binderup and Suarez.26 But as we have explained, that 
inquiry is inappropriate in this case. Applying some form of 
                                              
26 Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Dissent agrees 
with the Government that—to the extent that Binderup and 
Suarez are protected by the Second Amendment—their 
permanent disarmament under § 922(g)(1) is a “‘reasonable 
fit’ to carry out the Government’s purpose[s].” Dissent at 65. 
Should we be incorrect that § 922(g)(1) is categorically 
unconstitutional as applied to challengers who fall within the 
protective scope of the Second Amendment, we find Judge 
Ambro’s analysis more persuasive. Of course, the gap 
between Judge Ambro’s and the Dissent’s applications of 
Marzzarella’s “step two” assessment in this case highlights 
our concern that such interest-balancing exercises are too 
malleable when it comes to laws that eviscerate fundamental 
rights. Indeed, we fear that the winners and losers of 
“heightened” scrutiny contests are increasingly reflective of 
what rights—enumerated or not—“scrutinizing” judges favor 
or disfavor. As a Ninth Circuit judge presciently noted: 
“Judges know very well how to read the Constitution broadly 
when they are sympathetic to the right being asserted. . . . 
When a particular right comports especially well with our 
notions of good social policy, we build magnificent legal 
edifices on elliptical constitutional phrases—or even the 
white spaces between lines of constitutional text. But . . . 
when we’re none too keen on a particular constitutional 
guarantee, we can be equally ingenious . . . .” Silveira v. 
Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc of a panel 
decision adopting the “collective right” interpretation of the 
Second Amendment), panel decision abrogated by Heller, 
554 U.S. 570.  
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means-end scrutiny in an as-applied challenge against an 
absolute ban—after it has already been established that the 
individual has a right to keep and bear arms—eviscerates that 
right via judicial interest balancing in direct contravention of 
Heller. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 785 (“In Heller . . . we 
expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second 
Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest 
balancing.”). What matters, when it comes to a presumptively 
lawful regulation that eliminates the right to keep and bear 
arms, is whether Binderup and Suarez can distinguish 
themselves as responsible, law-abiding citizens in contrast to 
the class of persons historically understood to be excluded 
from Second Amendment protection.  
Even if the Government’s generalized studies are 
recast as addressing the issue of scope,27 they still fall short. 
Perhaps the Government might use statistics to demonstrate 
that persons who commit certain nonviolent crimes have a 
high likelihood of violent recidivism, even decades later. But 
that conclusion would stretch the notion of “close 
association” and the historical roots of felon disarmament. 
Moreover, it would require untangling a number of 
complicating variables, such as the effects of incarceration. 
Recidivism studies of this type would be better suited to 
demonstrating a means-end fit for less restrictive firearm 
regulations on criminals otherwise protected by the Second 
Amendment (such as waiting periods or licensing 
                                              
27 Judge Gardner astutely observed that “the 
contentions [that the Government] contend[s] these studies 
support are . . . pertinent to the analysis of [an] as-applied 
challenge under the Barton framework.” Binderup, 2014 WL 
4764424, at *26. 
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requirements). Either way, the studies cited by the 
Government don’t cut it.  
First, Binderup and Suarez were not convicted of 
felonies and have never been incarcerated, which renders 
irrelevant most of the Government’s studies. The Government 
argues that even criminals placed on probation rather than 
sent to prison have a heightened risk of recidivism. But the 
study it cites found that “[g]enerally, the risk of recidivism 
was highest during the first year after admission to 
probation,” and that “[a]s released prisoners and probationers 
age, they tend to exhibit lower rates of recidivism.” Iowa Div. 
of Crim. & Juvenile Justice Planning, Recidivism Among 
Iowa Probationers, at 2 (July 2005), available at 
http://publications.iowa.gov/15032/ (last visited Sept. 3, 
2016). Given Binderup’s and Suarez’s ages, the study cited 
by the Government would predict that they pose a negligible 
chance of being arrested for a violent crime and a zero 
percent chance of being arrested for a violent felony. Id. at 
39–40. Second, the denial-of-handgun survey was restricted 
to felons with extensive criminal records and conceded not 
only that the “modest benefit” it observed “may reflect the 
fact that the members of both study groups had extensive 
criminal records and therefore were at high risk for later 
criminal activity,” but also that “this study was too small to 
determine whether the differences occurred by chance.” 
Wright et al., 89 Am. J. of Pub. Health at 89.  
Finally, the Government’s sex-offender recidivism 
evidence paints with too broad a brush. Binderup’s 
misdemeanor was not classified as a sexual offense and did 
not trigger a duty to register as a sex offender. Compare 18 
Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 6301(a)(1)(i), with 18 Pa. Const. Stat. 
Ann. § 3103–3144. The report does not appear to cover 
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corruption-of-minors recidivists and lumps Binderup together 
with an amalgam of persons guilty of a broad range of 
unspecified sexual offenses. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office 
of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special 
Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 8 tbls.9, 
15. The same goes for the dated firearm-offense recidivism 
study the Government invokes against Suarez, which covers a 
wide, unspecified range of “nonviolent firearm-related 
offenses.” Wintemute, 280 Am. Med. Ass’n at 2086. 
Common sense dictates that violent recidivism rates are 
different for drug dealers carrying unlicensed firearms to 
protect their turf and ordinary citizens carrying unlicensed 
firearms for self-defense (behavior that several states do not 
even criminalize). See GAO, States’ Laws and Requirements 
for Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across Nation 8–9 (2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592552.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 3, 2016).  
Without more, the Government’s studies don’t support 
the application of § 922(g)(1) to Binderup and Suarez. Given 
the uncontroverted evidence they have presented 
distinguishing themselves from persons who are not entitled 
to keep and bear arms, the Government needs to offer more 
than regression analyses of recidivism (largely by felons who, 
unlike Binderup and Suarez, were incarcerated). An as-
applied challenge ultimately rests on the question of whether 
“application [of a statute] to a particular person under 
particular circumstances deprive[s] that person of a 
constitutional right.” Marcavage, 609 F.3d at 273 (emphases 
added). Binderup and Suarez have presented unrebutted 
evidence that their offenses were nonviolent and now decades 
old, and that they present no threat to society, which places 
them within the class persons who have a right to keep and 
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bear arms. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional as applied to them. 
* * * 
 In the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Heller, courts have had to wrestle with difficult Second 
Amendment questions. Although these questions can be 
challenging and the stakes high—the guarantee is one to 
deadly weapons, after all—it is no answer to say that 
legislatures “have near total control” over the right. Dissent at 
61. That is not how constitutional rights work. Because their 
personal circumstances are distinguishable from those of the 
class of persons historically excluded from Second 
Amendment protections due to their propensity for violence, 
Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez fall outside the proper 
scope of the felon dispossession statute. And their Second 
Amendment rights cannot be withdrawn merely because 
§ 922(g)(1) broadly serves the public good. Where the 
Second Amendment’s guarantees apply, as they do for 
Binderup and Suarez, “certain policy choices” are 
“necessarily” taken “off the table.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 636. 
Forever prohibiting them from possessing any firearm is one 
of those policy choices.  
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in 
part, and dissenting from the judgments, with whom McKEE, 
Chief Judge, and VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, 
RESTREPO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges, join. 
_______________ 
 The plaintiffs ask us to do something that no federal 
appellate court has done before:  to hold that, even though 
they were both convicted of crimes punishable by multiple 
years in prison, Congress may not constitutionally prevent 
them from owning firearms.  They ask us to do this 
notwithstanding a long tradition in this country of preventing 
criminals from owning guns, and despite the fact that the 
felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), has been 
in force for over half a century.1  Most troubling of all, they 
                                                 
1 Section 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any 
person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, 
or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or 
ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which 
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”   
Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), “[t]he term ‘crime punishable 
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not 
include . . . any State offense classified by the laws of the 
State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of 
imprisonment of two years or less.”  We therefore refer to 
§ 922(g)(1) as the “felon-in-possession” ban.  Courts 
commonly use this shorthand even though the statute itself 
does not use the term “felon,” and even though it includes 
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ask us to saddle district court judges with a seemingly 
unending obligation to review as-applied challenges like 
theirs, even as they fail to provide us with any workable 
standards that would make such a regime administratively 
feasible or doctrinally coherent.   
 Judges Ambro and Hardiman believe that the Second 
Amendment requires us to sustain the plaintiffs’ challenges, 
although they arrive at that conclusion along different routes 
and would shape our Second Amendment doctrine in 
divergent ways.  By contrast, I would hold that the plaintiffs’ 
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) must fail.  The Second 
Amendment, important as it may be, does not prevent 
Congress from deciding that convicted criminals should not 
have access to firearms.  We as a society require persons 
convicted of crimes to forfeit any number of rights and 
privileges, including the right to sit on a jury, the right to hold 
elective office, and the right to vote.2  However much the 
plaintiffs may see unfairness in the fact that their law-abiding 
peers can legally own firearms and they cannot, that disparity 
is a consequence of their own unlawful conduct.  Because I 
                                                                                                             
 
within its scope certain individuals who committed offenses 
labeled as “misdemeanors.”  See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 
552 U.S. 23, 27 (2007). 
2 Nothing herein should be interpreted as taking any position 
on the validity of statutes that deprive convicted felons of the 
right to vote.  The issue of felon disenfranchisement is not 
presented here, and there may well be very different 
considerations that distinguish a felon’s loss of the right to 
vote from the loss of the right to possess a gun. 
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believe that the Second Amendment permits Congress to 
disarm persons who commit serious crimes, and because 
§ 922(g)(1) reasonably circumscribes what counts as such a 
crime, I would reject the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenges and 
reverse the judgments of the District Courts. 
 What’s more, even if we were to apply intermediate 
scrutiny to test the validity of § 922(g)(1), I would conclude 
that the statute is reasonably tailored to promote the 
substantial government interest of suppressing armed 
violence.  Congress itself previously created and then 
defunded an administrative regime for providing 
individualized exceptions to the felon-in-possession ban.3  
When it terminated that program, it stated that the review of 
such applications was “a very difficult and subjective task 
which could have devastating consequences for innocent 
citizens if the wrong decision is made,”4 and warned that “too 
many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were 
restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.”5  
These congressional judgments stand in stark contrast to the 
plaintiffs’ arguments.  Congress has already experimented 
with a system of what were, in effect, as-applied challenges 
and concluded that it was unworkable and dangerous.   
 I therefore concur with Judge Ambro’s opinion in part, 
dissent from it in part, and dissent from the majority’s 
decision to affirm the judgments of the District Courts. 
                                                 
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).   
4 S. Rep. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992). 
5 H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). 
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I. The Current State of the Law Regarding 
Challenges to § 922(g)(1) 
 No federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, 
facial or as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute.  It may 
therefore be helpful to begin by summarizing the Supreme 
Court’s limited guidance on this issue and to explore how our 
sister circuits have applied that guidance in the context of 
§ 922(g)(1). 
A. The Meaning of Heller 
 The Second Amendment provides:  “A well regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”6  The touchstone in any Second Amendment case 
is District of Columbia v. Heller,7 the Supreme Court 
decision holding that the Second Amendment protects the 
“right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in 
defense of hearth and home.”8  While Heller recognized an 
individual right to bear arms, it also explained that, “[l]ike 
most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is 
not unlimited.”9  The Court went on to provide us with 
important guidance about the Second Amendment’s scope:  
                                                 
6 U.S. Const. amend. II.  
7 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
8 Id. at 635. 
9 Id. at 626. 
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[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.10 
 In a footnote, the Court described these laws 
collectively as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,” 
making clear that “[the] list does not purport to be 
exhaustive.”11  The Court also stated that people have the 
right to keep a loaded firearm in their homes for self-defense, 
provided that that they are “not disqualified from the exercise 
of Second Amendment rights.”12 
 Two interpretive questions about Heller therefore arise 
                                                 
10 Id. at 626–27. 
11 Id. at 627 n.26.  Elsewhere in the opinion, the Supreme 
Court described these regulations as “permissible” and as 
“exceptions” to the Second Amendment.  Id. at 635.  And two 
years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 
(2010), without otherwise expounding on Heller’s delineation 
of the scope of the Second Amendment right, the Court 
recapitulated the list of “longstanding regulatory measures” in 
Heller and “repeat[ed] [Heller’s] assurances” that such laws 
were not “imperil[ed]” by the Second Amendment.  
Id. at 786. 
12 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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again and again.  First, what does it mean to say that the 
felon-in-possession ban is “presumptively lawful”?  Second, 
what does it mean to say that a person may only possess a 
firearm if he or she has not been “disqualified from the 
exercise of Second Amendment rights”?  As we shall see, our 
sister circuits have already done yeoman’s work exploring 
these questions and suggesting possible answers.    
B. Four Circuits Have Rejected As-Applied 
Challenges Altogether 
 Four circuits—the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh—
have concluded that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are 
not permissible, at least with respect to felons.  
 We begin with the Fifth Circuit, which held years 
before Heller that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to bear arms.13  In another pre-Heller case, 
United States v. Everist,14 the Fifth Circuit held that the felon-
in-possession ban was constitutional with respect to both 
violent and nonviolent offenders.15  In the Fifth Circuit’s 
view, “[i]rrespective of whether his offense was violent in 
nature, a felon has shown manifest disregard for the rights of 
others” and “[h]e may not justly complain of the limitation on 
his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise 
                                                 
13 United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 229 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
14 368 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2004). 
15 See id. at 519 (“It is not inconsistent with the Second 
Amendment to limit the ability of convicted felons to keep 
and possess firearms.”). 
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threaten the security of his fellow citizens.”16  The issue of 
the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) arose again after Heller in 
United States. v. Scroggins.17  The Fifth Circuit there said that 
nothing in Heller caused it to question its prior conclusion in 
Everist that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional even as applied to 
non-violent felons.18 
 The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of as-applied 
challenges in United States v. Vongxay.19  The defendant 
there raised both a facial and an as-applied challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1).  With respect to the defendant’s facial challenge, 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[n]othing in Heller can be 
read legitimately to cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
§ 922(g)(1).”20  With respect to the defendant’s as-applied 
challenge, Vongxay concluded that § 922(g)(1) is 
constitutional even as applied to non-violent felons.  The 
Ninth Circuit articulated several rationales for this 
conclusion.  First, it noted that the right to bear arms could be 
restricted at common law.  Second, it observed “that to date 
                                                 
16 Id.  
17 599 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2010).   
18 Id. at 451; see also United States v. Anderson, 559 F.3d 
348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that “Heller provides no 
basis for reconsidering” whether § 922(g) is constitutional) 
(citing United States v. Darrington, 351 F.3d 632, 634 
(5th Cir. 2003) (“Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the 
Second Amendment.”)). 
19 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). 
20 Id. at 1114.   
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no court that has examined Heller has found 
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutionally suspect.”21  Third, it 
stated that “[d]enying felons the right to bear arms 
is . . . consistent with the explicit purpose of the Second 
Amendment to maintain ‘the security of a free State.’”22  To 
that end, “[f]elons are often, and historically have been, 
explicitly prohibited from militia duty.”23  Lastly, it stated 
that “most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the 
right to bear arms was ‘inextricably . . . tied to’ the concept of 
a ‘virtuous citizen[ry]’” and that “‘the right to bear arms does 
not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens,’” 
including criminals.24    
 A recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. 
Phillips,25 re-affirmed Vongxay, although with some 
                                                 
21 Id. at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
22 Id. (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II).   
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 1118 (alteration in original) (quoting Don B. Kates, 
Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986)).  As discussed infra, the 
strength of this historical interpretation has since been 
challenged by other scholars.  See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, 
Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit, 60 Hastings L.J. 
1371, 1374−75 (2009) (analyzing sources cited by earlier 
scholars); C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart 
Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 695, 714 (2009). 
25 --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 3675450 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016). 
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skepticism.  The defendant there argued that his prior 
criminal conviction could not support disarmament under 
§ 922(g)(1) because his crime, which consisted of concealing 
an ongoing felony from federal officials, was “a non-violent, 
passive crime of inaction.”26  The Ninth Circuit said that 
“there may be some good reasons to be skeptical about the 
correctness of the current framework of analyzing the Second 
Amendment rights of felons,”27 but it nonetheless concluded 
that Heller and Vongxay foreclosed the defendant’s 
argument.28 
 The Tenth Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) in United States v. McCane.29  It focused on the 
fact that the Supreme Court “explicitly stated in Heller that 
‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on 
                                                 
26 Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
27 Id. at *5.   
28 Id. at *4 (“[A]ssuming the propriety of felon firearm 
bans—as we must under Supreme Court precedent and our 
own—there is little question that Phillips’s predicate 
conviction . . . can constitutionally serve as the basis for a 
felon ban.”); see also Van Der Hule v. Holder, 759 F.3d 
1043, 1050–51 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We addressed whether 
§ 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment in [Vongxay] 
and determined that it did not.”).  But see United States v. 
Duckett, 406 F. App’x 185, 187 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., 
concurring) (stating that it might be constitutionally 
problematic to prevent non-violent felons from possessing 
firearms).   
29 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons.’”30  While Judge Tymkovich complained in 
concurrence that “[t]he Court’s summary treatment of felon 
dispossession in dictum forecloses the possibility of a more 
sophisticated interpretation of § 922(g)(1)’s scope,”31 the 
Tenth Circuit has not revisited the issue.  To the contrary, it 
said in a later case that it had “already rejected the notion that 
Heller mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons 
pursuant to § 922(g)(1).”32 
 Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Rozier.33  
That opinion focused on the Supreme Court’s language in 
Heller regarding “disqualifi[cation] from the exercise of 
Second Amendment rights.”34  Interpreting this language, the 
Eleventh Circuit concluded that one of Heller’s implied 
premises was that certain persons can be permissibly 
disqualified from exercising their Second Amendments rights 
altogether.  The court went on to say that Heller’s list of 
“longstanding prohibitions” indicated that “statutes 
disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and 
all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”35  
As a result, it concluded that “statutory restrictions of firearm 
                                                 
30 Id. at 1047 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).   
31 Id. at 1049.   
32 In re United States, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009). 
33 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010). 
34 Id. at 770 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). 
35 Id. at 771 (emphasis added).   
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possession, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to 
restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of 
people,” and that “Rozier, by virtue of his felony conviction, 
falls within such a class.”36    
C. Three Circuits Are Wary of As-Applied 
Challenges  
 The First Circuit has expressed skepticism about as-
applied challenges to the federal firearms laws, although it 
has not foreclosed such challenges.  In United States v. 
Torres-Rosario,37 the First Circuit considered a defendant’s 
as-applied challenge to his conviction under § 922(g)(1).  The 
defendant’s prior convictions were for possession with intent 
to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, and the 
court concluded that the defendant’s challenge failed because 
“drug dealing is notoriously linked to violence.”38  In 
reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit stated that the 
“Supreme Court may be open to claims that some felonies do 
not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for 
applying a categorical ban,” and likewise “might even be 
open to highly fact-specific objections.”39  Even so, the court 
observed that permitting “such an approach, applied to 
countless variations in individual circumstances, would 
obviously present serious problems of administration, 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 658 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2011).   
38 Id. at 113.   
39 Id.  
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consistency and fair warning.”40  The First Circuit thus 
suggested that defendants could bring as-applied challenges, 
even while recognizing the difficulties that considering such 
challenges would create.   
 The Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of 
§ 922(g)(1) in United States v. Bogle.41  It did not analyze the 
issue in great depth.  Instead, it pointed to Heller’s language 
about “longstanding prohibitions” and “join[ed] every other 
circuit to consider the issue in affirming that § 922(g)(1) is a 
constitutional restriction on the Second Amendment rights of 
convicted felons.”42  The court did not distinguish between 
facial and as-applied challenges.43 
 Meanwhile, the jurisprudence of the Sixth Circuit 
appears to be in flux.  That court dealt with challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1) in two non-precedential opinions.  In one, United 
States v. Frazier,44 the court rejected a challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) on the view that “congressional regulation of 
                                                 
40 Id.  
41 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013).   
42 Id. at 281–82.   
43 Bogle did not raise an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) 
on the basis of the Second Amendment.  Even so, the Second 
Circuit’s broad language and its citations to numerous courts 
that have considered such challenges suggest that it intended 
to broadly approve restrictions on the Second Amendment 
rights of individuals who are not law-abiding. 
44 314 F. App’x 801 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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firearms [remained] constitutional” even post-Heller.45  In 
another, United States v. Khami,46 the court recognized the 
theoretical possibility of an as-applied challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) but said that, on the facts before it, “[e]ven an as 
applied challenge would be difficult . . . to mount.”47  A later 
precedential opinion, United States v. Carey,48 stated flatly 
that “prohibitions on felon possession of firearms do not 
violate the Second Amendment.”49  And most recently, the 
Sixth Circuit has considered the issue of whether the federal 
statute making it unlawful to possess a firearm after having 
been committed to a mental institution, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(4), permits as-applied challenges.  That issue, which 
raises a doctrinal conundrum similar to the one we confront 
here, has also triggered en banc review.50 
                                                 
45 Id. at 807.   
46 362 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2010). 
47 Id. at 508. 
48 602 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2010). 
49 Id. at 741.   
50 Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 775 F.3d 308 
(6th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated 
(Apr. 21, 2015). 
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D. Four Circuits Permit As-Applied Challenges  
 The Fourth,51 Seventh,52 Eighth,53 and D.C. Circuits54 
have left the door open to a successful as-applied challenge.  
Even so, none of these courts has yet upheld one.  
 In many instances, these courts have also narrowed the 
                                                 
51 United States v. Moore, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) 
(“We do not foreclose the possibility that a case might exist in 
which an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) could succeed.”). 
52  Baer v. Lynch, 636 F. App’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(“We have not decided if felons historically were outside the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s protection and instead 
have focused on whether § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate 
scrutiny.  As to violent felons, the statute does survive 
intermediate scrutiny, we have concluded, because the 
prohibition on gun possession is substantially related to the 
government’s interest in keeping those most likely to misuse 
firearms from obtaining them.” (internal citations omitted)); 
United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as 
‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that 
there must exist the possibility that the ban could be 
unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”). 
53 United States v. Woolsey, 759 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014). 
54 Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 991–92 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting as-applied challenge to 
§ 922(g)(1) brought by common-law misdemeanants as a 
class). 
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universe of as-applied challenges that are permissible.  The 
Fourth Circuit, which has repeatedly said that it might affirm 
an as-applied challenge in the right circumstances, has 
rejected the proposition that Congress may disarm only 
persons who commit violent crimes.  In United States v. 
Pruess,55 the court considered a challenge to § 922(g)(1) 
brought by a firearms dealer and collector who also had over 
twenty prior convictions for failing to comply with various 
gun laws, although none of those convictions were for violent 
crime.  Pruess held “that application of the felon-in-
possession prohibition to allegedly non-violent 
felons . . . does not violate the Second Amendment.”56  
 There is also some ambiguity in the jurisprudence of 
the Eighth Circuit.  That court upheld the facial 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in United States v. Seay.57  It 
also addressed as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) in United 
States v. Woolsey,58 where it cited one of its prior non-
                                                 
55 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012). 
56 Id. at 247.   
57 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010).  Seay technically addressed 
§ 922(g)(3), which prohibits gun possession by drug users.  In 
reviewing the Eighth Circuit’s precedents, Seay stated that a 
prior non-precedential opinion upholding the constitutionality 
of § 922(g)(1) was correct.  See id. at 924 (citing United 
States v. Irish, 285 F. App’x 326 (8th Cir. 2008)).  The Eighth 
Circuit rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) a second 
time in United States v. Joos, 638 F.3d 581, 586 
(8th Cir. 2011).   
58 759 F.3d 905. 
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precedential opinions, United States v. Brown,59 that in turn 
relied on our decision in United States v. Barton.60  Following 
Barton’s logic, Woolsey rejected a defendant’s as-applied 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) because he had not “presented ‘facts 
about himself and his background that distinguish his 
circumstances from those of persons historically barred from 
Second Amendment protections.’”61   
 Even so, another Eighth Circuit decision, United 
States v. Bena,62 suggests that as-applied challenges might 
rest on shaky ground.  Bena involved a facial challenge to 
§ 922(g)(8), which bars possession of firearms by those 
subject to a restraining order.  In addressing that challenge, 
Bena stated that the Heller’s list of “longstanding 
prohibitions” suggested that the Supreme Court “viewed 
[those] regulatory measures . . . as presumptively lawful 
because they do not infringe on the Second Amendment 
right.”63  In support of that conclusion, the court cited our 
own analysis in United States v. Marzzarella.64  The Eighth 
Circuit also pointed to the fact that, as a historical matter, 
several states viewed the right to bear arms as limited to 
                                                 
59 Id. at 909 (citing Brown, 436 F. App’x 725 
(8th Cir. 2011)). 
60 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).   
61 Woolsey, 759 F.3d at 909 (quoting Brown, 436 F. App’x 
at 726). 
62 664 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 2011).   
63 Id. at 1183.   
64 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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peaceable, responsible citizens.  The court expressly declined 
to consider the question of “whether § 922(g)(8) would be 
constitutional as applied to a person who is subject to an 
order that was entered without evidence of dangerousness.”65 
 Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit considered the issue of 
as-applied challenges in Schrader v. Holder.66  In that case, 
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had brought, at most, a 
challenge to § 922(g)(1) “as applied to common-law 
misdemeanants as a class,” not as applied to Shrader 
individually.67  The court easily rejected that challenge.  It 
stated that the “plaintiffs [had] offered no evidence that 
individuals convicted of [common-law misdemeanors] pose 
an insignificant risk of future armed violence.”68  It also 
adopted the view that even if “some common-law 
misdemeanants . . . may well present no such 
risk . . . ‘Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of 
persons who have been shown to be untrustworthy with 
weapons, nor need these limits be established by evidence 
                                                 
65 Bena, 664 F.3d at 1185. 
66 704 F.3d 980 (D. C. Cir. 2013).   
67 Id. at 991. 
68 Id. at 990.   
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presented in court.’”69  
* * * 
 As this survey of cases demonstrates, federal judges 
face an almost complete absence of guidance from the 
Supreme Court about the scope of the Second Amendment 
right.  Even so, only four of our sister courts have clearly 
stated that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are even 
permissible.  In taking the further step of upholding such a 
challenge, we stand entirely alone. 
 With this background in mind, it is possible to explain 
where I agree—and disagree—with my colleagues.70    
                                                 
69 Id. at 990–91 (quoting United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 
638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)) (emphasis in original).  
Schrader suggested that, had the plaintiffs properly raised an 
as-applied challenge by arguing “that the statute is invalid as 
applied to Schrader specifically,” then “Heller might well 
dictate a different outcome” than the decision the court 
reached with respect to the class-wide challenge.  Id. at 991. 
70 As an initial matter, I agree with both Judge Ambro and 
Judge Hardiman that the plaintiffs’ statutory arguments are 
unavailing.  The two statutory provisions here are 
straightforward:  § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for anyone to 
possess a firearm after having been convicted of a crime 
punishable by more than one year in prison, and 
§ 921(a)(20)(B) removes from that prohibition persons 
convicted of misdemeanors with a maximum punishment of 
two years or less.   
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II. Marzzarella Step-One and Exclusions from the 
Second Amendment Right  
 Our decision in Marzzarella establishes a two-step test 
for assessing challenges to the constitutionality of statutes 
under the Second Amendment:   
First, we ask whether the challenged law 
imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.  
If it does not, our inquiry is complete.  If it 
does, we evaluate the law under some form of 
means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster 
under that standard, it is constitutional.  If it 
fails, it is invalid.71 
 I agree with Judge Ambro that Marzzarella provides 
the correct framework for assessing challenges to the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).  I also agree with him that, at 
Marzzarella step-one, persons who commit serious crimes are 
                                                                                                             
 
In other words, the only persons subject to § 922(g)(1) are 
(i) felons and (ii) misdemeanants whose crimes are 
punishable by more than two years in prison.  I therefore join 
Parts I and II of Judge Ambro’s opinion.   
71 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89 (internal citation and footnote 
omitted).   
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disqualified from asserting their Second Amendment rights.72  
 Unfortunately, Judge Ambro and I disagree over how 
to decide whether any particular crime is serious enough to 
cause a loss of firearm rights.  Judge Ambro believes that the 
category of “serious crime” is amorphous.  While some 
crimes may be serious by definition, including those in which 
the actual or attempted use of violence is an element of the 
offense,73 other crimes may be serious—or not—depending 
on the circumstances.  In Judge Ambro’s view, the 
seriousness inquiry therefore requires district courts to engage 
in person-specific assessments based on the facts of any 
particular case.  By contrast, I would hold that Heller itself 
tells us that felons are disqualified from exercising their 
Second Amendment rights.  Because there is no principled 
basis, at least in this context, for distinguishing felons from 
misdemeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than 
two years in prison, all crimes currently within § 922(g)(1)’s 
scope are serious by definition.  I would therefore hold that 
the plaintiffs’ challenges fail at Marzzarella step-one, full 
stop. 
                                                 
72 Accordingly, I join Parts III.A, III.B, III.C.1, III.C.2, and 
III.C.3.a of Judge Ambro’s opinion in their entirety.  I would 
also vote to overrule Barton, at least insofar as it states that 
as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible as that 
statute is currently codified.  In my view, they are not.   
Chief Judge McKee, Judge Shwartz, and Judge Restrepo 
join only Parts I and II of Judge Ambro’s opinion.  (See 
Ambro Op. Typescript at 6–7 n.1.) 
73 See Ambro Op. Typescript at 24, 31. 
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A. Congress May Permissibly Disarm Felons at 
Marzzarella Step-One  
 In applying step-one of the Marzzarella analysis, we 
ask whether § 922(g)(1) burdens any Second Amendment 
right.  At least as to the prohibition on felons possessing 
firearms, Heller and Marzzarella answer that question 
directly.   
 The Heller Court was careful to tell us that “nothing in 
[its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”74  It 
also referred to the felon-in-possession ban as one of several 
“presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”75  In 
Marzzarella, we concluded that the “better reading” of Heller 
was that these measures were complete “exceptions to the 
right to bear arms.”76  On this view, felons do not simply 
have narrower Second Amendment rights than their law-
abiding counterparts; they “are disqualified from exercising 
their Second Amendment rights” altogether.77  While felons 
certainly have an interest in using firearms “for defense of 
hearth and home,” Marzzarella stated that “a felony 
                                                 
74 554 U.S. at 626. 
75 Id. at 627 n.26. 
76 614 F.3d at 91 (emphasis added). 
77 Id. at 91–92; see also Jeff Golimowski, Note, Pulling the 
Trigger:  Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a Post-Heller 
World, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1599, 1616 (2012) (contending 
that felons forfeit Second Amendment rights through 
affirmative decisions to violate the social contract). 
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conviction disqualifies an individual from asserting that 
interest.”78   
 At the time Marzzarella came down, this reading of 
Heller was in accord with the views of several of our sister 
courts.79  Other circuits have since adopted the same 
position,80 and we ourselves have recommitted to it.81     
 Apart from the text of Heller itself, history and 
tradition also support Marzzarella’s conclusion that the felon-
in-possession ban is a permissible exclusion from the Second 
Amendment right.  Without “engaging in a round of full-
                                                 
78 614 F.3d at 92. 
79 See Rozier, 598 F.3d at 770–71 (“Prior to taking into 
account Rozier’s purpose for possessing the handgun, we 
must determine whether he is qualified to possess a 
handgun.”); Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1113 (“[F]elons are 
categorically different from the individuals who have a 
fundamental right to bear arms, and Vongxay’s reliance on 
Heller is misplaced.” (footnote omitted)).  
80 See, e.g., Bena, 664 F.3d at 1183 (“It seems most likely 
that the Supreme Court viewed the regulatory measures listed 
in Heller as presumptively lawful because they do not 
infringe on the Second Amendment right.”).   
81 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(reiterating that “certain longstanding regulations are 
‘exceptions’ to the right to keep and bear arms, such that the 
conduct they regulate is not within the scope of the Second 
Amendment”).  
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blown historical analysis,”82 it suffices for now to say that 
numerous courts have reviewed the historical record and 
concluded that Founding-era sources support the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) even as applied to non-violent 
felons.83   
 With respect to the Founding generation, the Eighth 
Circuit points us to Blackstone, who “explained that English 
subjects enjoyed a right to have arms for their defense, 
‘suitable to their condition and degree’ and ‘under due 
restrictions.’”84  As to the Founders themselves, several 
judges—including Judge Hardiman—have recounted how 
“[s]hortly after the Pennsylvania ratifying convention for the 
original Constitution . . . the Anti–Federalist minority 
recommended the following amendment:  ‘That the people 
have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and 
                                                 
82 Id. 
83 See, e.g., Bena, 664 F.3d at 1183 (“Scholarship suggests 
historical support for a common-law tradition that permits 
restrictions directed at citizens who are not law-abiding and 
responsible.”); Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1113 (“[M]ost scholars 
of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms 
‘was . . . inextricably tied to’ the concept of ‘virtuous 
citizen[ry]’ . . . .” (all alternations except first in original) 
(quoting Kates, supra note 24)); Emerson, 270 F.3d 
at 226 n.21 (citing sources for the proposition that “the 
Second Amendment does not prohibit legislation such as [the 
felon-in-possession ban]”). 
84 Bena, 664 F.3d at 1183 (quoting 1 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries 139). 
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their own state, or the United States . . . and no law shall be 
passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for 
crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from 
individuals.’”85  Heller identified this proposal as a 
“precursor” that was “highly influential” to the ratification of 
the Second Amendment.86 
 The Seventh Circuit has also done helpful work 
mining the historical sources.  Sitting en banc, the court 
highlighted the fact that, during the Founding era, “[m]any of 
the states, whose own constitutions entitled their citizens to 
be armed, did not extend this right to persons convicted of 
crime.”87  In United States v. Yancey,88 the court stated that 
“[w]hatever the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent 
felons possessing weapons . . . most scholars of the Second 
Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the 
                                                 
85 Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, 
Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 201 
(5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis removed) (quoting Saul Cornell, 
Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the 
Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in 
Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 16 Const. Comment. 
221, 233 (1999)); see also Hardiman Op. Typescript at 24 
(discussing the same proposal). 
86 554 U.S. at 604.   
87 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (citing Stephen P. Halbrook, The 
Founders’ Second Amendment 273 (2008); Marshall, Why 
Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. 
Pol’y at 700–13). 
88 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the 
government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”89  Yancey 
also noted that, “while felon-in-possession laws could be 
criticized as ‘wildly overinclusive’ for encompassing 
nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to 
consider the propriety of disarming felons under analogous 
state constitutional provisions has concluded that step to be 
permissible.”90 
 The federal statutory ban on convicts possessing 
firearms itself has a lengthy pedigree.  In 1932, Congress 
passed a law imposing restrictions on the possession of 
machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and certain other weapons 
in the District of Columbia.91  That law also made it illegal 
for any “person who has been convicted in the District of 
Columbia or elsewhere of a crime of violence [to] own or 
have in his possession a pistol, within the District of 
                                                 
89 Id. at 684–85 (considering a challenge to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(3), which makes it unlawful to possess firearms as a 
person who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to any 
controlled substance”). 
90 Id. at 685 (quoting Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the 
Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 721 (2007)).   
91 Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, § 14, 47 Stat. 650, 654. 
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Columbia.”92  In 1938, Congress passed a broader statute—
the Federal Firearms Act—that made it unlawful for those 
who had been convicted of a “crime of violence” to “receive 
any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or 
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”93  Congress 
removed the “crime of violence” limitation in 196194 and 
“changed the ‘receipt’ element of the 1938 law to 
‘possession’ [in 1968], giving § 922(g)(1) its current form.”95  
The stated purpose of the 1968 revision was “to curb crime 
by keeping ‘firearms out of the hands of those not legally 
entitled to possess them because of age, criminal background, 
or incompetency.’”96 
 The development of § 922(g) also evinces Congress’s 
desire to keep guns away from persons other than those 
                                                 
92 Id. § 3, 47 Stat. at 651.  The 1932 Act defined a “crime of 
violence” as “[m]urder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, 
maliciously disfiguring another, abduction, kidnaping, 
burglary, housebreaking, larceny, any assault with intent to 
kill, commit rape, or robbery, assault with a dangerous 
weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense 
punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,” or “an 
attempt to commit any of the same.”  Id. § 1, 47 Stat. at 650.   
93 Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, §§ 1(6), 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 
1250–51. 
94 Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757. 
95 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 640 (statutory citation truncated).   
96 Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) 
(quoting S. Rep. No. 90–1501, at 22 (1968)). 
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whose past unlawful conduct indicates a likelihood of future 
dangerousness.  The current iteration of § 922(g) prohibits 
nine groups of persons from possessing guns, including 
fugitives, drug addicts, persons previously committed to 
mental institutions, persons under a court order for 
threatening a partner or child, and persons with misdemeanor 
convictions for crimes of domestic violence.  The other 
prohibitions of § 922(g), however, rest on a slightly different 
rationale.  In 1968, Congress expanded what is now § 922(g) 
to cover undocumented or non-immigrant aliens, persons 
dishonorably discharged from the military, and persons who 
have renounced their U.S. citizenship.  These additions, 
which were “enacted in response to the wave of political and 
civil rights assassinations during the 1960s,”97 reflected 
Congress’s judgment that persons within these categories 
“may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a 
threat to society.”98  Rather than disarm persons based on a 
rigid link between past violent acts and future dangerousness, 
these restrictions—consistent with the tradition at the 
Founding of tying gun rights to civic virtue—disarm groups 
whose members Congress believes are unable or unwilling to 
conduct themselves in conformity with the responsibilities of 
                                                 
97 United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984). 
98 Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) 
(quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 14,773 (1968)); see also Stevens v. 
United States, 440 F.2d 144, 146–49, 152–70 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(recounting the relevant legislative history). 
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citizenship.99  
 To be fair, one might quibble with this kind of 
historical explanation for § 922(g)(1)’s scope.  With regard to 
the statute itself, one might ask if 50 years is a long enough 
period of time to entrench a constitutional tradition—
although several courts have said as much when assessing 
Second Amendment challenges.100  And with respect to 
Founding-era sources, some judges have expressed the view 
that the historical record is too infirm a platform on which to 
rest hard-and-fast decisions about the scope of the Second 
                                                 
99 I note that permitting plaintiffs to bring as-applied 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) opens the door to similar challenges 
under these other provisions.  For example, once a plaintiff 
can challenge application of the felon-in-possession ban on 
the ground that his or her prior crime does not indicate a 
likelihood of future dangerousness, the next case might 
involve an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(6), the provision 
concerning dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, 
for the same reason. 
100 See, e.g., Pruess, 703 F.3d at 245 n.1 (rejecting the 
argument that the ban on non-violent felons possessing 
firearms is not “longstanding,” since it has been in place “for 
more than half a century”). 
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Amendment right.101  Our Court’s multiple opinions in this 
case illustrate just how contested Founding-era historiography 
can be.   
 Even so, my review of the relevant history leads me to 
conclude that § 922(g)(1)’s categorical ban on felons 
possessing firearms is rooted deeply enough in our tradition 
to operate as a bona fide disqualification from the Second 
Amendment right.   
B. Misdemeanors Within § 922(g)(1)’s Scope 
Are Functionally Felonies 
 Having established that felons are categorically 
disqualified from asserting their Second Amendment rights, 
the next question is whether misdemeanants, like the 
plaintiffs, are situated differently.  The plaintiffs insist that 
they are.  In their view, “[w]hen Heller spoke of ‘felons,’ it 
                                                 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680–81 
(4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the relevant historical scholarship 
is, at best, “not conclusive” as to how the Founding 
generation treated felon dispossession); Skoien, 614 F.3d 
at 650 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[S]cholars disagree about the 
extent to which felons—let alone misdemeanants—were 
considered excluded from the right to bear arms during the 
founding era.”); McCane, 573 F.3d at 1048 (Tymkovich, J., 
concurring) (“But more recent authorities have not found 
evidence of longstanding dispossession laws.  On the 
contrary, a number have specifically argued such laws did not 
exist and have questioned the sources relied upon by the 
earlier authorities.”). 
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spoke of a traditional common-law classification known to 
the Framers, not a late-twentieth century statute including 
some vast (if disputed) number of misdemeanor offenses.”102  
Judge Ambro is sympathetic to that notion.103  I am not.   
 As an initial matter, nothing in Heller suggests that the 
felony-misdemeanor distinction is a meaningful one.  It is 
true, of course, that Heller’s list of “presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures” includes “longstanding prohibitions on 
the possession of firearms by felons.”104  One could perhaps 
read those words and conclude that the Supreme Court was 
purposefully placing felons—and only felons—in the 
category of persons who may be permissibly disqualified 
from the exercise of their Second Amendment rights.  Still, 
one could just as easily conclude that the Court was using 
shorthand to refer to § 922(g)(1) as a whole.  After all, the 
Court was careful elsewhere in Heller to say that the Second 
Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”105  
Neither felons nor misdemeanants are the kinds of “law-
                                                 
102 Binderup Br. at 55–56. 
103 See, e.g., Ambro Op. Typescript at 30–31 (“Congress 
may not overlook entirely the misdemeanor label, which, in 
the Second Amendment context, is also important.”). 
104 554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26. 
105 Id. at 635.   
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abiding” citizens whose rights Heller vindicated.106 
 More fundamentally, the notion that there is a sharp 
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, at least 
within the universe of crimes covered by § 922(g)(1), is not 
correct.  Our own Court has long recognized that, in the 
modern world, a “felony” is any crime punishable by at least 
one year and one day in prison.107  And the Supreme Court 
has explained that, in contemporary law, “the distinction 
[between felonies and misdemeanors] is minor and often 
arbitrary.”108  The kinds of misdemeanors within the scope of 
§ 922(g)(1)—those punishable by more than two years in 
prison—are effectively felonies in all but name.109 
                                                 
106 Heller also underscored that its list of longstanding 
prohibitions “does not purport to be exhaustive,” while 
emphasizing that the list flows from “historical 
justifications.”  Id. at 627 n.26, 635.  This guidance suggests a 
more practical approach than focusing on the word “felon” 
alone. 
107 See, e.g., Thorm v. United States, 59 F.2d 419, 419 
(3d Cir. 1932) (noting that Congress has historically defined 
felonies as crimes punishable by a prison term exceeding one 
year). 
108 Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (“[T]he 
assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a 
misdemeanant [is] untenable. Indeed, numerous 
misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many 
felonies.”). 
109 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Voisine v. United 
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 Indeed, we have previously held that Congress has the 
power to define a “felony” for purposes of federal law in 
ways that depart even from the year-and-a-day rule.  In 
United States v. Graham,110 we considered how to apply 
Congress’s definition of an “aggravated felony” to a 
provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that “increase[d] the 
penalty for the crime of reentering the country after 
                                                                                                             
 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016), also addressed the distinction 
between misdemeanors and felonies.  That case raised an 
issue of statutory interpretation regarding 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by 
persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence.”   
Because Voisine did not involve a challenge to the 
constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), it bears on these cases only 
indirectly.  Still, Voisine recognized that Congress passed 
§ 922(g)(9) “to close [a] dangerous loophole in the gun 
control laws.”  Id. at 2276 (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  In particular, Congress enacted 
§ 922(g)(9) to address the fact that “many perpetrators of 
domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors rather than 
felonies, notwithstanding the harmfulness of their conduct.”  
Id.  Congress believed that closing this loophole was 
important because, in the Supreme Court’s words, “[f]irearms 
and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination.”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 
U.S. 415, 427 (2009)). 
110 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999).   
33 
 
deportation.”111  The issue in the case was two-fold.  First, the 
federal statute defined the term “aggravated felony” as an 
offense punishable by at least one year in prison—not, as is 
more typical, an offense punishable by more than one year in 
prison.112  Second, the prior state offense that triggered the 
defendant’s federal sentencing enhancement was technically a 
misdemeanor under New York law.113 
 Graham recognized that “[t]he line between felonies 
and misdemeanors is an ancient one,” but it also noted that, 
“[w]ith the rise of the penitentiary and the disappearance of 
the death penalty for most felonies . . . the felony-
misdemeanor distinction solidified at the one-year line.”114  
Even so, we concluded that Congress could ignore the year-
and-a-day rule in its own statutory law.  As a result, the label 
New York had affixed to Graham’s offense was immaterial; 
what mattered was the fact that his misdemeanor fell within 
                                                 
111 Id. at 789 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B)).   
112 Id. at 791 (“8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) defines an 
aggravated felony as a theft offense with a sentence of at least 
one year.”).   
113 Id. at 789. 
114 Id. at 792. 
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the technical federal definition of an “aggravated felony.”115   
 Contrary to the statutory scheme we confronted in 
Graham, § 922(g)(1) respects the more modern, year-and-a-
day distinction between felonies and misdemeanors.  Indeed, 
it does more than respect it:  it actually excludes from its 
scope misdemeanors that are punishable by two years of 
imprisonment or less.  In this way, § 922(g)(1) incorporates 
certain state-law judgments about what crimes count as 
“serious” misdemeanors.  In other contexts, the Supreme 
Court has affirmed the value of easily administrable statutory 
schemes by stating that Congress can adopt clear, uniform 
rules about what counts as a “felony” for purposes of federal 
                                                 
115 Id. (“Congress has the power to define the punishment 
for the crime of reentering the country after deportation, and 
we conclude that Congress was defining a term of art, 
‘aggravated felony,’ which in this case includes certain 
misdemeanants who receive a sentence of one year.”). 
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law, even where state-level definitions are more nuanced.116   
 The bottom line is this:  once a misdemeanor is 
punishable by more than two years in prison, treating it as 
though it were intrinsically different than a felony is 
unjustifiably formalistic.  By choosing to punish such 
misdemeanors more severely than a traditional felony, a state 
has already indicated that such crimes are serious.  In my 
view, Congress is entitled to rely on that judgment.  
 Accordingly, my resolution of this case would be 
simple.  Heller tells us that “nothing in [that] opinion should 
be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons.”117  Our Court has since 
interpreted Heller to say that the ban on felons possessing 
firearms is a complete carve-out from the Second 
Amendment right.  Since, for present purposes, there is no 
                                                 
116 See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 134 
(2008) (recounting how Congress amended a statute’s 
definition of “felony drug offense,” which in its previous 
form “depended on the vagaries of state-law classifications of 
offenses as felonies or misdemeanors,” to instead use a 
“uniform federal standard”); Logan, 552 U.S. at 35 
(explaining that Congress could choose to “revise 
§ 921(a)(20) to provide . . . that federal rather than state law 
defines a conviction for purposes of [§ 922]”); United 
States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[I]n the absence 
of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state 
laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal 
statute should not be dependent on state law.”). 
117 554 U.S. at 626. 
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functional difference between felons and persons who 
commit misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in 
prison, all persons with the scope of § 922(g)(1)—including 
the plaintiffs here—are disqualified from asserting their 
interest in using firearms “for defense of hearth and home.”118  
At Marzzarella step-one, no further analysis is necessary. 
C. A Note on Heller’s Use of the Word 
“Presumptively”  
 A majority of my colleagues disagree with the 
proposition that the felon-in-possession ban is a constitutional 
carve-out from the Second Amendment right.  In affirming 
the plaintiffs’ challenges, they make it clear that district 
courts in our Circuit must now conduct person-by-person, 
individualized inquiries in order to determine whether the 
application of § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in any particular 
case. 
 In reaching that conclusion, my colleagues treat 
Heller’s use of the word “presumptively” as though it 
requires courts to consider as-applied challenges to the felon-
in-possession ban.  Judge Hardiman, for example, cites the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Williams, which 
read Heller’s reference “to felon disarmament bans only as 
‘presumptively lawful’” to imply “the possibility that the ban 
could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied 
challenge.”119  Likewise, Judge Ambro insists that “[u]nless 
                                                 
118 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92.  
119 Hardiman Op. Typescript at 9–10 n.6 (citing Williams, 
616 F.3d at 692). 
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flagged as irrebutable, presumptions are rebuttable.”120  The 
shared assumption here is that, when the Supreme Court used 
the word “presumptively” in Heller, it meant to convey 
something like the definition of “presumption” that one might 
find in a legal dictionary—i.e., “a rule of law, statutory or 
judicial, by which [a] finding of a basic fact gives rise to 
existence of presumed fact, until [the] presumption is 
rebutted.”121   
 This reading of “presumptively” in Heller puts more 
weight on that word than it can fairly bear.  It is important to 
keep in mind the context within which the word appears.  The 
key text of Heller says:     
[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the 
mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and 
government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial 
sale of arms.122 
 Footnote 26 of Heller, which accompanies this 
passage, states:  “We identify these presumptively lawful 
regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not 
                                                 
120 Ambro Op. Typescript at 28.   
121 United States v. Chase, 18 F.3d 1166, 1172 n.7 
(4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1185 
(6th ed. 1990)). 
122 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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purport to be exhaustive.”123   
   Judge Ambro and Judge Hardiman read the word 
“presumptively” as though the Supreme Court was 
communicating, through its use of a single adverb in a 
footnote, a mandate that the Second Amendment now 
requires courts to hear as-applied challenges to certain laws 
that limit gun rights.  That interpretation strikes me as exactly 
backwards.  The Supreme Court was not putting us on notice 
that “longstanding prohibitions” universally considered 
constitutional pre-Heller were, post-Heller, constitutionally 
suspect.  The Court was instead trying to provide assurances 
that, whatever else Heller might portend, it did not provide a 
basis for future litigants to upend any and all existing 
restrictions on the right to bear arms.  In other words, Heller’s 
language about “longstanding prohibitions” was meant to 
cabin its holding, not to expand it.  
 It is also important to underscore that not all of the 
“longstanding prohibitions” on Heller’s list are the same.  
The ban on “the possession of firearms by felons”124 is a 
black-and-white proscription that has deep roots in our shared 
constitutional tradition.  There is also nothing unclear about 
when it applies.  Marzzarella recognized as much, reasoning 
that Heller “suggests [that] felons . . . are disqualified from 
exercising their Second Amendment rights” because the 
“validity” of the felon-in-possession ban does not “turn on the 
                                                 
123 Id. at 627 n.26.   
124 Id. at 626.   
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presence or absence of certain circumstances.”125 
 The latter two kinds of “longstanding prohibitions” are 
different.  These categories—“laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places” and “laws imposing conditions 
and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”126—have 
much more ambiguous boundaries.  One might well ask:  
other than a school and a government building, what kind of 
location counts as a “sensitive place”?  What kinds of 
conditions on the sale of arms are truly “longstanding”?  In a 
case involving such a regulation, a court will need to engage 
in a more probing inquiry to determine whether the 
                                                 
125 614 F.3d at 91–92.  Judge Ambro states that “the two-
step Marzzarella framework controls all Second Amendment 
challenges,” (Ambro Op. Typescript at 40), and I agree.  Yet 
Marzzarella plainly stated that “the better reading” of Heller 
is that felons are disqualified from asserting their Second 
Amendment rights.  Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91–92.  Judge 
Ambro departs from this reading to leave open the possibility 
of “a successful as-applied challenge by a state-law felon” to 
§ 922(g)(1), although he cautions that the “individual’s 
burden would be extraordinarily high—and perhaps even 
insurmountable.”  (Ambro Op. Typescript at 33–34 n.6.)  
Nowhere does Judge Ambro explain how we can 
simultaneously proclaim our fidelity to Marzzarella while at 
the same time ignoring its reading of Heller’s key language. 
126 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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challenged law is constitutionally valid.127   
 And here we come back to the word “presumptively.”  
In a case involving “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
in sensitive places” or “laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms,”128 the word 
“presumptively” is important.  It signals to lower court judges 
that they must think carefully about whether the challenged 
regulation is truly analogous to “longstanding prohibitions” 
upon which Heller does not “cast doubt.”  In the parlance of 
our Court’s jurisprudence, not all such regulations will be 
“presumptively lawful” enough to satisfy the inquiry at 
Marzzarella step-one. 
 But with respect to the felon-in-possession ban, there 
is no work for the word “presumptively” to do.  Section 
922(g)(1) codifies the restriction on criminals possessing 
                                                 
127 See, e.g., Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 
1124–29 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1486 
(2016) (considering whether a federal regulation limiting the 
carrying of firearms in post office parking lots was 
constitutionally permissible in view of Heller’s guidance 
about carrying of firearms in government buildings); Nat’l 
Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d at 203 (considering the 
constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the sale of 
firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds by federally licensed firearms 
dealers, and concluding that the law “is consistent with a 
longstanding, historical tradition, which suggests that the 
conduct at issue falls outside the Second Amendment’s 
protection”).   
128 Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
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firearms in a manner that reflects longstanding history and 
tradition—and the Supreme Court has explicitly told us that 
Heller does not “cast doubt” on such a law.129  This is not to 
say that Congress could never press its luck.  If Congress 
were to expand § 922(g)(1) beyond its traditional scope by, 
for example, banning the possession of firearms by persons 
convicted of crimes punishable by six months’ imprisonment, 
it might well run afoul of the Second Amendment’s 
protections.  But such a law would be outside of Heller’s safe 
harbor for “longstanding prohibitions,” requiring courts—
again, in the parlance of our Circuit—to proceed to 
Marzzarella step-two and assess such a law under some form 
of heightened constitutional scrutiny.130 
 Consequently, I disagree with Judge Ambro’s view 
that courts must “determin[e] whether crimes are serious 
enough to destroy Second Amendment rights” on a case-by-
case basis.131  To my mind, the validity of the felon-in-
possession ban is not so precarious.  Congress has made a 
                                                 
129 Id. at 626.   
130 The same could be said of the ban on mentally-ill persons 
possessing firearms.  As currently codified, § 922(g)(4) 
makes it unlawful for any person to possess a gun “who has 
been adjudicated as a mental defective or . . . committed to a 
mental institution,” and Heller does not “cast doubt” on that 
law.  But if Congress were to expand the current restriction 
to, for example, all persons who have ever seen a mental 
health professional, Heller’s safe harbor for “longstanding 
prohibitions” would no longer apply.   
131 Ambro Op. Typescript at 29. 
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reasoned judgment that crimes currently covered by 
§ 922(g)(1)—felonies and misdemeanors punishable by more 
than two years’ imprisonment—are serious enough to support 
disarmament.  That categorical rule is consonant with history 
and tradition, and Heller does not “cast doubt” on it at all.132 
III. Marzzarella Step-Two and the Proper Application 
of Constitutional Scrutiny  
 Even if, out of an abundance of caution, we were to 
move on to step two of the Marzzarella analysis and apply 
heightened scrutiny—a step I do not believe is necessary—
Congress’s interests in preventing gun violence are 
sufficiently important, and the felon-in-possession statute 
sufficiently tailored, that § 922(g)(1) would survive the 
plaintiffs’ challenges. 
 My colleagues disagree.  Judge Hardiman believes that 
§ 922(g)(1) is so destructive of Second Amendment rights 
that, at least as applied to non-violent criminals, it is per se 
unconstitutional.  Judge Ambro, meanwhile, insists that we 
must apply constitutional scrutiny at the level of people like 
the plaintiffs, and that if the government cannot show that 
“disarming people like them will promote the responsible use 
of firearms,” or that people “like them remain potentially 
irresponsible after many years of apparently responsible 
behavior,”133 then application of § 922(g)(1) is 
unconstitutional.  By contrast, I believe that conducting a 
tailoring analysis at Judge Ambro’s level of specificity is 
                                                 
132 554 U.S. at 626.   
133 Ambro Op. Typescript at 39 (emphasis added).   
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problematic.  Even in the First Amendment context, there are 
some laws whose structure and purpose are incompatible with 
person-specific constitutional challenges.  For the reasons that 
follow, § 922(g)(1) is such a law. 
A. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate 
Standard for These Cases 
 In Marzzarella, we opted to apply intermediate rather 
than strict scrutiny to test the constitutionality of a federal 
statute.  Looking to First Amendment jurisprudence for 
guidance, we asked whether (i) the challenged law involved a 
government interest that was either “significant,” 
“substantial,” or “important,” and (ii) whether “the fit 
between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective 
[was] reasonable, not perfect.”134  The law challenged in 
Marzzarella, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), makes it unlawful to 
possess a firearm with an obliterated serial number.  We 
concluded that the law survived intermediate scrutiny because 
the government had a substantial interest “in enabling the 
tracing of weapons via their serial numbers,” and Marzzarella 
had failed to offer any “lawful purpose for which a person 
would prefer an unmarked firearm” to a marked one.135   
 In choosing to apply intermediate scrutiny, 
                                                 
134 614 F.3d at 98.   
135 Id. at 98–99.  For good measure, we noted that we would 
uphold the constitutionality of § 922(k) even if we applied 
strict scrutiny because, in our view, the statute was narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling government interest.  See 
id. at 99–101. 
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Marzzarella discerned an important distinction in Heller.  
While Heller clearly rejected rational-basis review,136 it did 
not select either intermediate or strict scrutiny as the 
appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of the 
District of Columbia’s gun regulations.  Instead, Heller stated 
that those regulations were unconstitutional “[u]nder any of 
the standards of scrutiny . . . applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.”137  Marzzarella interpreted Heller as 
suggesting that firearm regulations fall along a continuum, 
with laws like the District of Columbia’s handgun ban falling 
“at the far end of the spectrum of infringement.”138   
 Marzzarella thus drew a distinction between laws that 
burden the “core . . . right of law-abiding citizens to possess 
[certain] weapons for self-defense in the home,” on the one 
hand, and laws that “do[] not severely limit the possession of 
firearms,”139 on the other.  Marzzarella concluded that courts 
should apply strict scrutiny to test the constitutional validity 
of the former kind of regulations, while they should apply 
intermediate scrutiny to test the validity of other, less 
                                                 
136 See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required 
to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational 
basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the 
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and 
would have no effect.”). 
137 Id. at 628. 
138 614 F.3d at 97. 
139 Id. at 92, 97. 
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burdensome regulations.140 
 We reaffirmed this framework in Drake v. Filko,141 
where we considered the constitutionality of New Jersey’s 
regulations governing the issuance of permits to carry guns in 
public.  Drake reasoned that “the Second Amendment can 
trigger more than one particular standard of scrutiny, 
depending, at least in part, upon the type of law challenged 
and the type of Second Amendment restriction at issue.”142  It 
also concluded that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny 
unless the challenged regulation burdens the “core” Second 
Amendment right.143 
 Just as intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard 
to apply in Marzzarella and Drake, it is also the correct 
standard to apply here.  The felon-in-possession ban, to the 
extent it burdens Second Amendment rights at all, does not 
impinge on the rights of “law-abiding, responsible 
                                                 
140 See id. at 97 (“The distinction between limitations on the 
exercise of protected conduct and regulation of the form in 
which that conduct occurs also appears in the First 
Amendment context. . . .  Accordingly, we think § 922(k) also 
should merit intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.”). 
141 724 F.3d 426. 
142 Id. at 435 (quoting United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 
801 (10th Cir. 2010)). 
143 Id. at 436; see also id. at 436 & n.14 (noting a few subtle 
differences between the standard for intermediate scrutiny 
articulated by the various circuits). 
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citizens.”144  Rather, it constrains the rights of persons who, 
by virtue of their prior criminal conduct, fall outside the core 
of the Second Amendment’s protections. 
 Several of our sister circuits have assessed challenges 
to other provisions of § 922(g) using this same approach.  In 
United States v. Carter,145 for example, the Fourth Circuit 
considered a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which 
prohibits firearm possession by “any person . . . who is an 
unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.”  
Citing Marzzarella with approval, Carter applied 
intermediate scrutiny to assess the validity of the statute.146  It 
reasoned that a person within the scope of § 922(g)(3)—that 
is, a user of controlled substances—could not fairly claim to 
be asserting the “core” Second Amendment right of “law-
abiding, responsible citizens.”147  For the same reason, the 
Fourth Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the 
validity of those provisions of § 922(g) that limit the 
possession of firearms by persons subject to protective orders 
and by persons who have committed misdemeanor crimes of 
                                                 
144 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
145 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012).   
146 Id. at 417.   
147 Id. at 416 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 635). 
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domestic violence.148  The decisions of several other circuits 
are in accord.149 
 Thus, even assuming that Binderup and Suarez fall 
within the Second Amendment’s protections, I would join our 
sister circuits in holding that their prior criminal convictions 
place them outside the core “right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”150  For 
this reason, intermediate scrutiny is the correct standard under 
which to assess their challenges. 
                                                 
148 See United States v. Chapman, 666 F.3d 220, 226 
(4th Cir. 2012) (“Chapman’s claim is not within the core right 
identified in Heller—the right of a law-abiding, responsible 
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense.”) 
(considering a challenge to § 922(g)(8)); Chester, 628 F.3d at 
682–83 (“Although Chester asserts his right to possess a 
firearm in his home for the purpose of self-defense, we 
believe his claim is not within the core right identified in 
Heller . . . by virtue of Chester’s criminal history as a 
domestic violence misdemeanant.”) (considering a challenge 
to § 922(g)(9)). 
149 See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 
(9th Cir. 2013) (“Section 922(g)(9) does not implicate [the] 
core Second Amendment right because it regulates firearm 
possession for individuals with criminal convictions.”); 
Schrader, 704 F.3d at 989 (applying intermediate scrutiny 
“[b]ecause common-law misdemeanants as a class cannot be 
considered law-abiding and responsible”); Reese, 627 F.3d at 
802 (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(8)). 
150 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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B. Judge Hardiman’s Rejection of 
Heightened Scrutiny   
 Before proceeding any further, I think it is important to 
pause in order to address a profound doctrinal disagreement 
between myself and Judge Hardiman.  Like Judge Ambro and 
me, Judge Hardiman believes that we determine the proper 
scope of the Second Amendment by looking to history and 
tradition.  Reviewing the relevant historical sources, Judge 
Hardiman concludes that, as a matter of past practice, the 
only persons subject to disarmament were those who were 
dangerous.  Judge Ambro and I obviously disagree with that 
assessment, but I am happy to acknowledge that reasonable 
minds could differ on this score.  At that point, however, 
Judge Hardiman makes what I believe to be a serious 
doctrinal error.   
 Having concluded that Congress may permissibly 
disarm persons likely to commit violent acts, Judge Hardiman 
then defends the proposition that all other applications of 
§ 922(g)(1) are per se unconstitutional.  No recourse to 
heightened scrutiny or means-ends balancing is necessary.  
After all, Heller struck down a local ordinance that 
completely prevented citizens from possessing firearms in 
their homes for self-defense.  Section 922(g)(1) has the same 
effect with respect to felons and certain misdemeanants.  So, 
Judge Hardiman concludes, § 922(g)(1) must be 
unconstitutional in every application to non-violent criminals 
because it “eviscerates” their Second Amendment rights.151  I 
agree with Judge Ambro that such an approach is inconsistent 
with the development of Second Amendment doctrine in this 
                                                 
151 Hardiman Op. Typescript at 18, 50.   
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and other circuits.152   
 In addition, the rejection of heightened scrutiny in this 
context seems out-of-step with Heller itself.  As discussed 
earlier, Heller says that the “core” Second Amendment right 
is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms 
in defense of hearth and home.”153  Non-violent criminals are, 
by definition, not “law-abiding.”  Insofar as Judge 
Hardiman’s opinion holds that non-violent criminals have an 
absolute, inviolable right to keep guns in their homes for self-
defense, Heller seems to disagree.     
 The advantage of heightened scrutiny is that it allows 
us to think about how Congress (and, by corollary, we as a 
polity) can tackle real-world challenges within constitutional 
boundaries.  Such an inquiry necessarily requires us to think 
about the connection between means and ends, and therefore 
to debate the seriousness of the problems we face—including 
gun violence—and the permissible means of addressing them.  
While history is of course important, and in many cases will 
be dispositive, the tiers of scrutiny provide us with a useful 
analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of 
laws that burden Second Amendment rights—even those, like 
§ 922(g)(1), that disarm certain persons altogether.   
C. The Felon-in-Possession Ban Survives 
Intermediate Scrutiny  
 Applying intermediate scrutiny, we ask whether the 
                                                 
152 Ambro Op. Typescript at 15–18.   
153 554 U.S. at 635. 
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challenged law involves a government interest that is 
“significant,” “substantial,” or “important,” and then assess 
whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the 
asserted objective [was] reasonable, not perfect.”154  Section 
922(g)(1) easily clears those hurdles.     
 Courts have identified Congress’s objective in passing 
§ 922(g) as “keep[ing] guns out of the hands of presumptively 
risky people” and “suppressing armed violence.”155  As 
Congress explained when passing the 1968 modifications to 
the statute, “[T]he ease with which any person can acquire 
firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including 
criminals . . . ) is a significant factor in the prevalence of 
lawlessness and violent crime in the United States.”156 
 Our Court has also said that governments 
“undoubtedly [have] a significant, substantial and important 
interest in protecting [their] citizens’ safety.”157  As the 
Second Circuit stated shortly after the horrific shootings in 
Newtown, Connecticut, “[t]he regulation of firearms is a 
paramount issue of public safety, and recent events in this 
circuit are a sad reminder that firearms are dangerous in the 
                                                 
154 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.   
155 Yancey, 621 F.3d at 683–84 (citing S. Rep. No. 90–1501, 
at 22 (1968)). 
156 Pub. L. No. 90–351, § 901(a)(2), 82 Stat. 197, 225 
(1968).   
157 Drake, 724 F.3d at 437 (citing United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (punctuation modified). 
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wrong hands.”158   
 Having established that the government’s objective is a 
substantial one, we next ask if the challenged law is a 
“reasonable fit” to carry out the government’s purposes.  In 
making that assessment, the “State bears the burden of 
justifying its restrictions [and] it must affirmatively establish 
the reasonable fit we require.”159  Seeking to satisfy this 
burden, the government points to numerous studies that 
explore the link between past criminal conduct and future 
crime, including gun violence.160  The plaintiffs challenge the 
                                                 
158 Osterweil v. Bartlett, 706 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.) 
(O’Connor, J.), certifying question to the New York Court of 
Appeals, certified question answered, 999 N.E.2d 516 
(N.Y. 2013); see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. 
Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015) (“It is beyond cavil 
that both states have substantial, indeed compelling, 
governmental interests in public safety and crime 
prevention.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
159 Drake, 724 F.3d at 453 (quoting Bd. of Trs. of State 
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).   
160 See Gov’t Br. in Binderup at 28 (citing Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 6 
(2002); Mona A. Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial of 
Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed To Be at High Risk 
for Firearm Violence, 89 Am. J. of Pub. Health 88, 89 
(1999)).  The government also points out that the risk of 
recidivism is particularly high for sex offenders like Binderup 
irrespective of whether or not states categorize their crimes as 
felonies or as serious misdemeanors. 
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relevance of the government’s cited studies, asserting that 
while they may show a connection between past criminal 
conduct and gun violence, they do not show such a link with 
respect to criminals who share their characteristics and who 
committed offenses similar to theirs.161  Judges Ambro and 
Hardiman share this criticism.   
 Several courts have—correctly, in my view—refused 
to parse the government’s evidence as finely as the plaintiffs 
ask us to.162  The question is not whether someone exactly 
like the plaintiffs poses a threat to public safety.  The question 
is whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the 
asserted objective [is] reasonable, not perfect.”163  The 
plaintiffs seem to want something more.     
                                                 
161 We might also consider the fact that, as we noted in 
Drake, legislatures generally crafted the regulatory schemes 
governing firearms before Heller concluded that the Second 
Amendment protected an individual right to bear arms.  
Consequently, the statistical evidence of “fit” may be lacking 
in certain instances because the drafters of the regulations did 
not realize they would need to compile it.  See Drake, 
724 F.3d at 437–38. 
162 See, e.g., Yancey, 621 F.3d at 685 (“[M]ost felons are 
nonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his 
record is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and 
violent gun use.” (citing United States v. Lane, 252 F.3d 905, 
906 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
163 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98; see also Drake, 724 F.3d at 
436 (same).   
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 Assessing the strength of the government’s evidence as 
assiduously as the plaintiffs demand would also raise 
separation of powers concerns, at least in the context of 
intermediate scrutiny.  We generally say that “[i]t is the 
legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and 
make policy judgments.”164  Our Court has cautioned that 
“conflicting empirical evidence . . . does not suggest, let alone 
compel, a conclusion that the ‘fit’ between [a challenged 
firearm regulation] and public safety is not ‘reasonable.’”165  
Other courts have said that Congress may regulate firearms 
on the basis of “correlational evidence” that does not 
necessarily “prove a causal link” between the conduct at issue 
and a particular provision of § 922(g).166  In the words of the 
D.C. Circuit, “the legislature is ‘far better equipped than the 
judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy judgments (within 
constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying 
firearms and the manner to combat those risks.”167  Judge 
Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit has been even more direct:  
“This is serious business.  We do not wish to be even 
minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of 
mayhem because in the peace of our judicial chambers we 
                                                 
164 Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 99 
(2d Cir. 2012). 
165 Drake, 724 F.3d at 439.    
166 United States v. Carter, 750 F.3d 462, 469 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 273 (2014). 
167 Schrader, 704 F.3d at 990 (quoting Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 
at 97).   
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miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.”168 
 Against this backdrop, I conclude that the 
government’s evidence adequately establishes a connection 
between past criminal conduct and future gun violence.  I also 
conclude that Congress’s decision to disarm felons and those 
who commit misdemeanors punishable by more than two 
years in prison is reasonably tailored to preventing such 
violence.  
                                                 
168 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 
(4th Cir. 2011).  I do not take Judge Wilkinson’s admonition 
to imply that judges are incapable of making decisions about 
whether particular persons are dangerous.  Every day judges 
decide whether to grant bail, impose prison time, or revoke a 
period of supervised release—and all of these determinations 
touch on dangerousness.  The key point is that, in these 
contexts, there are mechanisms in place for informing judicial 
discretion.  In sentencing, revocation, and bail hearings, for 
example, judges have the benefit of presentence and pretrial 
services reports, input from trained probation and pretrial 
services professionals, and recommendations from 
prosecutors. 
By contrast, there are no tools readily at-hand for deciding 
whether an individual person should have access to a firearm 
despite a past criminal conviction.  See also infra at pages 
66−69 (discussing previous cases that have recognized the 
inherent difficulties in making such determinations). 
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D. Tailoring § 922(g)(1) Too Narrowly Is 
Problematic   
 The foregoing analysis, of course, speaks to the issue 
of tailoring with respect to the connection between the risk of 
gun violence and the universe of offenses that trigger 
§ 922(g)(1) (i.e., felonies and misdemeanors punishable by 
more than two years in prison).  The plaintiffs believe that the 
statute must be tailored more narrowly still—indeed, so 
narrowly that it takes account of their individual 
characteristics.   
 And here we come to the difficult conceptual issue in 
this case:  is this sort of as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) 
even permissible?  This issue has divided the Courts of 
Appeals, caused endless trouble for the government at oral 
argument, and has at times perplexed me as well.  But I 
ultimately conclude that the answer must be “no.”169  
 The notion of an as-applied challenge is familiar to us 
in the context of First Amendment law.  In such cases, the 
government enacts some kind of law limiting speech for 
either logistical reasons (such as time, place, and manner 
restrictions) or to promote its own conception of the public 
good (such as regulations governing campaign financing).  In 
                                                 
169 I offer here an alternative assessment of the problem of 
as-applied challenges in the context of intermediate scrutiny 
(i.e., at Marzzarella step-two).  Because I believe that felons 
and serious misdemeanants can be disarmed at Marzzarella 
step-one, I would hold as an initial matter that the plaintiffs 
have been disqualified from the exercise of their Second 
Amendment rights altogether. 
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such situations, it is entirely predictable that a certain number 
of citizens will raise the argument that the law makes little 
sense as applied to them.  These arguments typically sound in 
overbreadth.  The normal claim is that a person’s inclusion 
within the scope of the law has no meaningful connection to 
the government’s purported objective, leading to an 
impermissible infringement on that person’s free speech 
rights.  
 But Second Amendment limitations like the felon-in-
possession ban and the ban on mentally-ill persons possessing 
guns are different—and the reason they’re different is 
because, in this context, the government’s objective is neither 
logistical nor abstract.  It is, quite simply, to prevent armed 
mayhem and death.170  As a result, when we conduct a 
tailoring analysis in such a case, we must assess whether the 
challenged law is reasonably tailored to prevent future 
violence. 
                                                 
170 The Supreme Court’s decision in Vartelas v. Holder, 
132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012), reiterated these congressional 
purposes.  Vartelas addressed whether a provision of the 
immigration laws could be applied retroactively (that is, to 
conduct occurring before the law’s enactment).  The 
government tried to draw an analogy between the challenged 
statute and § 922(g).  The Court, rejecting that comparison, 
stated that the law at issue in Vartelas targeted “past 
misconduct,” id. at 1489, whereas “‘longstanding prohibitions 
on the possession of firearms by felons’ . . . target a present 
danger, i.e., the danger posed by felons who bear arms.”  Id. 
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626).   
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 And this is why as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) 
are so problematic.  Binderup and Suarez are, in effect, 
saying, “Trust us:  we are not the kind of people who will 
cause future gun violence.”  The problem is that it is 
practically impossible to make this kind of individualized 
prediction with any degree of confidence.  Mistakes—costly 
ones—are simply too likely. 
 That is not my judgment, but rather the judgment of 
Congress itself.  A separate provision of the federal gun laws, 
18 U.S.C. § 925(c), states that “[a] person who is prohibited 
from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms 
or ammunition may make application to the Attorney General 
for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws.”  The 
Attorney General may “grant such relief if it is established to 
his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, 
and the applicant’s record and reputation, are such that the 
applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to 
public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be 
contrary to the public interest.”171  If an application is denied, 
the applicant may petition a district court for relief.  As it 
turns out, this “relief provision has been rendered 
inoperative” by virtue of the fact that “Congress has 
repeatedly barred the Attorney General from using 
appropriated funds ‘to investigate or act upon [relief] 
applications.’”172   
 Congress defunded this provision in 1992.  In a 
                                                 
171 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). 
172 Logan, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74–75 (2002)).   
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Department of Justice appropriations statute, it provided that 
“none of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to 
investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal 
firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).”173  That 
embargo on funds has remained in place ever since.  And why 
did Congress effectively write § 925(c) out of the statute 
books?  Because it concluded that the task of granting 
individual applications for relief from § 922(g)(1) was too 
prone to error.  A 1992 Senate report stated that the Justice 
Department’s review of applications was “a very difficult and 
subjective task which could have devastating consequences 
for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made,”174 and 
noted that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms 
(“ATF”) spent “approximately 40 man-years . . . annually to 
investigate and act upon these investigations and 
applications.”175  Similarly, a later House report stated that 
“too many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were 
restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms,” 
and concluded that “[t]here is no reason to spend the 
Government[’s] time or taxpayer’s money to restore a 
convicted felon’s right to own a firearm.”176   
 In other words, Congress reviewed the evidence from 
its prior regime of what were, in effect, as-applied challenges 
                                                 
173 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government 
Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 
1729, 1732 (1992). 
174 S. Rep. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992). 
175 Id. at 20.   
176 H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995). 
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to § 922(g)(1) and concluded that such a system was 
unworkable.  This should have a profound impact on our 
tailoring analysis.  Under intermediate scrutiny, we ask 
whether there is a “reasonable” fit between the challenged 
regulation and the government’s objective.177  Here, Congress 
tried the plaintiffs’ way of doing things and concluded that it 
was too error-prone to support the government’s objective of 
preventing armed violence.178  There were too many 
mistakes—and, unlike in the First Amendment context, those 
mistakes were potentially fatal. 
 Notwithstanding Congress’s experience with § 925(c), 
the plaintiffs seem to believe that by shoehorning their 
complaints about § 922(g)(1)’s scope into the rubric of “as-
applied challenges,” they necessarily force us to assess their 
individual characteristics rather than rely on Congress’s 
categorical rule.  I disagree.  Even in the First Amendment 
context, where courts routinely assess as-applied challenges 
                                                 
177 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98.   
178 As one of our colleagues in the D.C. Circuit has put it, 
“the reality of gun violence means our constitutional analysis 
should incorporate deference to the legislature.”  Heller v. 
District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 
34−36 (2010)).  Deference in this context is even more 
appropriate when Congress has not simply made a policy 
judgment about preventing gun violence, but has actually 
experimented with a system of gun regulation and 
concluded—based on lived experience—that it was 
unworkable. 
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to speech-limiting laws, there are circumstances where such 
challenges must fail in the face of reasonable deference to 
legislative judgments. 
 The Supreme Court’s decision in United Public 
Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell179 is a perfect 
example.  The Supreme Court there confronted an as-applied 
challenge to the Hatch Act, which bans government 
employees from engaging in certain kinds of partisan political 
activity, including some forms of political speech.  
Congress’s goal in passing the Act was “to promote 
efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties.”180  
The challenger, a “skilled mechanic” at the United States 
Mint, argued that he was simply not the type of government 
employee whose conduct was likely to raise integrity 
concerns.181  Structurally, this argument is identical to the one 
the plaintiffs make here—i.e., that they are too far removed 
from the core group of people who pose the risk of harm that 
Congress sought to address by passing § 922(g)(1) for that 
law to be constitutional as applied to them.   
 The Supreme Court rejected that argument.  In its 
view, the Hatch Act survived constitutional scrutiny because 
the conduct it outlawed was “reasonably deemed by Congress 
to interfere with the efficiency of the public service.”182  The 
                                                 
179 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
180 Id. at 96–97 (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 373 
(1882)). 
181 Id. at 101.   
182 Id.  
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Court recognized that, given his role at the Mint, the 
challenger was situated somewhat differently than white-
collar employees who might be more inclined to take on 
management roles in political campaigns.  Even so, the Court 
did not think these distinctions were constitutionally 
dispositive.183  As the Court observed:  
Whatever differences there may be between 
administrative employees of the Government 
and industrial workers in its employ are 
differences in detail so far as the constitutional 
power under review is concerned.  Whether 
there are such differences and what weight to 
attach to them, are all matters of detail for 
Congress. . . .  
* * * 
When actions of civil servants in the judgment 
of Congress menace the integrity and the 
competency of the service, legislation to 
forestall such danger and adequate to maintain 
its usefulness is required.  The Hatch Act is the 
answer of Congress to this need.184 
 The logic of Mitchell applies with equal force to the 
present case.  Here, too, Congress has passed a law to respond 
to a public danger.  Here, too, individualized predictions are 
impossible with any degree of accuracy.  Here, too, a regime 
                                                 
183 Id. at 102.   
184 Id. at 102–03. 
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of person-by-person regulation would present grave problems 
of administrability.  But here, unlike in Mitchell, the potential 
harm is not only serious and widespread, but also deadly.   
 Mitchell instructs us that Congress has the power in 
such circumstances to impose a complete ban on the exercise 
of a constitutional right by a category of persons who, in its 
reasonable estimation, pose a threat to the public.  While 
courts must, of course, entertain constitutional challenges to 
statutes that infringe on constitutional rights, Mitchell makes 
it clear that there are some laws with respect to which as-
applied challenges will categorically fail.  I believe that 
§ 922(g)(1) is such a law.185 
 Moreover, insofar as the plaintiffs’ claims sound in 
overbreadth, it is worth emphasizing that the federal regime 
for regulating firearm possession by convicts has numerous 
safety valves that make any complaint about unfairness far 
less persuasive.   
 First, we should remember that § 922(g)(1) is a statute 
predicated on principles of federalism.  Rather than 
specifying a list of qualifying offenses, “[i]t looks to state 
                                                 
185 The First Circuit, too, has recognized that categorical 
rules are sometimes constitutionally permissible in the 
Second Amendment context.  See United States v. Booker, 
644 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Second Amendment 
permits categorical regulation of gun possession by classes of 
persons—e.g., felons and the mentally ill—rather than 
requiring that restrictions on the right be imposed only on an 
individualized, case-by-case basis.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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law” and imposes “restrictions on certain convicts based on 
decisions made by state legislatures and courts.”186  In this 
way, the federal statute leaves the judgment about which 
offenses should trigger disarmament to the discretion of state 
legislators who are, at least in theory, closer to the lived 
experience of their constituents.  To put it another way, 
Congress did not decide that the plaintiffs’ convictions would 
have the effect of preventing them from owning firearms; 
rather, their state legislatures did.   
 At this point, one might reasonably object that, by 
refusing to permit as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), we 
give legislatures far too much power to disarm citizens.  After 
all, what prevents a state from passing a law saying that 
jaywalking is punishable by five years in prison?  Or a 
speeding ticket?  Or littering?  “Surely,” one might think, 
“Congress cannot disarm people who commit those 
offenses?” 
 I understand and appreciate these concerns.  But 
institutional considerations lead me to conclude that Congress 
may permissibly use the existence of a prior criminal 
conviction as a trigger for collateral consequences under 
federal law.  This necessarily means that states have near total 
control over what offenses will trigger those federal 
consequences.  If the citizens of a particular state believe that 
a criminal offense is too minor to trigger disarmament, their 
remedy is to petition the state legislature to amend the law—
not to seek redress in the federal courts.  Indeed, there is 
evidence that state authorities are perfectly capable of 
assessing the consequences of § 922(g) and acting to counter 
                                                 
186 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1151 (Bea, J., concurring). 
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them if they feel that doing so is appropriate.187  The 
alternative, a regime of judges serving as a super-legislature 
to review the reasonableness of the criminal codes in all 
50 states, is inconsistent with the way we have regulated gun 
ownership for more than half a century.   
 To put it another way, § 922(g) reflects a 
congressional policy judgment that states should have a role 
in determining what kinds of misdemeanor offenses will 
trigger disarmament.  That is a question over which the states 
will predictably disagree.  The Supreme Court itself 
recognized as much in Logan v. United States.188  The 
petitioner there asserted that his conviction for violating 
§ 922(g)(1) was unlawful because, properly construed, that 
statute did not apply to state offenses—like his—that did not 
                                                 
187 See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s 
Shadow, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1411, 1463–64 & nn.187, 188 
(2005) (finding that expungement of domestic violence 
convictions increased following the enactment of 
§ 922(g)(9)); see also Logan, 552 U.S. at 33 (recounting that 
“Wisconsin no longer punishes misdemeanors by more than 
two years of imprisonment”). 
188 552 U.S. 23, 34–36 (2007). 
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trigger any loss of civil rights.189  The Supreme Court found 
that argument unpersuasive.  In the course of its analysis, it 
favorably cited McGrath v. United States,190 a Second Circuit 
opinion stating that “anomalies” in the application of the 
federal firearms laws are “inevitable” when those laws 
“depend on the differing laws and policies of the several 
states.”191  Logan also recognized that application of the 
federal firearm laws would be more uniform if “federal rather 
than state law define[d] a conviction for purposes of 
[§ 922].”192  Even so, Logan treated the issue of how to 
balance uniformity and state-by-state variation in this context 
as a policy question properly reserved to the legislative 
                                                 
189 See id. at 26.  The petitioner’s argument relied on 
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which provides that “[a]ny 
conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for 
which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights 
restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of 
this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration 
of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not 
ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 
190 60 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1995). 
191 Id. at 1009; see also Logan, 552 U.S. at 33–34 (quoting 
the same passage).   
192 552 U.S. at 35. 
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branch.193    
 Second, federal law lifts the felon-in-possession ban 
whenever a conviction “has been expunged, or set aside,” or 
is one “for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil 
rights restored.”194  This is a second way in which the statute 
devolves regulatory power to state authorities.  As a 
consequence, § 922(g) “in its normal application does not 
create a perpetual and unjustified disqualification” from the 
Second Amendment right.195  As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, any burden imposed by the provisions of § 922(g) 
“is lightened by these exceptions” in ways that can factor into 
                                                 
193 See id. (“We may assume, arguendo, that when Congress 
revised § 921(a)(20) in 1986 . . . it labored under the 
misapprehension that all offenders—misdemeanants as well 
as felons—forfeit civil rights, at least temporarily.  Even 
indulging the further assumption that courts may repair such a 
congressional oversight or mistake, we could hardly divine 
the revision the Legislature would favor.” (footnote omitted)). 
194 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); see also United States v. 
Leuschen, 395 F.3d 155, 159–60 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing 
the meaning of “civil rights” in our circuit). 
195 Skoien, 614 F.3d at 645 (discussing expungement as a 
way to lift the ban imposed by § 922(g)(9)); see also id. 
(“Some of the largest states make expungement available as 
of right to misdemeanants who have a clean record for a 
specified time.  California, for example, has such a program.” 
(citing Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4a)).   
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the relevant constitutional calculus.196   
 Third, there is the right to petition Congress itself.  
With respect to § 925(c), some members of Congress have 
announced their support for appropriating the funds necessary 
for the Justice Department to once again consider applications 
for relief from the felon-in-possession ban.197  Whether 
Congress will do so in light of its prior determination that 
such a regime is unworkable is an open question.   
 There is also the possibility of obtaining offense-
specific carve-outs from § 922(g)(1).  For example, another 
provision of the federal gun laws says that the term “crime 
punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” 
in § 922(g)(1) “does not include . . . any Federal or State 
offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade 
practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating 
to the regulation of business practices.”198  If the plaintiffs 
believe that the crimes of corrupting a minor and carrying a 
firearm without a license belong on that list, their efforts may 
be more fruitfully directed towards the national legislature 
                                                 
196 Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138. 
197 See Press Release, Rep. Ken Buck, Buck Fights for 
Second Chance at Second Amendment Rights (June 2, 2015), 
https://buck.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/ 
buck-fights-restore-second-amendment-rights (last visited 
Sept. 2, 2016). 
198 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A); see also United States v. 
Schultz, 586 F.3d 526, 529–31 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering 
the proper application of this statutory carve-out). 
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instead of the courts.   
 Accordingly, I believe that § 922(g)(1) is a reasonable 
fit to carry out the government’s purpose of reducing armed 
violence.  Congress has made a reasoned judgment that 
persons who commit felonies and misdemeanors punishable 
by more than two years in prison are likelier to commit future 
gun violence than law-abiding citizens.  That judgment is 
informed by Congress’s experience with § 925(c), which it 
concluded was unworkable and dangerous because, in its 
view, that law did not provide a way for the government to 
make accurate judgments about the safety of re-arming 
particular people.   
 I would therefore uphold § 922(g)(1) under 
intermediate scrutiny, both as applied to these plaintiffs and 
as applied to future plaintiffs who might bring similar 
challenges. 
IV. The Problems with As-Applied Challenges to 
§ 922(g)(1) Are Insurmountable   
 Finally, it is important to step back and take stock of 
what the plaintiffs are actually asking us to do, which is to 
create an entirely new judicial process for resolving as-
applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).  Such an approach is both 
doctrinally unnecessary and administratively unworkable.   
 The current rule for determining whether § 922(g)(1) 
applies is about as straightforward as it gets:  “the fact of a 
felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the 
conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability 
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by some affirmative action.”199  The advantage of this scheme 
is its simplicity.  The alternative, “a free floating prohibition,” 
would be “very hard to administer.”200  Indeed, it would 
create a never-ending stream of “serious problems of 
administration, consistency and fair warning.”201   
 This becomes apparent once we consider how a regime 
of as-applied challenges would function in the real world.  
We previously examined this issue in Pontarelli v. United 
States Department of the Treasury.202  That case arose from 
Congress’s previously discussed decision in 1992 to defund 
§ 925(c).  In the early 2000s, plaintiffs began filing suits in 
federal court alleging that, by refusing to process their 
applications due to lack of funding, the Justice Department 
had effectively denied those applications.  Because § 925(c) 
provides for judicial review of such denials, these litigants 
asserted that they could ask federal district courts to “review” 
their applications in the first instance.   
 Pontarelli rejected that argument.  Sitting en banc, we 
concluded that Congress’s denial of funds to process § 925(c) 
applications stripped the federal district courts of jurisdiction 
to review the Justice Department’s refusal to act on those 
                                                 
199 Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) 
(considering a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1202, the predecessor 
to the current § 922). 
200 United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 
(1st Cir. 2012). 
201 Torres-Rosario, 658 F.3d at 113.   
202 285 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
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applications.  We also expressed skepticism that courts were 
capable of making individualized determinations about 
whether any particular felon should have his or her firearm 
rights restored.  We stated that “[d]istrict courts’ institutional 
limitations suggest that Congress could not have intended for 
the appropriations ban to transfer to them the primary 
responsibility for determining whether to restore felons’ 
firearm privileges.”203  Such a task required “interviewing a 
wide array of people, including the felon, his family, his 
friends, the persons whom he lists as character references, 
members of the community where he lives, his current and 
former employers, his coworkers, and his former parole 
officers,” and, unlike a federal agency, “courts possess neither 
the resources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the 
expertise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns 
without threatening the public’s safety.”204 
 The Supreme Court later unanimously vindicated 
Pontarelli in United States v. Bean.205  The Court there 
explained that “[i]naction by ATF does not amount to a 
‘denial’ within the meaning of § 925(c),” and “an actual 
decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for 
judicial review.”206  It further noted that “[w]hether an 
applicant is ‘likely to act in a manner dangerous to public 
safety’ presupposes an inquiry into that applicant’s 
background—a function best performed by the Executive, 
                                                 
203 Id. at 230–31.   
204 Id. at 231.   
205 537 U.S. 71 (2002). 
206 Id. at 75–76. 
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which, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for 
conducting a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.”207  The 
Court summarized its view by stating that § 925(c) requires 
an “inherently policy-based decision best left in the hands of 
an agency.”208 
 Pontarelli and Bean recognized the many pitfalls 
inherent in a regime of as-applied challenges.  We should 
embrace the wisdom of those opinions now.209 
 Indeed, the great advantage of § 922(g)(1) is that its 
application turns on a prior adjudication.  There is a real risk 
that by instead peering into the seriousness of a plaintiff’s 
prior conviction, we are inviting what are, in effect, collateral 
attacks on long-closed proceedings.  The Tenth Circuit 
recognized as much in United States v. Reese.210  That case 
involved a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it 
unlawful to possess firearms while subject to a domestic 
protection order.  The defendant argued that his prosecution 
for violating § 922(g)(8) was improper due to alleged 
infirmities in the underlying state court proceeding.  The 
Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the 
                                                 
207 Id. at 77. 
208 Id. 
209 I recognize, of course, that Heller changed the 
constitutional landscape.  But again:  Heller held that the 
Second Amendment protects the “right of law-abiding, 
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.”  554 U.S. at 635.    
210 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010). 
72 
 
overwhelming weight of federal case law precludes a 
defendant in a § 922(g)(8) prosecution from mounting a 
collateral attack on the merits of the underlying state 
protective order.”211  As-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) 
invite the same kinds of collateral attacks that Reese firmly 
rejected.212     
 My colleagues’ approaches are also vulnerable on 
another front.  Their suggested criteria for assessing as-
applied challenges might be feasible if every challenger, like 
the plaintiffs here, filed a declaratory judgment action.  But at 
this point it is important to reiterate that § 922(g)(1) is a 
provision of criminal law.  This raises its own set of 
constitutional difficulties.   
                                                 
211 Id. at 804; see also id. at 805 (“[A]ny such challenges 
could and should have been raised by Reese in the Hawaii 
Family Court.”). 
212 We ourselves recently reiterated that, as a general rule, 
collateral attacks on past state convictions are disfavored in 
our federal system.  In United States v. Napolitan, --- F.3d ---, 
2016 WL 3902164 (3d Cir. July 19, 2016), we concluded that 
a defendant could not challenge the reasonableness of his 
federal sentence on the ground that it was to run 
consecutively to a state sentence that the defendant claimed 
was unconstitutional.  In our view, permitting such an attack 
“would be a cumbersome imposition on federal sentencing 
and a clear repudiation of the finality typically afforded to 
state court judgments.”  Id. at *4.  Asking district courts to 
litigate the seriousness of prior crimes giving rise to 
disarmament under § 922(g)(1) raises similar concerns.   
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 First, our decision today places an extraordinary 
administrative burden on district courts handling criminal 
prosecutions under § 922(g)(1).  Once as-applied challenges 
start to work their way through our courts, there will be an 
increasingly large body of “re-armament orders” that restore 
individuals’ firearm rights.  As a consequence, there will be 
more and more people who believe that they can rely on a 
particular judicial decision to claim that they, too, are entitled 
to possess a firearm.  District court judges will find 
themselves in an ever-thickening morass of as-applied 
precedent, trying to make fine-grained distinctions about 
whether individual felon-in-possession prosecutions can 
proceed.  Given that my colleagues leave the door open to as-
applied challenges even with respect to persons who have 
committed felonies, we can expect these challenges to begin 
working their way through our Circuit almost immediately.213 
 Still worse, my colleagues’ approaches appear to be on 
a collision course with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, which prohibits the government from “taking 
away someone’s life, liberty, or property under a criminal law 
so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the 
conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary 
enforcement.”214  It seems to me that, under a regime of as-
                                                 
213 See, e.g., Woolsey, 759 F.3d at 907 (noting defendant 
moved to dismiss indictment on Second Amendment 
grounds); Moore, 666 F.3d at 315 (same); Barton, 633 F.3d 
at 169 (same); Vongxay, 594 F.3d at 1114 (same); see also 
United States v. Hauck, 532 F. App’x 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(not precedential) (same). 
214 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) 
(citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–358 (1983)).   
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applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), compliance with principles 
of due process will quickly prove impossible.   
 Keep in mind that both Judge Ambro and Judge 
Hardiman are open to the possibility that a person convicted 
of a crime might, over time, be able to present evidence of 
rehabilitation sufficient to mount a successful as-applied 
challenge to the felon-in-possession ban.215  But if time-from-
conviction is really one of the relevant criteria, there is no 
clear reason why a person subject to § 922(g)(1) could not 
bring seriatim challenges in the hope that, at some point, his 
or her conviction would be too far in the past to support the 
statute’s application.  Perhaps in future cases we could try to 
jerry-rig some kind of doctrinal framework to address this 
situation (e.g., multiple challenges in a single year are 
disfavored; one challenge every five years is permissible), but 
we would be doing so on the basis of nothing more than our 
own judicial intuitions.   
 Imagine, for example, that three people are prosecuted 
for committing a non-violent felony.  One was convicted 
1 year ago, one 15 years ago, and one 30 years ago.  All three 
are caught by police officers at a shooting rage with guns-in-
                                                 
215 See Hardiman Op. Transcript at 35 n.15 (“We have not 
been presented with historical evidence one way or another 
whether [the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation] 
might be a route to restoration of the right to keep and bear 
arms in at least some cases, so we leave for another day the 
determination whether that turns out to be the case.”); Ambro 
Op. Typescript at 36–37 n.7 (“[U]nder the right 
circumstances the passage of time since a conviction can be a 
relevant consideration in assessing recidivism risks.”). 
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hand, thereby violating § 922(g)(1).  Are the ensuing 
indictments constitutional, or are the convictions too far in the 
past?  Under the approach adopted by my colleagues, I 
simply have no idea.  Neither will future defendants, to whom 
the Fifth Amendment guarantees some clarity as to whether 
their conduct is, or is not, unlawful. 
 In response to this evident quagmire, one might 
propose a series of bright-line rules for determining when 
application of § 922(g)(1) is constitutional.  Unfortunately, 
my colleagues do not offer such rules.  Under their more 
holistic standards, the constitutionality of the felon-in-
possession statute in any particular case may depend on the 
judge’s views about the offense and offender.  As a result, 
defendants may not have fair notice of when and against 
whom the statute will be—or constitutionally can be—
enforced.   
 The federal judiciary’s recent experience with the 
Armed Career Criminal Act makes it plain that our new 
regime of as-applied challenges may be heading towards a 
doctrinal dead-end.  The Act increases the penalties on 
violations of § 922(g) whenever a defendant has three or 
more earlier convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a 
“violent felony.”216  The so-called “residual clause” of the 
Act defined a “violent felony,” in part, as a crime that 
“involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”217  This clause bedeviled the 
Supreme Court for nearly a decade as it considered numerous 
                                                 
216 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).   
217 Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).   
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cases raising the question of whether a particular offense 
presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury to 
another.”  Finally, in the recent case of Johnson v. United 
States,218 the Supreme Court declared that the residual clause 
was void for vagueness.  In the Court’s view, the clause 
created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk 
posed by a crime”219 and generated too much “uncertainty 
about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a 
violent felony.”220 
 I take Johnson to stand for the proposition that the 
category of “violent felony” is simply too indefinite to use as 
a basis for determining who is and is not subject to criminal 
liability under § 922(g)(1).  Judge Hardiman, by contrast, 
would permit plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges on the 
ground that their previous crimes were not sufficiently violent 
to support disarmament.  This raises the question of how 
violent, exactly, a crime has to be for application of 
§ 922(g)(1) to be constitutional.  Citing Barton, Judge 
Hardiman focuses on offenses “closely related to violent 
crime,”221 but goes on to state that “‘[c]rimes of violence’ 
were commonly understood [in the early part of the 20th 
century] to include only those offenses ‘ordinarily committed 
                                                 
218 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). 
219 Id. at 2257. 
220 Id. at 2258.   
221 Hardiman Op. Typescript at 13 (quoting Barton, 633 
F.3d at 174). 
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with the aid of firearms.’”222  We and future litigants can only 
guess whether this definition, unbounded as it is by reference 
to the elements of an offense, extends to drug possession with 
intent to distribute, human trafficking, extortion, or RICO 
violations.  We need not wonder, however, whether it 
provides fair notice and comports with due process:  the 
Supreme Court made clear in Johnson it does not, and thus 
Judge Hardiman’s approach would lead inexorably to courts 
having to strike down § 922(g)(1) as void for vagueness.223 
 Unfortunately, Judge Ambro’s approach raises its own 
set of problems.  He would require district court judges to 
consider a variety of factors in order to assess a crime’s 
“seriousness,” including, among other things, (i) whether a 
crime is a misdemeanor or a felony,224 (ii) the sentence 
imposed,225 and (iii) whether there is a “cross-jurisdictional 
consensus regarding the seriousness” of the crime giving rise 
                                                 
222 Id. at 42 (material in second set of brackets added) 
(quoting Barton, 633 F.3d at 173).   
223 This is to say nothing of Judge Hardiman’s approach to 
assessing whether Binderup and Suarez are “responsible 
citizens.”  In answering that question, Judge Hardiman 
considers not only the plaintiffs’ recent avoidance of criminal 
conduct, but also personal traits like the fact that they both 
have “a job [and] a family.”  Id. at 46.  This approach seems 
to require an analysis so particularized as to be practically 
characterological, raising additional problems of fair warning 
and due process. 
224 Ambro Op. Typescript at 30–31. 
225 Id. at 31–32. 
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to the federal firearm disability.226  Judge Ambro leaves it to 
future cases to explain more fully how to weigh and balance 
these various factors.  Unfortunately, once district court 
judges start disagreeing about how to conduct this inquiry, it 
will only be a matter of time before void-for-vagueness 
challenges to § 922(g)(1) start to percolate throughout our 
courts.227   
 I see nothing in the Second Amendment that compels 
us to abandon the current system of administrable firearms 
regulation for such an uncertain future.     
V. Conclusion 
 It is easy to empathize with the plaintiffs in these 
cases.  Having committed misdemeanors far in the past, they 
fail to see how they can fairly be denied a right guaranteed to 
them by the Constitution.  Heller says that the “core” Second 
Amendment right is the “right of law-abiding, responsible 
citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”228  The 
                                                 
226 Id. at 32. 
227 Not to put too fine a point on it, but I disagree with Judge 
Ambro’s conclusions as to seriousness in this very case.  
While it may not have involved the threat of violence, 
Binderup’s relationship with a teenager in his employ 
involved power dynamics that were, at the very least, 
troubling.  And Suarez’s offense—carrying an unlicensed 
firearm—indicates a cavalier attitude towards gun safety 
regulations.  Neither offense strikes me as frivolous or “non-
serious.” 
228 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
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plaintiffs say that they are now “law-abiding, responsible 
citizens”—so why should they be unable to protect 
themselves and their families with a gun? 
 As understandable as that intuition may be, our 
emerging law of the Second Amendment does not permit this 
kind of as-applied challenge.  First, Heller establishes a clear 
rule:  statutes like § 922(g)(1) are “longstanding prohibitions” 
that are “presumptively lawful.”229  Interpreting that directive, 
our Court has said that Congress may permissibly disqualify 
certain people from asserting their Second Amendment rights 
on a categorical basis.230  As a matter of tradition and history, 
persons who commit felonies and misdemeanors punishable 
by more than two years in prison (which are felonies in all but 
name) fall into that category.  Second, even if we were to 
consider the plaintiffs’ challenges under the rubric of 
intermediate scrutiny, Congress has reasonably concluded 
that persons who commit crimes are also likelier to commit 
gun violence.  Because § 922(g)(1) is appropriately tailored to 
address that problem, the plaintiffs’ challenges must fail. 
 The plaintiffs’ suggestion that we should get into the 
business of issuing individualized exceptions to the felon-in-
possession ban is, in the final analysis, administratively 
unworkable and constitutionally suspect.  By affirming the 
plaintiffs’ challenges today, I fear my colleagues are sending 
our nascent law of the Second Amendment into a doctrinal 
Labyrinth from which it may not soon return. 
                                                 
229 Id. at 626–27 & n.26.   
230 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92.   
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 I therefore respectfully dissent.   
